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How Planning Process Impacts Bus Rapid Transit Outcomes: 




The ongoing debate within the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) community over the relative importance 
of 'appropriate' design standards, the 'right' institutional setup and 'political will' to the success of 
projects obscures the larger importance of the planning process.  Political leadership, institutions 
and design are important conditions that must be considered in the context of one another, but 
they are also conditions that will change and be influenced by the planning process. Drawing on 
case studies of the Janmarg BRT in Ahmedabad, and the Delhi BRT in India, I demonstrate the 
indirect and direct role of the planning process in influencing the outcome of BRT projects.  
 
My dissertation argues that planners too often treat the planning process as a one-dimensional 
sequence of steps in which design, institutions and leadership provide an unchanging framework 
in which planning proceeds.  Planners however, can assert more influence over outcomes by re-
framing the process as a three dimensional activity that considers not just the content and 
sequencing of the steps, but also requires decisions concerning approach (i.e. strategy and 
tactics) and timing (i.e. both moment of action and duration).  This broader three-dimensional 
understanding of the planning process can be used to reshape design, institutions and leadership.  
A well-designed planning process has the potential to overcome institutional and design 
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The subject of this dissertation emerged like most things of import - largely by happenstance. I 
originally became interested in the story of the Ahmedabad BRT system in 2011 when I was 
commissioned to undertake a background case study on sustainable transportation for the 2013 
Global Report on Human Settlements (Rizvi, 2013; UNHabitat, 2013). After several days on the 
Internet searching for recent global experience in urban transport I became captivated by this 
story. Though only months old, the BRT in Ahmedabad was highly popular with residents and had 
received considerable national and international attention, followed by multiple international 
awards. The promise of the BRT technology was also intriguing – offering a much needed, 
affordable and applicable option for growing urban centers in developing countries.  I wanted to 
learn more. 
 
My process of discovery led me to other BRT projects in India. In contrast to the Ahmedabad 
experience, these initiatives have faltered. Pune was the country’s initial foray with the technology, 
but has been widely dismissed as a failed and ‘incomplete’ system. It was not considered for 
analysis because the project scope is more reflective of road widening then BRT development.  
Delhi BRT on the other hand was a technologically advanced system (on parity with Ahmedabad) 
– but despite good intent the project faced implementation difficulties, has been widely lambasted 
in the press and faces a precarious future. Implemented over the same period, in the same 
country, Ahmedabad and Delhi BRTs experienced vastly different outcomes, with Ahmedabad 
receiving international acclaim, and Delhi widespread condemnation followed by court ordered 
closure. Ask those familiar with both systems, and most will tell you that the Ahmedabad BRT is a 
‘success’ and the Delhi BRT a ‘failure’. 
 
My initial intent in this dissertation was to understand the reasons for the different outcomes in 




experts tended to repeat common refrains – attributing success and failure of the schemes to the 
presence/lack of what I will call the ‘usual suspects’ – design, political will/leadership and strong 
institutions. 
 
As my investigation, and then fieldwork commenced, I became increasingly convinced that there 
existed a richer and more complex story. My years as a practitioner suggested that the labels 
assigned these schemes were simplistic and that while the ‘usual suspects’ played an important 
role, these common explanations were deterministic and did not give adequate consideration to 
the influence of effective planning processes on project outcomes. What I have found in my 
analysis is indeed more complex and nuanced, and clearly demonstrates that planners and 




Plans are nothing; planning is everything. 
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, former US President, 1890–1969 
 
 
What role does the planning process play in project outcomes? Can we improve ‘on-the-ground’ 
results through better planning, design and implementation of projects? Remarkably, these vital 
questions receive limited attention in current planning literature. This dissertation seeks to 
address these questions by examining the planning process in Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects 
in two Indian cities:  Delhi and Ahmedabad.   
 
To initiate this investigation, we start first with some explanation and background on the 
dissertation topic. This introductory chapter presents the origin and rationale of my interest in 
BRT planning processes in Delhi and Ahmedabad. It starts with background on the relatively new, 
and increasingly popular Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) technology. I then introduce the cases and 
overview their story. I explain how my interest in planning processes emerged from my initial 
enquiries into the Delhi and Ahmedabad experiences. The chapter then turns to the substance of 
my dissertation – the planning process. For clarity, I define what I mean when I refer to planning 
process – including how it is different from ‘implementation process’ – and demonstrate the 
importance and lack of information about this topic. The chapter concludes by outlining the 




Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) has been heavily promoted as a low cost panacea to problems of urban 
mobility (Hesse, 2010; Kubala & Barton, 2003; Wright, 2010). BRT holds great promise and has 
been widely adopted, with rapid uptake in developing cities in particular (Currie, 2005; Hensher, 
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2007; Hensher & Golob, 2008; Hidalgo & Gutierrez, 2013; Levinson et al., 2002; Wirasinghe et al., 
2013). This is not surprising, as BRT technology has characteristics that are especially attractive 
to cities in the developing world. It’s low capital costs makes it a more affordable alternative than 
rail, that is also flexible, and quicker to implement (Kishore, 2009). This allows planners in 
developing cities to provide more service, and respond faster, to what are often urgent problems. 
BRT also offers a more comprehensive solution to congestion relief in crowded city centers 
because it separates modes and readily incorporates non-motorized transport (NMT) (Fouracre & 
Dunkerley, 2003; Hidalgo & Graftieaux, 2008; Polzin & Baltes, 2002). Institutions in developing 
cities tend to be ‘young’ (relative to their developed city counterparts), and generally more 
amenable to rail alternatives such as BRT, having not ‘locked in’ to prior rail investment (Finn et 
al., 2011). Non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other international agencies such as the 
World Bank have also played an instrumental role in promoting BRTs application across the 
developing world (Matsumoto, 2007). This is fueled by peer example and exchange, with efforts 
led by Latin America which boasts numerous successful BRT projects in Curitiba, Quito, Bogota 
and Mexico and elsewhere (Dario Hidalgo, January 3, 2014, Email communication with author). 
 
Figure 1.1 depicts the rapid global growth of BRT, showing the exponential increase in the 
number of BRT systems in recent decades. It can be seen that much of this growth has been 
concentrated in developing cities. India has followed this trend, enthusiastically adopting BRT 
systems in many urban centers. Today there are eight operational BRT systems in India, six 
systems under construction, and a further five in preparation (H.M. Shivanand Swamy & 






Figure 1.1.  Global expansion of BRT.  Source: Image from Dario Hidalgo using BRTdata.org. 
 
1.2 Introduction to Cases 
 
 
In this dissertation I explore the planning process of BRT systems in two Indian cities – Delhi and 
Ahmedabad (refer to figure 1.2).  I examine the entire process from initial concept and planning, 
to design, through to construction and operationalization. Delhi and Ahmedabad represent 
interesting case studies for a number of reasons. Firstly, the cities were amongst the first in the 
country to adopt BRT technology1. Delhi was launched in 2008 and Ahmedabad in 2009.   
Secondly, it is timely to extract lessons from these cases. Each system now offers more than 4 
years of operational experience. Yet they remain relatively understudied, despite their potential to 
yield useful lessons for India’s rapidly expanding portfolio of BRT projects and beyond. But 
arguably, the most compelling reason for close examination of these cases relates to their 
                                                        
1 Officially Pune was the first BRT system to be implemented in India, followed by Delhi and Ahmedabad.  
Pune is not considered in this analysis because its service standards are significantly different and not 




outcomes. Implemented over the same period, in the same country, project outcomes in the two 
cities were vastly different. 
 
 
Figure 1.2.  Case study cities - Ahmedabad and Delh i. 
 
The Delhi BRT project was over ten years in the making. Despite significant initial political support 
and thoughtful and inclusive design as well as clearly assigned project responsibilities, the Delhi 
BRT has faced many operational challenges and has not been extended beyond its initial 5.8km 
pilot length. It has been widely lambasted in the press as an abject failure, with public interest 
litigation leading to a court-ordered shutdown of the system in 2012 (Aaron, 2008; TH, 2008b).  
Though the Delhi BRT ultimately prevailed in court and the system was re-opened in September 
of 2012, it continues to face public relations obstacles (Hidalgo & Pai, 2012a, 2012b). Today the 
future of the Delhi BRT is precarious, with discussions concerning it’s fate entering current 
election discourse (Mathur, 2013). 
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In contrast the ‘Janmarg’ BRT in Ahmedabad, has been successful in overcoming initial hiccups 
and is now internationally lauded as a success story, receiving multiple national and international 
awards2. Implemented much faster than Delhi, it also benefited from a careful design, clearly 
assigned responsibilities, and strong political will. Today the system is well-received by city 
residents, extending over 70 km and approaching cost recovery of operating expenses (CEPT, 
2013b). 
 
What explains the difference in real and perceived outcomes of these two schemes? This is the 
question that piqued my interest and prompted my initial investigation of Ahmedabad and Delhi.   
Typically, success of BRT systems across the globe has been attributed to a wide variety of 
factors. Broadly these can be bundled into three broad categories – political will and/or leadership, 
institutions and design3. These ‘usual suspects’ are assigned responsibility for the success and 
failure of a wide range of transport projects by academics and practitioners alike (Al-Dubikhi & 
Mees, 2010; Golotta & Hensher, 2008; Goodman et al., 2005; HIdalgo & Carrigan, 2010; Hidalgo 
& Graftieaux, 2008; KittelsonandAssociates & Consultants, 2007; Mark A Miller & Buckley, 2000; 
Mark A. Miller & Buckley, 2001; Munoz & Hidalgo, 2013; Wright, 2005; Wright & Hook, 2007) 
 
At first glance, the ‘usual suspects’ do offer a simple explanation for the apparent differences in 
outcomes between my two selected cases. Delhi has faced considerable criticism related to 
design issues, and struggled due to institutional complexity and inconsistent political support. In 
contrast, Ahmedabad benefited from strong leadership and political commitment. Design 
problems arose in the course of implementation, but committed leadership combined with aligned, 
well-coordinated institutions were able to overcome missteps and contribute to successful 
outcomes.    
                                                        
2 A non-exhaustive list of awards includes being named a Lighthouse Project Momentum of Change 
(UNFCCC); 2011 Sustainable Urban Transport Award (ITDP, New York); 2010 Outstanding Innovation in 
Public Transport (ITF, Germany); 2010 Daring Ambition Award (UITP Dubai), 2010 Best New Innovation 
Award (JnNURM, India); 2010 PTX@ Knowledge and Research Award for BRTS Network Planning (UITP); 
and the 2009 Best Mass Transit System, India. 
 
3 In this context, ‘design’ refers to both financial and technical design aspects. 
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My initial approach to this research was thus to focus on capturing the details of the institutional 
arrangements, financial and technical design features, and political support and structure, that 
were associated with Delhi and Ahmedabad. The intent was to contribute to the useful and 
growing body of practical literature that synthesizes BRT experiences, extracting lessons for 
future application in different locations and contexts (Ardila-Gomez, 2004; GAO, 2012; Hidalgo & 
Carrrigan, 2010; Mark A. Miller & Buckley, 2001; Munoz & Hidalgo, 2013).   But as my 
investigation proceeded, and then fieldwork commenced, it became clear that the ‘usual suspect’ 
storyline was oversimplified and incomplete. Like most projects, the processes in these two cities 
were complex, locally specific and involved many actions, actors and influences. The ‘usual 
suspects’ explanation was too deterministic, and did not give adequate consideration to the 
powerful role which ‘good’ planners and effective planning processes can play in influencing 
project outcomes. The cases thus became an opportunity to not only capture lessons from 
practice of BRT in India, but to also re-examine the theoretical framing and understanding of the 
planning process with possible implications beyond BRT, and outside India. 
 
1.3 Planning process 
 
 
The ‘planning process’ has received considerable attention in the planning literature but the term 
itself is rarely defined. In the literature review I discuss the lack of a suitable definition (refer 
chapter 2). For the purposes of this dissertation I have chosen to define the ‘planning process’ as 
all activities, actions and decisions involved in project (program or policy) development from initial 
concept through to operationalization. It includes the setting of objectives, strategies, 
establishment of institutions and policies, as well as design and implementation. It thus 
incorporates the implementation process, but extends before and after to include actions and 
decisions taken during concept and planning phases as well as post construction during project 
launch and operation.   
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The distinction between implementation process and planning process is both important and 
easily confused and thus warrants some discussion. Implementation is often a critical component 
of the planning process because it is the phase where plans are converted to reality and conflicts 
are likely to emerge. But while it may have a dominant influence and demand the most attention, 
the implementation process represents only a portion of the planning process. In the early stage 
of my research I considered the two terms – planning process and implementation process – 
largely interchangeable. After field research however I became convinced of the power of 
decisions and actions taken both upstream and downstream of the implementation phase (e.g. 
during concept, planning, and operationalization phases) on project outcomes. For example, 
initiatives to update and educate the public on project dimensions during concept development 
can yield political dividends that can be useful in easing implementation difficulties and improve 
overall project outcomes. Attention to implementation actions alone is therefore inadequate, and 
underestimates the extent of influence that planning practice can have on project outcomes. For 
this reason I am considering the entire planning process – and not just implementation – as the 
subject of my investigation. 
 
Despite the shortage of definitional offerings for the planning process, the planning literature does 
espouse a number of alternative ‘models’ of planning, or styles of planning processes (Banister, 
2002; Dimitriou, 1990, 2011; Meyer & Miller, 1984).  “Instrumental rationality has been the 
traditional espoused paradigm of transportation planning” (Willson, 2003, p. 354). Brooks (2002) 
adds:  “Ask a professional planner to describe how he or she carries out the planning process, 
and the odds are good that you will hear some version of the rational model”. For the most part, 
the planning process for transport projects has tended to adopt the rational comprehensive model 
– following a ‘rational’ series of events that follows a set sequence commencing with problem 
analysis, proceeding to identification and evaluation of alternatives, selection of preferred 
alternative, design, implementation and feedback (Banfield, 1959; Meyer & Miller, 1984). Over the 
last several decades the rational model has been widely discredited and planning theorists have 
advocated for the adoption of alternative approaches – variants range from communicative action 
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(Healey, 1996; Innes, 1995), to disjointed incrementalism (Harper & Stein, 2006) to mixed 
scanning (Etzioni, 1967) approaches.   
 
But uptake of these normative models within the transportation sector has been limited 
(Schiefelbusch, 2010). Though they articulate ideal approaches to planning, they do little to define 
the actions that are required by planning practitioners to implement them, and largely ignore on-
the-ground realities. Accepting that a single universal theory of practice is implausible 
(Mandelbaum, 1979; Meyer & Miller, 1984), there is also little guidance or understanding of which 
approaches will yield better outcomes in different contexts. Specifically, there is very little advice 
on how to select processes to suit different contexts. Planning theory gives little definitive 
guidance on either how, or when, to implement different planning processes. 
 
Another relevant strand of planning theory looks at influences on the planning process. This area 
of research evaluates the relative importance of political versus technical concerns to planning 
decisions (Altshuler, 1965; Beckman, 1964; Davidoff, 1965; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Friedmann, 1998; 
Krumholz, 1982). There is general consensus that the role of the planner is implicitly political and 
that technical feasibility is generally subordinate to issues of political viability in the planning 
process. But, as explained by Brooks (2002,16): 
 
(While) the political nature of planning is widely recognized today, many planners 
continue to display ambivalence on this matter. Acceptance is one thing; acting upon that 
acceptance is quite another. Too often planners are ill-prepared to act upon the political 
content of their work; they may lack understanding of the political system (ignorance), or 
lack of knowledge of the techniques needed to function effectively within it (inadequate 
education), or feel overwhelmed by political forces (despair), or even reject the notion 
that they – in their particular roles – are subject to the play of political power (denial).   
 
There is a disconnect between theory and practice.  While planning theory has highlighted the 
importance of political issues in the planning process, there is little guidance on how to navigate 
the additional complexity that politics introduces (Brooks, 2002). As a result, this body of theory 
performs no better than that related to planning models. Though there is theoretical agreement on 
relative influences on the planning process, and information about different models of planning, 
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there remains limited guidance for the practitioner on how to either apply or choose between 
alternative approaches or address important practical questions. For example, what are the 
indicative steps or project activities that comprise alternative models of planning?  How do you 
implement alternative models in practice? How do you incorporate and manage political concerns 
in the planning process? And what are the consequences of choosing between different 
approaches to planning? Finally, how do these choices concerning planning processes ultimately 
impact project outcomes?  
 
My research focuses on addressing the last of these questions, drawing on practical experience 
offered by case studies of the planning process for two BRT systems in India. I will examine the 
choices made in Delhi and Ahmedabad to demonstrate how the planning process acts to 
influence outcomes. My decision to pursue detailed case study research necessarily limits my 
dataset to two cases. With this limited reference point my research cannot provide definitive 
guidance on all planning processes and contexts. Instead my aim is to simply demonstrate 
through illustration the role played by the planning process in dictating outcomes, and in the 
process hope to broaden the current debate in the BRT community from a focus on the 
‘appropriate’ design standards, the ‘right’ institutional setup and ‘political will’ to a discussion 
about how to craft the planning process itself to maximize project effectiveness. These usual 
suspects remain important conditions that must be considered in the context of one another 
during project development.  However they are also conditions that will change and be influenced 
by the planning process. Much like a poker player, a planner must deal with the cards he is dealt 
– within the context of project development; cards take the form of a predetermined mix of 
political, institutional and design circumstances. Though these ‘cards’ and their specific mix 
contribute to a winning hand, outcomes of the round are largely determined by the way the hand 
is played. For a good poker player and/or planner, most hands have the potential for success. 
 
The implications of this research are threefold. For practitioners, an improved understanding of 
the nature and influence of the planning process can lead to better decisions and actions, leading 
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to more successful projects. For theorists, a more nuanced and practical understanding of the 
role and nature of the planning process can lead to improvements in the quality and applicability 
of models, reducing the normative gap between theory and practice. For all planners, renewed 
attention on the role and importance of the planning process is empowering, and offers the 
profession a new and compelling way to influence outcomes.  
 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
 
 
This dissertation is organized in seven chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 examines the relevant literature. It describes recent empirical work on BRT systems as 
well as theoretical discourse on the planning process highlighting the lack of attention to this 
important topic and its documented influence on project outcomes. The chapter concludes by 
outlining the gaps in current understanding and the proposed contributions of my research. 
 
Chapter 3 sets the context of my dissertation with a preview of key findings. It posits a new model 
of project development and re-conceptualized framework for the planning process. The chapter 
then describes the research approach I employed to develop and analyze this framework.  
 
In Chapter 4 and 5 I present my two BRT case studies – Ahmedabad and Delhi respectively.  
These stand-alone chapters offer information on the context, design, institutions, politics, planning 
process, performance and operation of the two schemes.  
 
Chapter 6 draws on information presented in the case studies, comparing and contrasting the 
experiences of the BRT planning processes in Delhi and Ahmedabad to develop an 
understanding of the distinctly different situations and decisions made in the two cities and how 
this translated to different outcomes, both real and perceived. 
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Chapter 7 consolidates and verifies my research findings demonstrating that process does matter.  
I present evidence from an expert opinion survey that show that these findings may be 
transferable to other BRT contexts. Drawing on evidence from the cases I then elaborate on the 
direct and indirect mechanisms by which process influences outcomes, and return to the three 
dimensional framework laid out in chapter 3 to show how it can be used to design ‘better’ 
planning processes – one that gives the planner greater control over the project and yields 
stronger outcomes. I conclude by highlighting the implications of these findings for both theory 





2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
My failures and successes as a transport engineer and planner and my training, 
led me to read about planning theory and reluctantly conclude that there is no 
such thing. With a few exceptions, planners write to each other intellectual 
treatises and only a handful write about their experiences as a planner and try to 
abstract, theorize, and evaluate what really has taken place.   




My research draws on case studies of BRT projects in Delhi and Ahmedabad to demonstrate the 
importance of planning processes to project outcomes. To inform this investigation I draw on 
recent empirical work on BRT systems, as well as planning theory discourse on the subject of 
planning process. This chapter starts by providing some background on BRT technology, 
outlining global growth of BRT, and describing current implementation difficulties. It examines 
recent research on BRT success factors, highlighting the prominent role given to design, 
institutional and political issues, as well as the critical omission of the planning process from 
project development discourse. It then looks to planning literature for theoretical guidance on the 
planning process and explains how this dissertation contributes to current practical and 
theoretical debate. 
 
2.1  Bus Rapid Transit 
 
 
Bus Rapid Transit is a relatively new transportation technology that was first developed in its 
modern form in Curitiba, Brazil in 1974 (Hidalgo, 2012; Wirasinghe et al., 2013). It is best 
described as a transportation system that “looks like a light rail system but physically operates 
like a bus” (Jarzab et al., 2002, p. 32). Common features include dedicated running ways, 
distinctive attractively designed bus stops, clearly branded accessible vehicles, off-board fare 
collection, GPS-equipped buses and platforms, and regular all-day service (Levinson, 
Zimmerman, et al., 2003b).  However the nature and quality of these different characteristics vary 
greatly.  BRT should be distinguished from alternative bus terminology such as High Capacity 
Bus System (HCBS) or Bus with High Level of Service (BHLS) which are more generic terms for 
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a broad range of bus service standards (Finn et al., 2011; Wright, 2011).  The Transportation 
Research Board provides a formal definition of BRT as follows4:   
 
(A) flexible, rubber-tired rapid transit mode that combines stations, vehicles, services, 
running ways, and Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) elements to an integrated 
system with a strong positive identity that evokes a unique image.  BRT applications are 
designed to be appropriate to the market they serve and their physical surroundings and 
they can be incrementally implemented in a variety of environments.  In brief, BRT is an 
integrated system of facilities, services, and amenities that collectively improve the speed, 
reliability, and identity of bus transit (Levinson, Zimmerman, et al., 2003b, p. 1). 
 
 
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is growing in popularity around the world due to it’s “passenger and 
developer attractiveness, its high performance and quality, and its ability to be built quickly, 
incrementally, and economically” (Levinson et al., 2002, p. 1). Currently, approximately 168 BRT 
systems and bus corridors are operational worldwide serving almost 31 million passengers a day 
(BRTData, 2013). An equivalent number of systems are in planning and preparation phases, 
reflecting the significant level of current BRT activity globally (Wright, 2011). “ BRT is increasingly 
recognized as amongst the most effective solutions to providing transit services on a cost-
effective basis to urban areas, in both the developed and the developing world” (Wright, 2011, pp. 
421-423). A recent World Bank review of urban transport lending found that BRT had great 
potential as an instrument to achieve “modal split, environmental and poverty related objectives”, 
while also facilitating broader development of institutions and regulation in the urban public 
transport sector (Mitric, 2013, p. 32). Other advantages include its ability to be implemented 
rapidly and quickly, its adaptability to various urban and suburban environments, its service 
quality and capacity, its suitability as a feeder service for rail and its ability to be integrated into 
urban development and pedestrian friendly environments (Levinson et al., 2002).  
 
BRT technology is a particularly appealing option for developing countries. It is highly affordable:   
 
                                                        
4 This definition was developed by TRB under the TCRP A-23 project – an initiative that reviewed global 
experience with the aim of improving information on the role, features, design and implementation of BRT 
projects globally.  
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From the public transport customer’s perspective, a full network serving most major 
origins and destinations is fundamental to system usability.  A BRT system will likely 
permit a city to build a network four to 50 times more extensive than a rail-based system 
costing the same amount.  Thus, for most developing-nation applications, BRT is capable 




These lower costs also make cost overruns easier to absorb because percentage budget 
increases have much smaller absolute values (relative to high cost projects such as rail) 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). This is an important consideration in financially constrained economies. 
The degree of cost and risk is at least an order of magnitude less than metro (Wright, 2011). In 
addition, BRT has a relatively short planning and implementation timeline that conforms well to 
short political cycles. It is also a labor intensive, relatively low-tech technology that offers local 
employment opportunities in planning, implementation, and operation phases and the potential for 
local bus manufacturing. Unlike metro alternatives, the BRT can extend further into 
neighborhoods making it more accessible to feeder modes such as cycle rickshaw, three wheeled 
scooters, bicycles and pedestrians. Stations are at-grade and frequently spaced, reducing the 
need for stairs and walking distances (except where pedestrian overpasses are provided)(Kishore, 
2009). There have been some concerns about passenger capacities, but recent experience in 
China and Bogota demonstrate its possibilities with the Bogota system currently carrying a peak 
of 45,000 passengers per hour per direction (pphpd.) (Hidalgo et al., 2013).  The proposed Rio 
BRT, scheduled for completion before the 2014 Olympic games, is expected to exceed this with a 
projected demand of 56,000 pphpd. (Murray, 2013). 
 
For all of the reasons outlined above, BRT is a particularly attractive mass transportation option 
for India (M. Jain et al., 2007; Kishore, 2009) where public transport is in crisis (Madhav G 
Badami et al., 2004; Madhav G. Badami, 2005; Madhav G. Badami & Haider, 2007; Pucher et al., 
2005; Pucher et al., 2007; S. K. Singh, 2005)5.  Buses are a familiar technology, and the ability to 
segregate traffic patterns and integrate NMT infrastructure for the large proportion of people who 
do not have access to motor vehicles offers mobility, safety, air pollution and congestion benefits 
                                                        
5 A detailed discussion of the current state and problems of public transport in India is not provided in this 
dissertation, however can be found in the provided references. 
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for all (Madhav G. Badami & Haider, 2007; V. S. John, 2010; Kishore, 2009; Mohan & Tiwari, 
1999).    
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Growth of BRT systems in India.  Source: Data from Dario Hidalgo, EMBARQ. 
 
There has been a rapid uptake of BRT technology in India. Currently, there are 8 systems in 
operation in India (BRTData, 2013).  A further 11 systems are either under construction or in 
preparation in cities across India (Dario Hidalgo, January 3, 2014, Email communication with 
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author). Figure 2.1 depicts the current status of BRT systems in India.  The enthusiasm for BRT 
technology can be attributed to a mix of technical suitability and strong policy support.  The 2006 
National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) that was launched in April 2006 by the Ministry of Urban 
Development (MoUD) (GOI, 2006) heightened interest. This new transport policy represented a 
dramatic policy shift for the sector, advocating a move away from highway and road expansion 
investment towards the promotion of non-motorized transport and improvement of public 
transport services (Pucher et al., 2005; Pucher et al., 2007) (Agarwal & Zimmerman, 2008).  The 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM) funded the implementation of the 
NUTP (Baijal, 2011; Ponnaluri, 2011). This centrally financed program provided USD15 Billion 
equivalent over 6 years for a range of infrastructure improvements in key urban centers (Baijal, 
2011).  To be eligible for JnNURM funding, all transport projects in these centers had to comply 
with NUTP guidelines (GOI, 2005; Pai & Hidalgo, 2009; G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010):  
 
As a result cities transformed projects initially conceptualized as road infrastructure 
project into BRTS projects, shifting the focus from accommodating general traffic 
demands to improving the operational conditions for public transport and non-motorized 
transport.  NUTP was thus extremely successful in achieving its objectives of prioritizing 
public transport and non-motorized transport using financial incentives under JnNURM” 
(Pai & Hidalgo, 2009, p. 11) 
 
Despite its considerable promise and broad political and financial support, BRT systems have 
faced numerous obstacles in India. These difficulties mirror BRT experiences globally where 
numerous systems have become mired in controversy (e.g. TransSantiago, Transjakarta, Beijing, 
Delhi) (Hossain, 2006; Joewono et al., 2012; Lu & Wen, 2006; Matsumoto, 2007; Munoz et al., 
2009; Yunita, 2008). Though there are a broad variety of causes, most can be traced to a 
combination of design, institutional and political issues. In an international review of operational 
BRT systems Hidalgo and Guiterrez (2013) conclude that BRT  “systems in the developing world 
suffer problems resulting from poor planning, implementation and operation, due to financial, 
institutional and regulatory constraints” (Hidalgo & Gutierrez, 2013, p. 8). A detailed analysis of 
problems in planning, implementation and operation of 13 BRT systems in Latin America and 
Asia identified the following most commonly encountered flaws: rushed initial implementation 
 17
generating operational and user problems, issues concerning institutional and financial 
sustainability, and lack of integration with city’s public transport system and traffic. Public 
information and user education was especially critical to smooth launch. The review concluded 
that no project was perfectly executed, and that the majority of problems arose due to a variety of 
institutional, political and technical (including both design and financial) issues (Hidalgo & 
Carrrigan, 2010, p. 7). These findings echo those of the BRT Sourcebook for Policy Makers in 
Developing Countries, which provides guidance on BRT planning and implementation and 
outlines the following key barriers to BRT: political will, existing operators, institutional biases, 
lack of information, institutional capacity, technical capacity, financing and geographical/physical 
limitations (Wright, 2005). The literature is thus consistent in highlighting the importance of what 
can be broadly defined as design, institutional and political issues in planning and implementation 
of BRT. The experience also echoes that of many large-scale infrastructure projects in developing 
countries, where blame is attributed to these same ‘usual suspects’ (Gow & Morss, 1988; 
Thomas & Grindle, 1990). Key findings from the considerable public policy literature on 
implementation also identify these concerns (S. Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Dunsire, 1978; Pressman 
& Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979). In the next section I will outline the 
mechanisms through which each of these variables – design, institutions and politics - influence 
the outcomes of BRT projects. 
 
2.1.1  Design Issues 
 
The characteristics that define a BRT system play an important role in determining its acceptance, 
usage and ultimate success. For the purposes of this dissertation, design refers to both technical 
and financial aspects of the project, as both need to be crafted as part of the design process. 
Technical and financial parameters selected during the design process dictate service and 
performance standards, and play an integral role in project outcomes.   
 
In recent years, technical design issues have dominated debate in the BRT community. There 
has been considerable discussion by BRT practitioners concerning the importance of design 
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quality for successful BRT outcomes. The Institute for Transport and Development Policy (ITDP) 
in consortium with other international institutions6 has developed a BRT Standard that uses 
design characteristics as a proxy for performance and customer experience. BRT systems are 
ranked according to a tiered scoring system that classifies systems as ‘gold’, ‘silver’ or ‘bronze’.  
The purpose of this initiative was to establish a common understanding of ‘best practice’ in BRT 
and to also clarify the distinction between BRT technology and other lower level bus 
improvements (ITDP, 2013).     
 
Design issues - both technical and financial – are critical to the performance of BRT systems as 
well as their long-term sustainability. But design is one of the more straightforward tasks 
associated with BRT planning and implementation and there is considerable guidance available 
on options. The literature is replete with knowledge and experience of what has worked and what 
hasn’t with respect to financial and technical details, the content of which fills numerous BRT 
manuals (CFTE; Duduta et al., 2012; ITDP, 2013; Levinson, Zimmerman, Clinger, & Gast, 2003; 
Levinson et al., 2002; Levinson, Zimmerman, et al., 2003a; Levinson, Zimmerman, et al., 2003b; 
Wright, 2005; Wright & Hook, 2007). While it is clear that good technical and financial design is 
likely to streamline implementation, it does not always translate to successful outcomes (Thomas 
& Grindle, 1990). 
 
2.1.2 Institutional issues 
 
The role of institutional  ‘success factors’ for BRT system implementation are well documented.   
(Gow & Morss, 1988; Hossain, 2006; Lindau et al., 2010; Mark A. Miller & Buckley, 2001; Thynell 
et al., 2010).  In a review of 16 BRT systems in Latin American cities, institutional constraints 
were identified as a cause of implementation and operational difficulties in numerous systems 
(HIdalgo & Carrigan, 2010).   BRT technology is new to many countries and a lack of institutional 
capacity and knowledge regarding these systems can lead to incomplete analysis and drawn-out 
decision-making processes. This can be compounded by diluted institutional responsibilities and 
                                                        
6 Other actors include Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, ClimateWorks 
Foundation; The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) and the Rockefeller Foundation 
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weak coordination mechanisms. Because BRT systems typically engage both public and private 
partners as well as multiple agencies and stakeholders they are particularly vulnerable to 
institutional coordination problems. BRT initiatives also lack a natural advocate because benefits 
are dispersed.  In India, the situation is more problematic due to historically weak municipal 
structures and fragmented decision-making responsibility amongst multiple agencies (Hossain, 
2006).  Strong and well-coordinated institutions with adequate technical expertise are needed for 
BRT project development.  But in practice this has been difficult to achieve, and alone is 
insufficient for successful uptake and implementation of BRT systems.   
 
2.1.3  Political issues 
 
Political commitment, and strong individual leadership are deemed success factors for a wide 
range of large-scale infrastructure projects in developing countries (Gow and Morss 1998).  BRT 
systems are no exception and in many ways are especially susceptible because, as mentioned 
previously, the technology lacks a natural advocate. Unlike well-established rail and highway 
alternatives that are supported by large and powerful vested public and private interests, BRT 
impacts tend to be more localized and benefits dispersed while projects are necessarily intricate.  
Typically BRT initiatives have complex stakeholder arrangements and are promoted on principles 
of rationality and equity. They are less likely to produce a powerful or self-motivated interest 
group to navigate planning and action (Hossain, 2006). For this reason there is all the more need 
for a ‘catalyst for change…a political official, a non-governmental organization or simply a 
concerned citizen’ (Wright & Hook, 2007, p. 1) who initiates the project and then converts into an 
actionable project. Global experience with BRT provides compelling evidence for the importance 
of political will and leadership (Kumar et al., 2012; Lindau et al., 2010). Matsumoto (2007) 
concludes from BRT experience in Asia that "strong political will was…a common thread in the 
adoption of BRTs ” with leading political figures playing a role in introducing the concept, 
overcoming planning deadlocks, smoothing institutional processes and ensuring 
operationalization proceeded smoothly (Matsumoto, 2007). Lloyd Wright (2005) offers similar 
planning advice for BRT:  
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Political leadership is probably the single most important factor in realizing a successful 
BRT project. Without such leadership the project will not develop sufficient momentum to 
survive the inevitable challenges from opposition groups and special interests. Further, 
without leadership, it is significantly more difficult to galvanize public opinion towards 
supporting a new outlook on public transit (Wright, 2005, p. 8). 
 
The track record in India is consistent with this thesis. The fragmented and unstable political 
arena in the country demands strong political leadership and support to successfully navigate the 
often-intricate BRT projects (Hossain, 2006).  Based on India’s experience with BRT, Ponnaluri 
(2011) concludes: 
 
….that leadership and institutions play a crucial role in successfully initiating the multimodal 
projects.  Despite national expertise in conceptualizing, planning, designing and deploying 
the projects, the challenges in converting policies to reality, translating studies to field 
deployment, and obtaining institutional leadership and commitment demand attention 
(Ponnaluri, 2011, p. 274/275). 
 
Literature and practice both argue for the importance of design, institutions and political will to the 
success of BRT projects. But these variables have also become convenient ‘catch-all’ culprits for 
explaining success and failure of development programs. Thomas and Grindle (1990) articulate 
the situation as follows, 
 
All too often, implementation is thought to be a matter of carrying out that which has been 
decided upon, and successful implementation is viewed as a question of whether or not the 
implementing institutions is strong enough for the task. If implementation is unsuccessful, 
the usual remedy is to call for greater efforts to strengthen institutional capacity or to blame 
failure on lack of political wills, an explanation often propounded by external analysts and 
donors who see countries not carrying out reforms they consider desirable (Thomas & 
Grindle, 1990, p. 1164).   
 
Likewise, technical and financial design elements dictate service standards and cost recovery 
and thus are often equated to program success (Munoz & Hidalgo, 2013). But, in many instances 
these explanations are simplistic, often vague and generally incomplete. Planning and 
implementing programs is complex, locally specific and involves many actions, actors and 
influences. Under these conditions, ‘how’ the program is undertaken can be as important as ‘what’ 
the program comprises.   
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To date there has been relatively little BRT research directed specifically towards the planning 
process, though there is increasing evidence of its importance. One of the few documents to 
explicitly address this issue for BRT is the BRT Planning Guide (Wright & Hook, 2007). This 
reference book outlines “a step-by-step description of the BRT planning process” (Wright & Hook, 
2007, p. ii) that commences with project preparation, operational design, physical design, 
integration and business plan development; and concludes with implementation and evaluation. 
The authors recognize that this representation is idealized and that in practice, the steps may be 
iterative instead of sequential, with variations in process according to context. They concede that 
“there is significant interaction between the different stages (in the process), and many activities 
must be undertaken simultaneously…each topic should be addressed in an iterative manner. 
Different scenarios may be attempted until an optimum solution is reached” (Wright & Hook, 2007, 
pp. 29-30). Recent cross-country studies have also paid attention to the possibility of improving 
outcomes through planning practice (HIdalgo & Carrigan, 2010; Hidalgo & Carrrigan, 2010; 
Hidalgo et al.; Lindau et al., 2013). These studies offer checklists for improving the planning 
process of BRT schemes.  But while they are useful tools for BRT implementers they offer a one-
dimensional understanding of the planning process as a ‘series of steps’ and do not reflect other 
critical dimensions of the process – most notably timing and planning approach. Nor is there 
enough understanding of the value of different types of planning processes. Hidalgo and 
Carrrigan (2010) agree that: “further investigation of the advantages, disadvantages, and required 
processes…would be fruitful”  (Hidalgo & Carrrigan, 2010). 
 
To develop an improved understanding of ‘how’ projects are undertaken– i.e. the planning 
process  - and how the approach taken impacts outcomes, we now turn our attention to the 
planning literature. 




Process does matter. The way things are done impacts outcomes (Fainstein, 2005; Healey, 2003; 
Willson et al., 2003). An awareness of the influence of process gives rise to numerous additional 
considerations in the planning and implementation of projects. And yet there is limited formal 
understanding of the consequences of process decisions. Should a project be implemented 
slowly and incrementally, or should a comprehensive, instantaneous transformation be pursued?  
Which approach is going to yield better outcomes? In what contexts? And what is the impact of 
these choices on outcomes? The planning literature provides surprisingly little guidance on these 
important questions, thereby overlooking the powerful role that ‘good’ planners and effective 
planning processes can play in influencing project outcomes. 
 
To initiate this discussion it is useful to start by defining the planning process. Planning theory in 
general remains remarkably vague on this matter.  Urban transport planning theory also avoids a 
clear definition (Banister, 2002; Dimitriou, 2011; Meyer & Miller, 1984). John Friedmann 
articulates the issue well in his musings on planning theory: 
  
 What exactly do we talk about when we talk about planning?  We use words like ‘to plan’ 
‘the planner’, ‘the planning process’, but, quite apart from whether these definitions would 
be helpful in answering my question, these terms are actually confusing” (Friedmann, 
1998, p. 247).    
 
Some, like E. R. Alexander (2005a) would argue that there is no planning, or planning process – 
“just different kinds of planning with referents, e.g., urban planning, advocacy planning, 
transportation planning or environmental planning” (E. R. Alexander, 2005b, p. 91), presumably 
with multiple processes. The absence of a widely accepted definition of the planning process has 
meant that theorists and practitioners alike have tended to overlook this valuable planning tool, 
and its potential influence on project outcomes. Further, the lack of guidance regarding process 
has led to an implicit adoption of now widely discredited ‘rational’ processes. Process models 
thus tend to be based on linear sequences that start with problem analysis, proceed to 
identification of design alternatives, evaluation and selection of alternatives, design, 
implementation, and feedback (Ardila-Gomez, 2004). This has been especially problematic in the 
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transport planning field with it’s technocratic bias formed by its strong roots in engineering and 
economics (Black, 1990; Schiefelbusch, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, there have been some attempts to define ‘planning’, from which a definition for  
‘planning process’ might be derived. Of those identified by the author, Hudson (1979) offers the 
most practical, describing ‘planning’ as “foresight in formulating and implementing programs and 
policies” (Hudson et al., 1979, p. 387). Under this definition the planning process presumably 
comprises those activities, actions and decisions that generate the foresight, and result in 
formulated and implemented programs and policies. 
 
In this dissertation I have adopted a similar, but more constrained definition.  First introduced in 
section 1.3, I am repeating it here for ease.  The planning process will be defined as:  all activities, 
actions and decisions involved in project (program or policy) development from initial concept 
through to operationalization. It includes the setting of objectives, strategies, establishment of 
institutions and policies, as well as design and implementation, but makes no specification 
concerning sequencing. It thus builds on Hudson’s definition while offering specific start and end 
points for the process. 
 
Despite the definitional ambiguity within the planning literature concerning planning process, 
there has been some theoretical debate on this subject matter. The focus of the discussion 
however has been on alternative ‘models’ of planning, or styles of planning process. They reflect 
attempts to abstract models from planning practice. I have discussed in the introduction already 
the powerful influence of the comprehensive rational method of planning with its all-inclusive, 
scientific and linear process of planning (Banfield, 1959). This approach ‘has dominated both 
American planning practice and the planning of development assistance programs overseas’ 
(Hudson et al., 1979, p. 388). It was widely discredited in the 1960s and 70s for being too 
ambitious, too technical, and too apolitical (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003; Hall, 2002). Gradually it 
has been supplanted by alternative traditions of planning including incremental planning 
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(Lindblom, 1959) and mixed scanning (Etzioni, 1967) that offer shorter term, iterative and 
pragmatic approaches. In the decades since, planning has continued to evolve with a growing 
awareness of the political and value-laden nature of the planning process (Taylor, 1998). 
Advocacy and equity planning emerged as alternatives where the planner assumes the role of 
activist (Davidoff, 1965; Krumholz, 1982). A parallel discussion within academia focused on the 
role of planner as technical expert versus politician (Banfield, 1959; Benveniste, 1972; Hoch, 
1996).  
 
A paradigm shift occurred in the 1980s with planning taking a turn to communicative planning 
(Healey, 1996).  Under this new regime “planning was process, stripped of rational-technical 
expertise and spatial practice, but with voice, equity and social justice as centerpiece” (Kudva, 
2008, p. 366). The planning process became interpretive and fluid, engaging diverse individuals 
and communities through discourse and interaction (Campbell & Fainstein, 2003; Innes, 1995). 
These processes were criticized for being idealized, and failing to take into account pervasive 
power imbalances (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Harper & Stein, 2006). Today, planning theory is concerned 
with critical reflection, with advances being made in the understanding of power, communicative 
action, stakeholder mediation, modernization, and issues of diversity, equity and community 
(Campbell & Fainstein, 2003). Not all agree however with the status quo. Scholars such as 
Sandercock (2003, 2004) promote alternative planning histories. She questions the state-driven 
premise of modern planning and it’s dominance by white middle class men, advocating instead 
for insurgent planning processes that recognize the diversity of the 21st century city and are 
political, audacious, creative and emotional. 
 
Throughout this evolution from the rational comprehensive model to now, the gap between 
planning theory and practice has grown (Hall, 2002). From the well-articulated step-wise linear 
process suggested in the rational model, academic guidance has been increasingly abstract, 
offering limited direction to practitioners on how to embark on different styles of planning. Though 
there have been numerous studies of planning and planning agencies outlining political behavior 
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and attitudes of planners, there have been relatively few studies of individual planning processes 
and the social and dynamic interactions that occur (Dalton, 1989). What is missing is a  
‘fine-grained analysis of what actually takes place in formal decision-making and implementation, 
in the transition from plan to formal adoption of the plan and its actual implementation, as 
opposed to what they normatively would like to see happen” (Albrechts, 2003, p. 250).  
(Friedmann, 1998) and others echo these concerns and advocate for a more grounded approach 
to theory. Flyvbjerg (1996) argues that research should focus on “‘what is actually done’, towards 
verita effettuale. In this way, we may gain a better grasp – less idealistic, more grounded – of 
what planning is and what the strategies and tactics are that may help change it for the better” 
(Flyvbjerg, 1996, p. 393). What is required is “a much more responsive, interactive, and 
experience-based mode of planning, and less reliance on analysis by scientific methods, or on a 
rational planning method that aims to persuade by the reasonableness of its proposals and the 
objectivity of its information” (E. R. Alexander, p. 110). 
 
Bryson and Delbecq (2007) have undertaken one of the few large-scale studies that looks at how 
planners conduct their practice. Conducting a simulation exercise they were able to capture 
decisions made by experienced planners in designing a planning process. Their work showed 
that planners’ strategies and tactics changed as conditions changed in an attempt to improve the 
likelihood of goal achievement, ”specifically, there appear to be some things planners do, never 
do, and do contingent upon the situation, given constraints on budget and staff time” (Bryson & 
Delbecq, 2007, p. 177). Earlier research by Bryson and other authors also tried to understand 
“which planning processes appears to work under which circumstances and why” (Bryson et al., 
1990, p. 183). Analyzing 58 case studies of projects, this study quantitatively evaluated the 
relationships between context, process, and outcomes, finding the existence of both direct and 
indirect relationships between context and/or process variables and outcomes. They conclude, 
“this study implies that we need both theoretical reformulations of the planning process and more 
empirical studies to determine which planning processes work, under which circumstances, and 
why” (Bryson et al., 1990, p. 194). While there is unlikely to be a universal planning process, it is 
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reasonable to believe that some strategies might be more effective in certain circumstances. 
Prescriptions for the planning processes should thus be contingent on context and carefully linked 
to outcomes (E. R. Alexander, 2005b).   
 
Why haven’t planning processes received more scholarly interest? Several explanations have 
been offered for this theory-praxis gap. The pure diversity of planning, and its broad range of 
applications7 makes it a difficult topic to address at a practical level. As E.R. Alexander (2003) 
states, “for any practical purposes, there is no ‘planning’. Rather, there is a diversity of practices 
in planning (as there is everywhere), and different kinds of planners in different contexts should 
(and do) enact different models or theories of planning” (E.R. Alexander, 2003, p. 180).    
 
The planning process is also complex, involving multiple actors and agents acting in uncertain 
and changing conditions. Fundamentally, the planning process is a ‘wicked’ problem - to many, 
navigating the process of planning is more ‘art’ then ‘science’ and not reducible to simple 
formulations (Gow & Morss, 1988). Hirschmans’ principle of the hiding hand argues along these 
line, suggesting that the great successes in policy/project/plan-making are less a result of careful 
and rational planning, than of ‘stumbling’ into the correct actions. He believes that true success 
emerges from the creativity unleashed by initial failure (Hirschman, 1967). The development of 
scientific-systematic knowledge to represent such a creative and unpredictable process is clearly 
problematic.   
 
Another reason for why theory has not addressed issues of planning process concerns the nature 
of academic debate itself. Historically planning theory has tended to be framed around opposing 
schools of thought – rationalism, policy science, organizational development, empiricism and 
social learning. Though most theorists agree about the impossibility of a ‘universal theory of 
planning’, in practice this is overlooked as advocates of particular normative theories compete for 
primacy in debate (E.R. Alexander, 2003; Mandelbaum, 1979). As a result thinking has been 
                                                        
7 Planning takes many forms, ranging from environmental planning, land-use planning, transport planning, 
strategic planning, city planning etc. 
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dominated by planning philosophies, and not structure and process, and there has been 
inadequate investment in “sound, large-sample, quantitative empirical research to help clarify 
which planning processes appear to work best under which circumstances and why” (Bryson & 
Delbecq, 2007, p. 183).   
 
A final explanation for why planning theory has avoided issues of practical application comes 
from Friedman who suggests it reflects a reticence to deal with issues of power. “I have already 
talked about how reluctant planning theorists generally are to incorporate dimensions of power 
into their work. We have consequently had little to say on the implementation strategies of 
specific actors, being more concerned with the extent of their formal adherence to particular 
planning-theoretic models” (Friedmann, 1998, p. 252).    
 
This avoidance of process issues within the planning literature can thus be attributed to numerous 
factors, including the diversity and complexity of the subject matter, the tendency of the literature 
to focus on philosophies over process, and difficulties dealing with issues of power. These 
obstacles however have not impeded other disciplines. In contrast, the political science literature 
has devoted considerable effort to research on the entire policy-making process and 
implementation (S. Barrett & Fudge, 1981; S. M. Barrett, 2004; Dunsire, 1978; Jackson, 2001; 
Pinto & Slevin, 1988; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Rein & Rabinovitz, 1977; Schofield & 
Sausman, 2004; Smith, 1973). This is especially curious, given that planning and policy 
processes are for most purposes identical, and the terms are commonly used interchangeably 
(Ardila-Gomez, 2004). For the purposes of this research a review of the available planning 
literature was supplemented with literature from the field of political science. Following is a 
discussion of key lessons concerning the planning process extracted from both bodies of 
research.  
 
Firstly, and most importantly, existing research provides compelling evidence for the importance 
of the planning process, and it’s direct influence on outcomes. While good design, strong, well-
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coordinated institutions and political will are necessary; they are not sufficient conditions for 
success.   Earlier quotes from Friedmann (1998), Flyvbjerg (1996), Albrechts (2003), and Dalton 
(1989) as well as research by Healey (2003) and Fainstein (2005) among others, have already 
highlighted the importance of the planning process, belying the relative paucity of practical 
research in the field. Empirical evidence is also available demonstrating its influence on outcomes. 
Boal and Bryson (1987) developed alternative models of the planning process comprising four 
variables: context, process, outcome and interconnections. They tested alternate models with 
public sector planning data to find that the strongest link between the four variables occurs 
between process and outcomes.  Further, the evidence shows that the planning process doesn’t 
just intervene between context and outcomes, but instead has independent (not just moderating, 
intervening or interaction effects) on outcome variables. This both points to the need for more 
studies to improve our understanding of the planning process and the relationship between these 
variables, as well as for a theoretical reframing of the planning process and its role in outcomes 
(Boal & Bryson, 1987).  
 
A second consistent finding to emerge from the literature is that the planning process is 
contingent on context and time. The nature of the planning process will need to be modified 
according to contextual conditions – e.g. environment, people, organization conditions, history, 
culture - and may need to change at different points in the planning life cycle (E. R. Alexander, 
2005a; Bryson et al., 1990; Bryson & Delbecq, 2007; Kudva, 2008; McCaskey, 1974; Smith, 
1973). For example, where political issues are complex there is evidence to suggest more time 
should be spent in upfront conceptualization and reaching in-principle agreements (Bryson & 
Delbecq, 2007). Put simply, there is not one process – but multiple contingent processes that 
change over time as practice and its context change. 
 
The planning process is also unlikely to be linear, as conceived in rational models.  It is better 
understood as a circular or iterative process (Thomas & Grindle, 1990). Friedman explains it as 
follows: “effective planning is a negotiated process among affected parties who have different 
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values, concerns and interests…it is not static, but rather a fluid process of rapidly shifting forces 
that reflects the fluid power positions (and different configurations) of the players in the game” 
(Friedmann, 1998, p. 129). In a similar vein, Gows and Morss (1998) suggest the adoption of a 
“flexible, adaptive, learning oriented approach” to project development that involves collaborative 
design, participatory decision making, appropriate incentive structure and provision for periodic 
revision (Gow & Morss, 1988, pp. 1414-1415). 
 
A fourth and final insight that can be extracted from the various streams of research concerns the 
presence of conflict in the planning process. Discord is to be expected and should be managed.  
To a large extent the nature of the project will dictate the type of conflict or opposition faced, but 
resistance can be minimized through careful problem formulation (S. Barrett & Fudge, 1981; 
Forester, 1987; Sanyal, 2005; Smith, 1973; Thomas & Grindle, 1990). The presence of conflict 
also serves as another argument for flexible and iterative processes because these provide an 
opportunity to respond to often-unpredictable tensions that emerge throughout the process 
(Thomas & Grindle, 1990). Thus there is overall consensus (and some practical guidance) in the 
literature that planning processes, in their various forms, should discard blueprint approaches in 
favor of flexible approaches that allow incremental adjustment to incorporate new information.   
 
What are the key lessons that we can draw from this review of the relevant literature and 
practice?  Current experience with implementing BRT systems suggests there are factors beyond 
the ‘usual suspects” that contribute to outcomes. More recent BRT implementation studies have 
started to examine this issue by looking at parts of the planning process. But while there is 
general agreement amongst both BRT practitioners and planning theorists regarding the 
importance of the planning process, there is relatively limited focus on it’s definition, content or 
influence. Consolidating knowledge from planning and other disciplines we can conclude that the 
planning process is important. There exists some evidence of its direct influence on outcomes.  
We know that it is likely to be contingent on both context and time, and that the process is unlikely 
to be linear as commonly assumed under RCM models. We can also expect that most planning 
 30
processes will engage conflict and thus will require skills beyond traditional technical fields. Most 
importantly though, the review suggests that there is both a lot more to be learnt about the 
planning process, and considerable merit in understanding it better.   
 
2.3 Research justification 
 
My research contributes to two bodies of planning literature, specifically transportation planning, 
and planning theory.   
 
At a practical level, the dissertation makes a contribution to the growing body of practical 
knowledge on global BRT systems, highlighting the understudied experiences with this 
technology in India. This evaluation is timely, given India’s decision to expand their investment in 
BRT, with at least another 11 systems envisaged in cities across the country in the next 5 years. 
The lessons drawn from the cases in Ahmedabad and Delhi will inform Indian planners, offering 
both examples of good practice that can serve as models, as well as illustrations of failure from 
which lessons can be drawn to inform future projects. By focusing on the planning process, it also 
contributes to broader discussion within the BRT community regarding ‘success factors’ for BRT 
– hopefully expanding debate beyond traditional catchalls of design, institutions and politics to 
include more meaningful consideration of the role of the planning process in improving project 
outcomes. 
 
At a theoretical level, this dissertation contributes to the more limited body of existing literature on 
the details of planning process. Through fine-grained analysis of two cases of BRT planning and 
implementation in India it will first demonstrate the importance of the planning process to project 
outcomes – illustrating how timing, decision and strategies within the planning process in each 
scheme contributed to their relative success and failure. The choice of detailed case study 
research necessarily limited the dataset to two cases. This limitation precludes the development 
of any definitive conclusions regarding which approaches to planning or techniques yields better 
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outcomes in different contexts. However the experiences of the two cities can be used to show 
how different strategies translated to outcomes, from which other projects might be able to 
deduce applicability. Further, by supplementing the works of others, I would hope that these 
cases make a useful contribution to the still small, but much needed body of practical work that 
this topic requires. It is my belief that an improved understanding of the planning process will help 
theorists theorize and practitioners practice in ways that improve outcomes. It also empowers 





3 RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE PLANNING PROCESS 
 
Research should focus on ‘what is actually done’, towards verita effectuale.  In 
this way, we may gain a better grasp – less idealistic, more grounded – of what 
planning is and what the strategies and tactics are that may help change it for the 
better. 
-- Bent Flyvbjerg, Explorations in Planning Theory 
 
 
In the previous chapter I provided an overview of the current state of BRT development, 
highlighting the growing difficulties in planning and implementing these systems globally. I also 
discussed limitations in both current practice and research with respect to the planning process.  
There is clearly a need to improve our understanding of the planning process and how different 
approaches impact project success. But despite both the apparent need, and dearth of 
knowledge, planning scholars (with few exceptions) have tended to avoid specification of the 
planning process, or analysis of its interaction with planning outcomes. In the absence of strong 
direction from the literature, I would like to use this chapter to posit a new framework for 
conceptualizing the planning process. The chapter concludes with a description of the research 
approach I employed to develop and analyze this framework.  
 




Planning theory has not entirely avoided issues of planning process. In the previous chapter I 
outlined numerous works that offer useful lessons on this issue (Fainstein, 2005; Forester, 1987; 
Friedmann, 1998; Healey, 2003). Unfortunately, while different ‘styles’ of planning have been 
discussed (e.g. incremental planning, communicative planning etc.) attempts to prescribe the 
planning process in the theoretical literature have been limited to the rational comprehensive 
model (RCM). In many ways this failure to more fully articulate process in alternative planning 
approaches has contributed to the longevity and persistence of the now widely discredited RCM 
(Kudva, 2008; Mandelbaum, 1979; Schiefelbusch, 2010). In the absence of easily translatable 
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alternatives it has become the ‘default’ approach to planning and has led to a ‘traditional’ model of 
project development that is depicted in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1.  Traditional model of project developme nt. 
 
Under the traditional model of project preparation key variables such as existing institutions, 
political leadership and design conditions are essentially treated as ‘initial conditions’ that, 
through a planning process is converted into a project or plan that yields (hopefully) defined 
outcomes. Under this arrangement the planning process is a rational and linear process that 
commences with problem analysis, then proceeds to identification and evaluation of alternatives, 
selection of preferred alternative, design, implementation and feedback. The model assumes that 
the planning process transforms, but does not interact with other variables, nor does it contribute 
directly to outcomes. 
 
I posit an alternative model of project development that I believe can lead to stronger project 
outcomes.  Under this conceptualization institutions, political leadership and design are important 
variables that must be considered in the context of one another, but they are also variables that 
interact with and are changed by the planning process. The planning process behaves like 
institutions, political leadership and design as an independent but interacting variable that also 




Figure 3.2.  Alternative model of project developme nt.  
 
Figure 3.2 depicts this alternative model of project development. It shows how the planning 
process is no longer a linear sequence of steps by which initial conditions (aka institutions, 
political will and leadership and design conditions) are transformed to outcomes, but is instead an 
integral part of project development that impacts, and is in turn impacted upon by changing 
design conditions, politics and institutions, as well as having it’s own direct influence on project 
outcomes. 
 




The alternate model presented in figure 3.2 allows for a more powerful role for the planning 
process in project development. This requires a broader understanding of the planning process 
that looks beyond its traditional representation as a one-dimensional series of steps. I propose a 
new conceptualization where the planning process is considered in three dimensions – including 
not just ‘what’ occurs in the planning process (e.g. content and sequencing of steps), to also 
 35
consider ‘how’ and ‘when’ the process occurs. Figure 3.3 depicts diagrammatically this re-
conceptualized three-dimensional model of the planning process. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Three-dimensional model of the plannin g process. 
 
When framed as a three dimensional activity – involving steps (content and sequencing), strategy 
and tactics (style, actor interaction, communication strategy, tools and techniques) and timing 
(both duration and moment of action) – the importance of the planning process and its potential to 
be ‘crafted’ to influence outcomes becomes clearer. To illustrate this point I will address each of 
these three dimensions individually. 
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WHAT.  This dimension of the planning process comprises the content, or steps undertaken in 
the planning process. Under a normative rational process this would equate to the following well-
defined sequence: Problem analysis; identification of design alternative; evaluation of 
alternatives; selection of preferred alternative; design; implementation, and feedback (Banfield, 
1959). In practice it may look quite different with the content and sequencing of steps varying 
significantly between contexts and projects (Bryson et al., 1990). Evidence presented in the last 
chapter suggests that the process is more likely to be circular or iterative (Friedmann, 1998).  
 
WHEN.  Planners have tended to ignore the significance of timing to planning outcomes, 
assuming that planning processes can start at any point in time, and extend indefinitely (Ardila-
Gomez, 2004). I argue that it is important to consider the ‘moment of action’ – timing process in a 
way that it interacts and complements other events or activities. Some projects will have the good 
luck to align naturally with other government initiatives – for example, municipal plans for 
pedestrianization of a local street may fortuitously coincide with the launch of a national health 
campaign promoting walking and the simultaneous opening of new private storefronts in the 
project area. The expanded political and financial support and private and public momentum 
thereby obtained for the project contributes to better outcomes. But timing should not be a matter 
of chance. Within the planning process, planners can (and should) explore and identify synergies 
between their proposal and other initiatives – looking for opportunities to leverage support by 
forming alliances with events, activities and programs within and outside sectoral boundaries, 
across levels of government, as well as in inside and outside government.  
 
Another consideration with respect to timing concerns the ‘duration’ of action. The length of time 
that the process takes has a significant impact on outcomes. Protracted planning processes 
reduce momentum by diluting existing support, and increasing the susceptibility of the process to 
changing leadership (e.g. Cali and Bogota (Hidalgo & Gutierrez, 2013)). Conversely, rushed 
processes run the risk of overlooking important considerations resulting in flawed design and 
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implementation decisions (e.g. Santiago (Munoz et al., 2009)). The planner has a role in striking 
the right balance of haste versus thoroughness in the planning process. This balance may be 
different for different stages in the planning process – for example strong political disagreements 
may need to be dealt with through an elongated period of concept development to forge in-
principle agreements, that may then be compensated for by faster design and implementation 
schedules (Bryson & Delbecq, 2007). These are ultimately decisions that need to be explicitly 
addressed (not just ‘happen’) as part of the design of the planning process.  Of course, not all 
conditions can be controlled for, but planners have the ability to seize, create and transform 
opportunities (Dario Hidalgo, January 3, 2014, Email communication with author). 
 
HOW.   The third and final dimension of the planning process represented in figure 3.3 concerns 
strategy and tactics or ‘approach’ to the planning process. An important part of designing the 
planning process is to explicitly address the various strategies and tactics that will be employed 
(Bryson & Delbecq, 2007). This includes a vision for the overall approach as well as direction on 
the techniques that will be employed within specific activities (e.g. targeting/engagement of 
stakeholders, phasing of works, communication approaches etc.). For example, where a project 
is relatively untested, it may be prudent to develop a strategy that is more incremental overall, 
and to use techniques that allow pre-testing of design through development of prototypes etc. 
(Lindblom, 1959, 1979; Rein & Rabinovitz, 1977). There is considerable experience, and concrete 
examples of techniques that might be employed (some of which will be highlighted in forthcoming 
chapters). However, there is currently inadequate research directed towards understanding how 
different strategies in different contexts translate to different outcomes (E. R. Alexander; Bryson 
et al., 1990; Bryson & Crosby, 1989). A more systematic approach to collecting and evaluating 
experience in this area would enable planners to more effectively design the planning process 
and improve likelihood of project success.    
 
With this alternate model of project development and re-conceptualized planning process as 
context, the remainder of this chapter will now turn to describing my dissertation research. I will 
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outline the study question and research methodology that gave rise to this proposed new 
framework, before moving on in subsequent chapters to the cases themselves and a more 
detailed discussion of findings and recommendations. 
 
3.3 Description of Research 
 
 
3.3.1 Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
There is a widespread perception that the Janmarg BRT has been incredibly successful and that 
Delhi ‘failed’ (Mathur, 2013; Modi, 2012). This is both supported and perpetuated by the slew of 
international and national awards Janmarg has received, and conversely, by the adverse media 
scrutiny, negative publicity and ultimately the closure (albeit temporarily) of the Delhi system. 
Given the wide disparity in perceived outcomes of the two systems, my initial research question 
was framed as follows: 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION:   “What accounts for the difference in performance between the BRT 
systems in Delhi and Ahmedabad?”   
 
Initial research suggested that the stories of these systems were more complex than presented 
and that reasons for ‘success’ and ‘failure’ could not be reduced to standard explanations found 
in the literature. As my investigation proceeded, the following hypothesis emerged: 
  
HYPOTHESIS:  The diverse outcomes in Ahmedabad and Delhi are only partially explained by 
the ‘usual suspects’ – namely political will/leadership, design, and institutions. A more complete 
explanation considers the integral role of the planning process and how it influences project 
perceptions and results. 
 
 39
With this hypothesis as a basis I re-visited the two cases with the purpose of unbundling the 
planning process and linking key decisions to outcomes. My aim was to demonstrate the 
influence of planning process on outcomes, and to extract lessons for use in future programs. My 
findings informed a reframing of project development and the planning process (as outlined 
earlier in this chapter).  
 
3.3.2 Methodology     
 
To address the questions raised by my cases, my research examined the planning process of 
BRT systems in Ahmedabad (2005 to present) and Delhi (1996 to present) using qualitative case 
study research methods. The unit of analysis for evaluation is the BRT planning process in these 
cities for these time periods. I apply a phronetic approach  (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg et al., 
2012)8 – to compare and contrast the planning processes (from initial conceptualization to final 
stages of execution) and evaluate current outcomes in the two cases9. The intent is to unbundle 
the consequences of different planning processes and demonstrate its importance to outcomes in 
the specific contexts examined. 
 
3.3.3 Rationale for case selection 
 
India is the second most populous country in the world, behind only China. As such, patterns of 
rapid urbanization and motorization are shaping energy demand on a global level. Sustainable, 
and affordable transport modes are critical to India’s development, with global implications. BRT 
represents a uniquely suitable technology for meeting India’s urgent needs (refer discussion 
                                                        
8 Phronetic social science focuses on research that enhances practical wisdom.  Instead of abstract 
knowledge, it engages in the specific contexts of cases to produce research that focuses on what can be 
done, what should be done, and how to do it. According to Flyvberg, ‘the goal of phronetic research is to 
produce input into the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in a society, rather than to generate ultimate, 
unequivocally verified knowledge (Flyvberg 2001, 139) 
 
9 Projects are necessarily dynamic, and outcomes change as systems evolve and expand (Dario Hidalgo, 
January 3, 2013, Email communication with author). For comparison purposes I choose to evaluate a 
selected snapshot of outcome data, using the most current information available to me as of December 
2013. 
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section 2.1) and it has been enthusiastically adopted across the country. Yet despite its global 
significance, there is limited formal documentation of its experiences to date.   
 
Delhi and Ahmedabad were selected as case studies because they represent some of the first 
BRT systems to be implemented in India. Launched in 2008 and 2009 respectively Delhi and 
Ahmedabad have each been in operation for over four years making evaluation timely. As one of 
the nations first experiments with BRT they present a unique opportunity to critically review the 
application of BRT technology in India. Coincidentally, these two cases also offer ‘extreme’ 
examples with markedly different perceived outcomes. The Janmarg BRT in Ahmedabad has 
been honored with multiple national and international awards for its achievements whereas the 
Delhi BRT has been widely criticized in the media and has struggled to maintain operations.  
Finally, the cases were interesting to me because I have managed infrastructure projects in India 
for the World Bank for numerous years. I thus had sufficient contacts and professional familiarity 
with the sector to contribute meaningfully to the debate.  
 
There are various evaluations of the systems in Delhi and Ahmedabad, including both individual 
case studies (HIdalgo & Pai, 2009; Jaiswal et al., 2012; Kishore, 2009; Kost, 2009; Murty et al., 
2006; Nupur, 2012), and comparative case studies  (Baijal, 2011; Hook, 2008; Joshi & 
Bramhecha, 2010; Mahedevia & Joshi, 2011). To date however, the analysis has tended to focus 
on technical and institutional performance. To the author’s knowledge, there has been no specific 
evaluation of the planning or implementation process of these cases. The investigation of the 
planning process is especially pertinent given the Government of India’s intention to finance and 
implement at least 11 further BRT systems in urban centers across India over the next 5 years. 
The lessons drawn from the cases are expected to offer instructive advice for the planning and 




3.3.4  Field work and data collection  
 
The research was conducted in three phases. Research commenced with a desktop review of 
publicly available materials, newspaper articles, literature, policy reports and other documents 
related to the two selected cases. Due to the high profile of the BRT schemes being investigated, 
there exists a large amount of publicly available technical and non-technical literature on the 
projects including newspaper articles, policy reports and other documents. A number of peer 
reviewed journal articles and conference papers also offered partial information on the schemes.  
In addition to providing background data, this review identified interviewees, and highlighted 
information gaps, discrepancies and areas for clarification as well as other important potential 
information sources.  An initial interview list was prepared. To validate representativeness of the 
initial interview list, names were checked with a key contact in the field that was familiar with both 
projects. Once a full list of interviewees was identified, the author worked with key contacts within 
academia as well as the Indian government administration to secure introductions and confirm 
participation in the research.  
 
The second phase of the research extended from September 2012 to June 2013. During this 
phase fieldwork and detailed data collection and verification was undertaken. Visits were made to 
Delhi and Ahmedabad in the fall of 2012. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
decision makers, relevant agencies, officials and stakeholder representatives identified in the 
interview list. For the most part, selected interviewees were senior enough to give a rounded 
perspective reflective of their organization. The author also obtained access to design and 
implementation teams of both systems. Additional discussions, important design and preparation 
documents, meeting minutes, technical reports, promotional pamphlets and other written material 
were collected at these meetings. Field observations of the operating systems were also 
conducted in September 2012.    
 
Following fieldwork and data consolidation, a second round of discussions were held from 
January 2013 through to June 2013 with select interviewees as well as new contacts using phone, 
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skype and email. These discussions were critical to cross-verify data and to probe more closely 
on certain issues. New contacts were also identified over the course of this work to broaden 
perspective and solicit new input on specific issues. A full list of the 39 individuals who 
contributed primary data to this research is provided in table 3.1 at the end of this chapter. Many 
of these interviewees contributed more than once by agreeing to multiple interviews, email 
exchanges and Skype sessions. 
 
In the final phase of my research, I tested my findings for broader applicability. In September 
2013 I presented my cases and preliminary findings to a focus group of 8 BRT experts. These 
individuals were a mix of academics and practitioners. All had direct involvement in the planning 
of one or more BRT systems and jointly represented over 14 current BRT projects. An opinion 
survey was individually administered to each expert to test their views on the relative influences 
of institutions, politics, design and planning process in project outcomes. The results of this 









Dr. O.P Agarwal 
Author of NUTP 
 
Ministry for Urban Development 
(MUD), Currently at World Bank 
 
• Meeting 07/12 
• Interview 1/13 
• Multiple follow-up 
phone and email 
conversations 
(4/17/13 – 10/18/2013) 




Consultant for Ahmedabad/Delhi 
BRT Report 




(AMC Commissioner during 
planning and implementation 
of Janmarg) 
Urban Development and Urban 
Housing Department, GoG 
• Interview 9/12 
 
Ms. Mamta Verma 
CEO 
Ahmedabad Urban Development 
Authority (AUDA) 
• Scheduled interview, 
met with spokesperson 
Ms. Deepa Dave 
Assistant Manager 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
(AMC) 
• Interview 9/12 
Pratik Dave Former AMC Employees 
(Currently at ITDP) 
• Email exchange 2/12 
Mr Harshadrya J. Solanki 
Gen. Manager 
Ahmedabad Janmarg Limited 
(AJL) 
• Interview 9/12 
Mr Akhilesh Bhrambati 
Dep. Gen. Manager 
AJL • Interview 9/12 
Prof. Shivanand Swamy 
Director 
(Project Leader/Key Planner) 
CEPT, COE  • Interview 9/12 
• Meeting 02/13 
• Email exchange 
Prof Manjiri Akalkotkar 
Design 
CEPT, COE • Interview 9/12 
Prof Abhijit Lokre 
Project Management 
CEPT, COE • Interview 9/12 
• Email exchange 
• Skype interview 9/13 
Mr. Bhavesh Patel  
IT, User surveys 
CEPT, COE • Interview 9/12 
 
Ms. Shelly Kulshrestha 
Program Coordinator, Env. 
CEPT, COE • Interview 9/12 
 
Ms. Aanan Sutaria 
Data/Design 
CEPT, COE • Interview 9/12 
 
Prof. Darshini Mahadevia CEPT, Center for Urban Equity • Interview 9/12 
• Email exchange 
Prof. Rutul Joshi CEPT, Center for Urban Equity • Skype interview 3/12 
Dr. Desai Renu CEPT, Center for Urban Equity • Email exchange  
Mr. Christoph Kost, 
 Team Leader 
ITDP, Chennai • Phone Interview 
4/17/13 
Ms. Shreya Gadepalli Senior 
Program Director 
(Key external support during 
planning process) 





AGENCY DETAILS  
Delhi  
Mr. Abhijit Sarkar 
Managing Director 
(Manages the BRTS facility) 
Delhi Integrated Multi-modal transit 
system (DIMTS) 
• Email exchange 
Dr. Rakesh Katyal, VP DIMTS • Interview 9/12 
Prof. Geetam Tiwari 
(Key Planner) 
Transportation Research and 
Injury Prevention 
Programme,(TRIPP) IIT Delhi 
• Interview 9/12 
• Interview 2/13 
Mr. Sandeep Gandhi 
(Key Planner) 
TRIPP • Interview 9/12 
Ms. Anumita Chowdhury Centre for Science and 
Environment (CSE) 
• Interview 9/12 
Mr. Madhav Pai EMBARQ India • Meeting 9/12 
Pawan K. Mulukutia EMBARQ India • Meeting 9/12 
Mr. Dunu Roy Hazards Center • Interview 9/12 
Sunny Kodukula GIZ (Currently with ICLEI) • Skype 4/18/13 
Academic  
Prof. Vineet Sam John Cornell University • Email exchange 
Karthik Rao-Cavale 
 
MIT, BRT Researcher & 
Blogger/PhD Student 




Princeton University, BRT 
Researcher/PhD Student 
• Email exchange 
International Agencies  
Sam Zimmerman World Bank • Interview 7/12 
Dario Hidalgo 





• Interview 9/12 
• Phone 
conversation/email 
Dr. Laurel Paget-Seekins, 
Post Doc- Researcher 
Bus Rapid Transit Centre of 
Excellence, Chile  
• Interview 9/13 
Dr. Tod Litman Victoria Transport Policy Institute, • Email exchange 
Walter Hook, BRT Advisor ITDP, New York • Meeting 7/12 
Michael Kodransky,  ITDP • Email exchange 2/12 
Lloyd Wright  Asian Development Bank (ADB) • Interview 9/12 
Mr. Luis Guiterrez  Association of BRT operators in 
South America, SIBRT 




4 JANMARG:  THE ‘PEOPLE’S WAY” IN AHMEDABAD 
 
“BRTS: Ahmedabad’s pride” 
- Newspaper headline “The Hindu”, July 7, 2013 
 
 
Launched in October 2009, the Janmarg BRT in Ahmedabad City is the first full service BRT in 
India10 (refer figure 4.1). Today Janmarg, after only four years of operation, is an impressive city-
wide bus network with 10 operational routes and 110 bus stations extending 72 kilometers 
carrying an estimated daily ridership of 112,882 persons a day in the city11. The system is 
considered one of BRT’s success stories (DNA, 2009a, 2009b, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e; 
IANS, 2010; Kost, 2009; Manish, 2010; Rana, 2010)12. It has received international and national 
awards and widespread recognition for innovation and performance13. Janmarg successfully 
recovers operating costs, has widespread political support, and has contributed to air quality 
improvements and congestion relief in the city of Ahmedabad. Much of this success can be 
attributed to a remarkable and artful planning process. 
 
                                                        
10 Janmarg officially opened a full year after the Delhi BRT, which itself was pre-dated by the Pune BRT.  
Though not the first BRT in India, Janmarg is remarkable for being the first operational closed bus system in 
the nation offering full BRT service. It incorporates median stations, dedicated lanes, purpose-built bus fleet 
and curbside ticketing (Kost, 2009) 
 
11 Latest data from Janmarg monthly operational report (48th month, 15th Sep – 14th October, 2013)  
 
12 “Ahmedabad is ground zero for innovation in BRTS”; “Ahmedabad and Guangzhou are perceived leaders 
in Asia” (Lloyd Wright, September 6, 2012, Public comments at Asian BRTS Conference, Ahmedabad) 
 
13 Refer to footnote #2 for list of awards 
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Figure 4.1.  Ahmedabad BRT - "Janmarg". Photograph from www.narendramodi.in 
 
In this chapter, I will present the details of my first case study - the Ahmedabad BRT called 
Janmarg.  The chapter is broken into three parts. Context is important, and so the first part of the 
chapter provides project background on key economic, geographic and demographic features of 
Ahmedabad city before outlining the urban transport situation prior to BRT implementation. The 
second part of the chapter focuses on the planning process. This discussion is broken down into 
five subsections. It starts by looking at the reasons for BRT application, followed by descriptions 
of different phases of the planning process. The first four subsections are rationale, concept 
development, design, and implementation. The final subsection examines the consultation 
process. Though consultation activities occurred within each of the phases of the planning 
process its significance warrants that it be treated holistically in a distinct subsection. The final 
part of the chapter describes the BRT project – providing important information on system 
features, institutional and financial arrangements, and operational performance.  
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4.1   Project Context 
 
4.1.1  Ahmedabad 
 
Ahmedabad is the commercial and educational center of the fast-growing and rapidly urbanizing 
State of Gujarat, located in the west of India. Originally a walled city established in 1141 AD on 
the eastern bank of the Sabarmati River, today it is the seventh largest metropolis in India, and 
the largest in the state. Historically home to a strong textile industry (referred to as the 
“Manchester of India”), it is now also a major industrial and financial city and contains educational 
and scientific institutions of national importance. The city also has a strong architectural tradition 
with many monuments, temples and modern buildings (Adhvaryu, 2011; AMC, 2008).   
 
Geographically, there are several areas that define Ahmedabad. The Greater Ahmedabad Urban 
Agglomeration14 is an expansive area of approximately 4200 sq. kilometers, which at its core 
comprises the Municipality of Ahmedabad (466 sq. km) as well as hundreds of surrounding 
villages and municipalities (including amongst others, the State Capital of Gandhinagar). Within 
municipal boundaries itself, the city of Ahmedabad comprises four distinct areas. On the north 
eastern side lays the traditional walled fort city that comprises older, high-density development, 
narrow streets and commercial activities. Outside of this core area, the eastern sector 
accommodates large and small industries and low-income residential areas. In contrast, the area 
to the west of the Sabarmati River is relatively well planned with wide roads, modern office 
development, major education institutions and high-income residential areas15. Towards the 
periphery, in areas newly acquired by the municipality, are residential developments for middle 
and low-income households (AMC, 2008; Bhatt, 2003). 
 
The current population of city is 6.3 million, with the urban agglomeration serving as home to a 
total of 7.2 million residents (GOI, 2011). Population growth of the city is relatively high at a 
                                                        
14 “Urban agglomeration” is a functional definition that includes the population of contiguous growth centers 
outside the formal administrative boundaries of Ahmedabad city. 
 
15 Population densities in the old city range from 1200 to 2293 persons/hectare, much higher than the newer 
western regions that have relatively low densities of 150-370 persons/hectare (Bajracharya, 2009) 
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sustained rate of 3.5% over the last decade.  This is attributed to the confluence of natural 
increases, in-migration, and expansion of official city boundaries (Mahadevia, 2012).  In recent 
years population growth has been concentrated in areas on the western periphery of the city due 
largely to population saturation within inner city and eastern areas as well as large-scale housing 
development in the west (AMC, 2007). Poverty in Ahmedabad is geographically concentrated. 
The poor reside in the industrial centers in the east as well as the dense commercial areas within 
the walled old city (Bajracharya, 2009; Munshi et al., 2008).  
 
The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) manages the city.  It is a huge organization of over 
40,000 employees responsible for a variety of urban services. Areas outside official city 
boundaries are governed (along with the majority of the greater Ahmedabad urban 
agglomeration) by the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) (Bajracharya, 2009). 
Figure 4.2 shows the old walled city, as well AMC boundaries.   
 
Figure 4.2.  Ahmedabad City. Source: CEPT University 
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4.1.2  Urban Transportation in Ahmedabad 
 
Physically, Ahmedabad has a ring radial road network that although quite comprehensive, 
consumes a relatively small (and arguably inadequate) proportion of the city’s land (roads 
account for only 7.5% of land use, compared with recommended national urban standard of 15-
18%)16 (AMC, 2008). Rail lines also infiltrate the city but train service is largely dedicated to inter-
regional/long distance travelers. Thus, urban transportation in Ahmedabad is heavily reliant on its 
limited road capacity. This infrastructure is strained by high peak hour traffic concentrations that 
flow from western residential areas to eastern industrial estates in the morning (and vice versa in 
the evening peak) causing congestion. Recent investments in road widening have eased these 
conditions, but promise only temporary relief (ITDP & EMBARQ, 2012). For the time being, motor 
vehicle ownership (cars and two wheelers) lies at 371 per thousand population but this figure is 
rising rapidly.  Average trip lengths are relatively short at 5.4kms. As a result a significant number 
of residents choose to walk (13%) or bicycle (19%) despite the general absence of dedicated 
NMT facilities. Public transport patronage is also significant, representing 30% of trips (EMBARQ, 
2007). If recent trends continue unabated, rapidly rising car ownership rates, and massive 
increases in auto-rickshaw and two-wheelers promise to rapidly overwhelm the current 
infrastructure and services (AMC, 2007). Improvement in transportation infrastructure, including 
public transport and NMT facilities, is essential to arrest current developments. 
 
Since 1945, buses operated by the publicly owned Ahmedabad Municipal Transport System 
(AMTS)17 have dominated public transport provision (H.M Shivanand Swamy, 2010).  After many 
decades of operation, the quality of service is poor and inefficient with all routes converging on 
the city center. Ridership on public transport prior to BRT implementation was declining (Pai, 
2009). A detailed evaluation of AMTS conducted in 2001 as part of the city’s Integrated Public 
Transit System (IPTS) study found that “AMTS is plagued with persistent problems of financial 
viability, lack of organizational autonomy and basic infrastructure constraints” (LBGC, 2001, p. 3). 
                                                        
16Desired road area percentage is specified in Urban Development Plan Formulation and Implementation 
(UDPFI) Guidelines, issued by the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment (MUAE), Government of India. 
 
17 The AMTS is a division of the AMC with responsibility for transportation services. 
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In 2001, 55% of the AMTS fleet was over-aged, and provided infrequent, unreliable, 
uncomfortable, unsafe and loss-making service on all routes (LBGC, 2001).   
 
In addition to the AMTS services, there are a number of private and public transport operators 
within Ahmedabad. The Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (GSRTC) provides buses for 
approximately 200,000 (two-way trips) passengers per day between Ahmedabad and the central 
bus station (CBS). A further 1,000 private long distance buses provide daily two-way work and 
school commuter services to an additional 35,000 to 40,000 passengers (AMC, 2007). Though 
the city includes important regional rail facilities, trains serve long distance travel needs and do 
not contribute significantly to internal urban transport demand. Historically, the transportation 
network has comprised an inefficient mix of poorly coordinated short and long distance commuter 
services; with inadequate interchange facilities and a concentration of traffic patterns in central 
areas that fails to meet the peak hour east-west transport demand18 (LBGC, 2001).   
 
The Government took action to address some of these problems, restructuring the AMTS in 2005 
with some success. The private sector was invited to operate defined routes on a gross contract 
basis, leading to a doubling of fleet size to 1022 buses and a dramatic increase in daily 
passengers to over 900,000 (from a low of 325,000 average daily riders in 2004). However, 
services remained sparse even after these upgrades. Long journey and waiting times as well as 
problems with unreliable service persisted. The average speed of an AMTS bus in 2008 was 
18.6km/hr. with only 25% of routes having a frequency of more than one bus every 20 minutes, 
and no single route with headway of fewer than 8 minutes (AMC, 2007; Bajracharya, 2009). 
Though the restructuring initiative failed to significantly improve the coordination and quality of 
services, it did demonstrate the clear latent demand for improved public transport service (AMC, 
2008). 
 
In the absence of alternative satisfactory options, Ahmedabad commuters have increasingly 
                                                        
18 During the morning peak hour, traffic flows from western residential areas towards eastern industrial 
estates, and conversely in the evenings (Bajracharya, 2009). 
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relied on more flexible and reliable private and shared vehicles (LBGC, 2001). Over the last 
decade two-wheelers usage (both bicycles and motorized scooters) has risen dramatically and 
now represents 73% of the private vehicles on city streets19 to which an additional 430 vehicles 
are added each day (H.M Shivanand Swamy, 2010). Three-wheeler auto rickshaws, with 3 
person and 6-8 person capacity also proliferate (LBGC, 2001). A fuel switching initiative20 
converting all buses and auto rickshaws in the city to CNG as part of the 2005 restructuring 
process has had some success in ameliorating air quality conditions but traffic congestion, 
pollution21 and dangerous road conditions persist (ADB, 2010). 
 
4.2 Planning Process 
 
4.2.1 Rationale for BRT 
 
Bus Rapid transit was neither the first, nor the only choice examined by state and municipal 
officials to address Ahmedabad’s transportation woes. In the decade prior to BRT implementation, 
Ahmedabad authorities had actively pursued a range of alternative and integrated approaches to 
addressing pollution and congestion concerns that incorporated road, rail, bus and metro 
improvements22. Given the complexity of transportation needs there was a clear recognition that 
no single mode could adequately serve the city. Instead the Gujarat Infrastructure Development 
Board (GIDB), AMC, and AUDA jointly drafted a comprehensive mobility plan for the city that 
encompassed regional rail, metro, parking policy, existing AMTS service as well as provisions for 
a new citywide bus-based public transport system with high-end BRT features (NIUA, 2009; Pai & 
                                                        
19 In comparison, four-wheeler ownership is relatively low, comprising only 12.5% of total vehicles and 3% of 
total trips (NIUA, 2009). 
 
20 The fuel switching initiative was implemented in 2005 alongside AMC restructuring program and has led to 
significant air quality improvements (NIUA, 2009). 
 
21 The City of Ahmedabad ranked amongst the top 3 of India’s critically polluted cities in 2003 (NIUA, 2009). 
 
22 This range of transportation initiatives included the Integrated Public Transit System project by GIDB 
(1998-2002); the Suburban Rail System by AUDA &GIDB (2004); the Metro Rail Transit System by GIDB 
(2004); CNG bus-conversion program by AMC (2005); Comprehensive Road Improvement Plans by AMC 
and AUDA (2004-5) as well as the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRT) project by GIDB with support from 
AUDA and AMC (2006) (AMC, 2007). 
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Hidalgo, 2009).   The intent of the BRT investment was to provide an alternative public transport 
option that would complement other systems such as a metro, and existing AMTS service.  
Significantly, the design of metro and BRT proposals occurred in parallel with no overt 
competition established between the two modes (Shivanand Swamy, September 11, 2012, 
Interview with author).  
 
The former Mayor of Bogota - Mayor Enrique Penalosa – was invited to visit Ahmedabad in 
November 200423.  His presentations of the successful achievements of TransMilenio – the BRT 
system in Bogota, Colombia - was instrumental in developing enthusiasm for the BRT concept 
amongst state and local officials (Kumar et al., 2012; Pai & Hidalgo, 2009). Concept development 
commenced, and was facilitated by ITDP24, which shared experiences from operational systems 
such as the TransJakarta in Indonesia, and Lyon’s BRT in France (Shri I.P. Guatam, September 
11, 2012, Interview with author). A direct consequence of these exploratory activities was a 
request by the Chief Secretary for GIDB to study the feasibility of BRT for Ahmedabad, which 
ultimately led to the appointment of a prominent local university - the Center of Environmental 
Planning and Technology (CEPT) – to manage the project in Feb 2005 (Baijal, 2011). 
 
The rationale for BRT adoption in Ahmedabad can be explained by the confluence of numerous 
factors.  This list includes favorable existing travel patterns, a supportive national policy, fortuitous 
timing and forward planning by key proponents. Geographically, the city’s ring road structure and 
relatively short trip length made it particularly suitable to BRT technology. Ahmedabad’s existing 
road layout largely matched transport needs and could support the proposed bus network 
(Shivanand Swamy, September 6, 2012, Presentation at Asian BRTS Conference, Ahmedabad). 
BRT was considered flexible and expandable enough to deal with both the high and low-density 
passenger demand around (but avoiding) the CBD area. It was also deemed easier and quicker 
                                                        
23 Mr. Penalosa was invited by the Environmental Planning Collaborative and CEPT to make a presentation 
on BRT systems to representatives of AUDA, and the Chief Secretary (Baijal, 2011).  Enrique Penalosa 
championed the TransMilenio system in Bogota when he was Mayor and is now a key international 
proponent of BRT (http://blog.ted.com/2013/12/06/5-ted-talks-about-bikes/). 
 
24 ITDP is a New York agency that offers BRT advocacy and technical advice services. 
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to implement than the metro alternative and offered the opportunity to improve public space and 
accessibility alongside infrastructure provision (NIUA, 2009). 
 
But timing was also critical to BRT’s successful adoption. Concept development of the BRTS 
coincided with the Year of Urban Development in the State of Gujarat.  It was one of several 
initiatives promoted by the State Urban Development Department to resolve traffic management 
and improve public transport (refer footnote 22) (NIUA, 2009). The project was similarly well 
aligned with the city’s Accessible Ahmedabad vision that advocated for measures that reduce the 
need and length of travel and automobile dependence. Importantly, it was identified as part of a 
package of investments personally championed by the State’s charismatic and highly popular 
Chief Minister - Shri Narendra Modi.  Modi was instrumental in promoting the system and closely 
aligned himself with Janmarg’s success from the start (Baijal, 2011; Modi, 2012, 2013; Vora, 
2012).  At the federal level the project was also supported by national policy developments in the 
form of the emerging National Urban Transport Policy (NUTP) and its well-resourced, reformed-
linked investment program, JnNURM (Iuchi, 2012). 
 
Foresight and preparation also played an important role in the adoption of BRT. In Ahmedabad, 
this came in the form of Prof. Shivanand Swamy25 (Director, CEPT) who had been working on 
BRT proposals since the early 1990s, guiding masters thesis topics on its application to Indian 
cities. Prof Swamy would ultimately serve as a key actor in the implementation of Janmarg. His 
influence started at this early stage, when he was engaged to assist AMC with the preparation of 
terms of reference for the IPTS study (Baijal, 2011). This contract was ultimately awarded to 
Louis Berger Group Consortium (LBGC), who issued an interim report in 2001 that contained 
extensive data analysis and preliminary proposals for multi-modal improvements schemes (LBGC, 
2000, 2001). 
 
                                                        
25 Prof Swamy served as Head of the Department of Transportation Planning and Director of the Center of 
Excellence (COE) at CEPT. 
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4.2.2 From concept to design 
 
Leading from the IPTS report, feasibility studies for metro and BRT systems were commissioned 
in 2005.  The development of the BRT project concept and design was awarded to CEPT who 
were supported in the early stages by the ITDP (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009). Concept design was 
initiated at an International Workshop in August of that year, and followed by a submission to 
JnNURM for funding early in 2006 (Shivanand Swamy, September 11, 2012, Interview with 
author). From the beginning Janmarg BRT was launched as the core of a new rapid transit 
system designed to serve the daily mobility needs for the city of Ahmedabad.   
 
In June 2006, another key figure entered the planning process with the appointment of I.P 
Gautam as Commissioner of AMC, who became an enthusiastic proponent of BRT (Baijal, 2011).  
He personally advocated for the project to the National MoUD, securing early support under the 
recently launched JnNURM program. By May of 2006, little more than one year after initial 
discussions, the Janmarg BRT received its first round of funding, with the approval by MoUD of 
JnNURM funds for implementation of the first 12 km demonstration corridor.  This was followed in 
June 2006 by additional funds to complete the remaining 46 km under Phase I of the scheme 
(total length 58km) and 30km under Phase II (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009). Commercial operations 
commenced on parts of the BRTS a little more than 3 short years later, in October 2009 (Pai & 
Hidalgo, 2009; Pai & Lokre, 2010). Table 4.1 summarizes the project development timeline for the 
Janmarg BRT in Ahmedabad. 
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Table 4.1 Janmarg BRT development timeline . 
Date Event 
Early 2005  Feasibility study for BRTS commissioned by Gujarat Infrastructure 
Development Board (GIDB).  Included detailed assessment of demand, 
socio-economic characteristics and technical feasibility.  Identified 
58km corridor. 
August 2005  International Workshop on BRTS design 
Early 2006  Submission of proposal for JnNURM funding 
May 2006 GoI approval for 12km Phase I demonstration corridor  
June 2006  GoI approve additional funding for remaining phase I and II works 
October 2006  Tenders issued for pilot corridor 
February 2007  Tender awarded/construction work commenced on pilot corridor 
August 2007  DPR Phase I submitted to MoUD.  Included detailed planning of 
corridor and associated infrastructure and operations 
March 2008  DPR Phase II submitted to MoUD. 
July 15 2009  Commence free trial operation on pilot corridor (6 – 14 buses) 
October 15, 2009  Commence commercial operations on pilot corridor (18 buses) 
December 25, 2009 Addition of Kankaria Lake front development route (26 buses) 
April 2010  Extension to Naroi and one-way Maninagar loop completed (43 buses) 
Mid June 2012  Extension to Yashodanagar completed. 
February 2013  Completion of Phase I 
 
4.3.3  Design Process 
 
The initial BRTS master plan (Phase I and II) included 88km of closed BRTS corridors. Routing 
was identified based on a wide variety of criteria including socioeconomic needs, right-of-way 
availability, mobility demand, existing bus routing, implementation ease, land use and future 
development plans26.  Proposed metro routes were also planned around so that services 
supplemented rather than directly competed (Kadri, 2010; H.M Shivanand Swamy, 2010; G. 
Tiwari & Jain, 2010). Design drew on analysis undertaken for the IPTS plan, that included 
quantification of public transport needs and existing facilities as well as extensive traffic surveys, 
household interviews, socioeconomic data, and demand assessments (LBGC, 2001).    
 
Several important philosophies guided the design of Janmarg BRT.  Firstly, there was a defined 
and clearly stated effort to “connect busy places but avoid busy roads” (AMC, 2012). Routing was 
selected to connect destinations, but deliberately avoid congested roads (Shivanand Swamy, 
                                                        
26 An important consideration highlighted by Prof. Swamy (CEPT) during interview discussions was the 
potential of the BRT to contribute to redevelopment of the city’s abandoned textile mills into modern 
commercial and industrial production space (Shivanand Swamy, September 11,2012, Interview with author). 
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September 11, 2012, Presentation at Asian BRTS conference, Ahmedabad). Secondly, there was 
an emphasis on “designing a network and not corridors” to serve the whole (and not just part) of 
the city and thirdly, a clear decision to support “equitable road space allocation amongst users” 
(AMC, 2012). Finally, BRT design was orientated around the city’s Accessible Ahmedabad vision 
that called for greater accessibility and efficient mobility for all – both poor and rich – by ensuring 
spatial coverage, employment coverage and improved accessibility (NIUA, 2009). Design took a 
‘systems’ approach, looking beyond the project to BRT integration with metro, rickshaw as well as 
a restructured and expanded AMTS services (AMC, 2007, 2012)(Shivanand Swamy, September 
6, 2012, Presentation at Asian BRTS conference, Ahmedabad). Though it was primarily about 
transportation, planners saw the system as an important instrument for defining the future of the 
city. This was made clear in promotional material about the system: 
 
Janmarg is a system for one and all. It is about connecting people and ensuring 
progress. It is also about creating an identity for public transport in Ahmedabad and 
a sense of pride in the citizens. Janmarg is an image that will define the ethos of 
Ahmedabad as a city that is ready to accept change, a city that has a vision for the 




There was also a strong dose of ‘pragmatism’ in the design approach, as evidenced by 
the following extraction from the DPR documents: 
 
During phase1, while existing and potential demand was prime consideration for 
selection of the corridor, as the concept was being implemented for the first time, 
often the availability of RoW and ease of implementation took precedence over 
demand. More difficult corridors for implementation, but having higher demand, 
were included in subsequent phases. Overall project size limitation was also a 
factor to leave out some of the critical links from phase-1. This (DPR Phase II) 
proposal is to develop BRT on these critical links so that optimal utilization of the 
system is achieved.The attempt is to consolidate on the gains(AMC, 2008, pp. 6-3). 
 
Pragmatism was coupled with a keen political awareness of the need to consider all 
users. The design proposals clearly state their objective to identify corridors based on 
travel demand, accessibility, the needs of the urban poor and development goals, while 
conceding that the ‘critical condition’ for identifying BRT routes was ability to improve 
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conditions for all road users: 
 
Following Pareto Optimality, it is preferred that when a road is adopted as BRT 
corridor, all existing users, immediately after completion of the project, receive 
same or better level of services, while the bus users receive very high quality 
services (AMC, 2008, pp. 6-4). 
 
Driven by these philosophies, the 58km phase I corridor of the BRT was designed to link the city’s 
residential and business areas in the west to its industrial regions in the east, matching existing 
travel patterns and public transport demand (I.P. Gautam, September 11, 2012, Interview with 
author).  Approximately one third of the population reside within walking distance of the Phase I 
corridor, as well as one third of the student population, and 38% of total jobs (AMC, 2007). Phase 
I was developed incrementally in five discrete packages (Baijal, 2011). Phase II corridors were 
designed to complete the ‘network’, passing through the central city for the first time, as well as 
connecting busy commercial areas and providing access to the educational hub. Phase III 
corridors included infill and expansion to new areas. The BRTS network, showing Phase I, II and 










Figure 4.4.  Janmarg BRT network.  Source: CEPT University.  
 
The design process for the Ahmedabad BRT was iterative, drawing heavily from experiences in 
Delhi, Pune and other international systems. The design team made over 100 minor design 
modifications to avoid implementation difficulties encountered in these systems and streamline 
operations (AMC, 2007). For example, an initial decision to adopt curbside bus stops (allowing for 
two bus stops on either side of the central lane) was altered as construction started based on 
information gained during field trips to Bogota and Pereira by AMC officials and the CEPT design 
team. Instead a central island bus stop with doors and bus lanes on either side was adopted, with 
the intention of saving costs and facilitating transfers (AMC, 2008).   
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The design process was also carefully phased to maximize feedback from the system’s own 
rollout. For example, Phase II design was not initiated until after completion of construction of 
Phase I. This allowed early results of Phase I system implementation to be incorporated into 
Phase II design. Changing conditions and experiences during implementation resulted in 
modifications to the original Phase I & II 88km master plan. For example, flooding issues 
prevented the completion of a 5.3 km stretch from Naroda to Kalupur. A decision was made 
relatively early to defer these works to Phase II (at which time a JnNURM funded storm water 
drainage upgrade was expected to be completed) and replace it with alternate stretches (Soni ni 
chali to Odhav 3.1km, and Shivranjini to Iskcon temple, 2.1km) identified for Phase II (AMC, 
2008). Another change adopted during Phase II was the provision of overtaking lanes at bus 
stops to take into account higher project capacity on these busier networked corridors. Bus stop 
locations were also moved away from junctions to promote better flow of mixed traffic and turning 
movements. Philosophically the system was changed from a mixed system (with buses moving 
out of dedicated corridors) to a trunk and feeder system27. In addition, geometric standards for the 
road design was changed to take into account narrower ROW on some stretches, lighting was 





The construction of the Ahmedabad BRT took two and a half years.  Construction work on the 
pilot corridor commenced in February 2007 and ended in October 2009 when the system was 
opened for commercial operations. Initially implementation was delayed as planners paused to 
reflect and incorporate issues that began to emerge in Delhi (Dario Hidalgo, January 3, 2014, 
Email communication with author), but from this point onwards the process proceeded 
remarkably smoothly.  The relative ease of implementation can be attributed to many factors. 
                                                        
27 A full feeder service has yet to be deployed for Janmarg. Currently, the AMTS continues to provide 
complementary, and sometimes competing services. Plans exist for a full re-organization of the bus system 
(Janmarg and AMTS) to create an integrated network with feeders, long and short routes and BRT service 
(and eventually Metro). (Shivanand Swamy, December 2013, Presentation at India Urban Mobility 
Conference, Delhi). 
 61
Firstly, the project benefited from a collaborative institutional structure with strong leadership. The 
municipal authority - Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) - led the decisions but included 
actors from state, city departments and academic institutions (Iuchi, 2012) with CEPT playing a 
critical role in mediating and engaging stakeholders. Secondly, the strategic use of phased 
construction was instrumental in building support for the system, removing barriers that might 
otherwise have impeded implementation. CEPT carefully planned an incremental process that 
engaged the public and maximized ridership. Construction commenced with a 12km 
demonstration corridor (Phase IA), followed by the remainder of the first 58 km of Phase I 
launched gradually in lengths of 5 to10km (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009). The outstanding 30km of the 
network is now nearing completion (CEPT, 2013c). 
 
The 12km demonstration corridor was especially instrumental in building public support for the 
new scheme (AMC, 2012). Firstly, to overcome critics’ concerns about congestion, this initial 
corridor was strategically placed on a lower congestion route with moderate bus volumes (Kost, 
2009). More difficult to implement corridors were delayed until later stages of implementation 
when initial gains had been solidified (NIUA, 2009). This also allowed the system concept to be 
tested and modified before moving onto more difficult routes. Additionally, trial rides on the 
demonstration corridor were offered to passengers free of charge in the 3 months leading up to 
formal launch (July 15 to October 14, 2009)(Shivanand Swamy, January 11, 2012, Interview with 
author). In so doing the planners familiarized commuters with the system, gave them the 
opportunity to provide feedback, and broadened public acceptance (see also discussion in 
section 4.3.5) (ADB, 2010; Pai & Hidalgo, 2009). Importantly, the free trial period enabled testing 
of scheduling, bus operations and signal interface - identifying numerous operational hiccups 
prior to launch (NIUA, 2009). Finally, concessions were made in the operation of the pilot corridor 
to increase attractiveness of the truncated route. Instead of operating a closed system in the 
initial phase, buses were allowed to travel in mixed traffic outside the dedicated 12km stretch, to 
maintain connectivity for passengers in the initial phase (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009).   
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These initiatives ultimately proved successful. When commercial operations for Phase IA 
commenced in October 14, 2009, ridership immediately reached 12,000 to 19,000 passengers 
per day (Kost, 2009). This was significantly higher than the municipal buses that previously 
traveled on the corridor. It is notable that many of these riders were ‘new’ public transport users.  
Passenger surveys undertaken by the Times of India found that over one third of Janmarg riders 
previously used private motor vehicles or three wheeled rickshaws (Kost, 2009).    
 
Building on these initial successes, the second half of the first phase was inaugurated on 
December 25, 2009 – stretching phase I to Kankaria Lake and connecting the eastern part of the 
city to the network. A year later, the system was extended 40kms from RTO to Jashodanagar 
(DNA, 2010b). For the first couple of years the system continued to grow with great success 
(CEPT, 2013c; DNA, 2010b; Kaushik, 2010).  The Phase I and II network (total length 88km) was 
scheduled to be completed by December 2012 but was delayed a couple of months and 
completed in February 2013. Ridership on the Ahmedabad BRT is presently estimated at almost 
113,000 passengers daily with a completed network of 72km (CEPT, 2013a).  Over the last year, 
physical and ridership growth of the system has slowed (Kaushik, 2013; Kaushik & John, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the system is generally perceived as a success and an additional 155km network 
of city roads have been identified for further BRT development (AMC, 2011). 
 
Beyond physical works, the implementation process in Ahmedabad also included several 
innovative human resource initiatives that ultimately supported operational success. One notable 
measure was directed at enforcement. Planners recognized that the new system would require 
significant changes to travel behavior along the bus corridors (e.g. dedicated lane, pedestrian 
right-of-way) and would therefore demand strong and effective enforcement beyond what the 
traffic police could offer. To address this need planners enlisted ex-army servicemen to 
supplement traffic police, creating a dedicated, uniformed, loyal and appropriately empowered 
cadre of professionals to oversee and trouble shoot operations on the ground (Shivanand Swamy, 
September 6, 2012, Presentation at Asian BRTS conference, Ahmedabad). Janmarg drivers were 
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carefully selected and received training for both physical and mental dimensions of their work. 
Practical and theoretical training was provided on docking procedures and safe, comfortable 
driving techniques, supplemented by innovative yoga training to support mental and physical 
health (NIUA, 2009).   
 
Finally, BRT implementation did not occur in a vacuum in Ahmedabad, but instead was well 
coordinated with broader transport sector reforms in the city. Since 2005 this has included the 
CNG conversion program for buses and rickshaws, bus procurement through public-private 
partnership (PPP), and bus replacement of the AMTS fleet. As discussed earlier, the initiative 
was also aligned with important national level transport agendas including the NUTP and 
JnNURM program, and beyond the transport sector was integrated into Accessible Ahmedabad 
and Gujarat Year of Urban Development, thereby meeting needs at city, state and national levels 
(NIUA, 2009). 
 
It would be remiss to suggest that the Ahmedabad BRT was implemented without flaws.  
Numerous difficulties did emerge during the planning process, however many of these obstacles 
were overcome. For example, road clearances and right-of-way acquisition undertaken ahead of 
construction activities attracted criticism (Mahadevia et al., 2013). The quality of pavement 
construction was also poor, with severe ‘rutting’ developing at stations.  This impacts ride quality 
by causing buses to ‘lurch’ during docking and departure (Author observations, September, 2012).  
The initial bus station design was also flawed, with ceilings needing to be replaced due to 
overheating.  Other missteps included poorly designed bikeways, delays installing fare-card 
system, and growing competition between AMTS and BRTS routes. But in all these instances, 
measures were taken to rectify errors before adverse perceptions spread. Federal funds were 
secured for resettlement activities and information disseminated broadly about the advantages of 
the BRTS in a bid to broaden support. Concrete pavements were developed and installed at 
station locations to improve ride quality (Shivanand Swamy, January 11, 2012, Interview with 
author). And station ceilings were corrected during the trial period prior to launch of operation 
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(Dario Hidalgo, January 4, 2014, Email communication with author). Actions are ongoing to 
continuously improve and upgrade these and other issues as they arise.  
 
4.3.5  Consultation Process 
 
In Ahmedabad, planners adopted a policy of early, frequent and targeted community consultation 
and public relations efforts. The consultation process was managed in-house and evolved 
continuously as the planning process progressed, responding rapidly to changing conditions. At 
different phases it comprised outreach activities (stakeholder consultations, meetings, workshops, 
seminars, media engagement); technology promotion and knowledge sharing (study tours to 
other BRT systems, use of prototypes and trials); image branding (uniforms, signage) and 
transparent two-way communication strategies (sharing of documents, presentation and 
newsletters, feedback loops) (Baijal, 2011). The results were extremely effective. Some of the 
strategies employed are outlined below. 
 
OUTREACH. The earliest outreach efforts occurred as part of city planning efforts to prepare the 
Statutory Development Plan, City Development Plan, IPTS plan and early BRT proposals. An 
initial set of broad-brushed community workshops were held from January 20-25 in 2000 
organized jointly by AMC, AUDA and GOG as part of the planning processes. These were 
followed by a second series of workshops held from May 2002 through to February 2003 focused 
on environmental and social consequences of these programs (AMC, 2008). Feedback from 
these workshops was incorporated into initial project concept design proposals. The interaction 
also helped to clear many misconceptions about the project and allay concerns regarding 
consumption of road space, accessibility of median bus stops etc. (Baijal, 2011). 
 
The first set of consultations dedicated to BRT proposal occurred on August 25, 2005. This day 
long workshop was organized jointly by AMC, GIDB, AUDA and CEPT to seek general feedback 
from the community and city opinion makers on corridor selection, design proposals, 
implementation strategies and to identify potential bus operators. This was followed by a joint 
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AMC, GIDB, AUDA and CEPT workshop on bus technology on October 26, 2005 attended by 
State Transport Department officials, AMC representatives, bus operators, and other concerned 
institutions such as Central Road Research Institute (CRRI), Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) 
Delhi and Indian Institute of Management (IIM) Ahmedabad (Baijal, 2011). More specialized 
forums were used to gather input from other stakeholder groups throughout 2005 and 2006 – as 
but one example, bus manufacturers were invited to technical discussions in 2006 to seek their 
views on fleet design and supply issues (NIUA, 2009).   
 
Similarly, a diverse range of experts were engaged in the process through seminars, workshops 
and meetings as well as a series of papers on topics ranging from design, environmental impact, 
route rationalization and institutional issues. In other instances, international practitioners were 
recruited to travel to Ahmedabad to share experiences and comment on system design (AMC, 
2008). The International Workshop on BRT held in Ahmedabad in September 2007 was one such 
forum (NIUA, 2009). Sponsored by the MoUD, to examine the proposals for BRT systems in 11 
Indian cities (including Ahmedabad), it provided a forum for international, national, state and local 
officials to embark on detailed technical deliberations over three days resulting in specific inputs 
for each city (AMC, 2008). 
 
Janmarg authorities did a particularly masterful job of reaching out to the media, developing what 
became a constructive interaction. There was a genuine attempt at collaboration between project 
authorities and the media to inform the public and to explain technical aspects of the project 
28(Baijal, 2011). The few stories published on Janmarg that were not positive showed a 
willingness to engage different opinions with an emphasis on improving and not ‘attacking’ the 
system (Rana, 2009c). 
                                                        
28 The media covered stories updating residents on construction progress, bus technology decisions, and 
outlining benefits of BRT.  Sample headlines include “A’bad traffic to lose a lane, but gain huge 
leeway’(Dave & Agarwal, 2009); ‘BRTS passes five technical tests”(Jadav, 2009); “BRTS will lead to shift 
from pvt to public transport”(Raghuram, 2009)” and “BRTS buses to cut carbon/make green cash for 
AMC”(Rana, 2009a). 
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KNOWLEDGE-SHARING . To promote learning and build understanding of the BRT concept 
study tours were organized for a range of politicians, officials, and technical personnel.  
Delegates from AMC, politicians, planners, design professionals and municipal councilors 
travelled to other BRT cities such as Bogota, London, Beijing, Guangzhou, Jakarta, Singapore 
and Seoul to experience and learn from the planning, implementation and operation of these 
systems (AMC, 2008; NIUA, 2009). Reciprocal visits by American and Asian delegations and 
international experts were also hosted by Janmarg to promote continuing exchange and 
knowledge-sharing (Baijal, 2011).  
 
TECHNOLOGY PROMOTION.  The  ‘Janmarg BRT’ was widely promoted by the state and city in 
major public events within Gujarat and beyond. It was showcased in the Real Estate Mega Show 
by the Gujarat Institute of Housing and Estate Developers (GIHED) in February 2008 as well as in 
the International Vibrant Gujarat Convention in January 2009, hosted to attract investment into 
the state. AMC and Janmarg representatives also worked with media outlets and international 
experts to promote stories highlighting the technology and the projected benefits to city-dwellers 
(Baijal, 2011). This included the construction of a prototype bus stop design to facilitate public 
understanding of the system and solicit feedback (NIUA, 2009) (Harshadrya Solanki, September 
13, 2012, Interview with author).   
 
But the masterstroke of the communication strategy was the introduction of three months of free 
trials to ‘showcase’ the new BRT technology to customers prior to commencement of commercial 
operations. As discussed previously, not only did this allow potential passengers to test and 
understand systems and applications, but it also improved system performance by familiarizing 
drivers with corridor and docking practices, while giving Janmarg the ability to test and modify the 
system prior to formal commencement of operations (Baijal, 2011). Certain groups were targeted 
during the trial period – including school children, doctors, visually impaired, physically challenged, 
industrialists, religious people, and other eminent groups. The support generated from these 
groups was critical in garnering broad support for the system (NIUA 2009;Shivanand Swamy, 
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September 11, 2012, Interview with author). This philosophy of engagement and feedback 
continues today with the ongoing administration and evaluation of monthly user surveys along the 
network (Shivanand Swamy, September 6, 2012, Public discussion at Asian BRTS Conference, 
Ahmedabad). 
 
BRANDING .  From its inception the Ahmedabad BRT image was carefully and consistently 
managed. This starts from the strategic naming of the BRT as “Janmarg” to mean “People’s way”, 
to the slickly designed facilities and bus stations. The brand projected an ‘everymans’ image, 
generating broad based stakeholder support, while also offering ‘world class’ quality. The name 
and logo were used widely in advertising, stationary, signboards, corridor infrastructure and 
facilities. For easy identification and unity, all staff (including workshop, control center and system 
operators) were provided uniforms. Signage was simple and easy to understand, and bus 
stations were designed with a clean and appealing aesthetic with the comfort of passengers in 
mind.  These strategies were important in making the service appealing to a broad range of users, 
but also in instilling pride and sense of identity amongst staff members (Baijal, 2011).  
 
Where possible the Janmarg ‘brand’ was associated with other well-liked community initiatives.  
The alignment of the opening of the Kankaria Loop corridor with the Kankaria Festival in 
December 2009 was particularly masterful. The BRT received positive publicity and was forever 
associated with this prominent and festive cultural event with huge public relations dividends29.   
The BRT was perceived as a genuine public good that delivered revenues and served the needs 
of the city. To this day regular media updates kept the public informed of the projects milestones 
and achievements (Baijal, 2011). 
 
                                                        
29 The media coverage lauded the BRT and its contribution.  For example, an Indian Express article wrote 
“Between 25th and 31st December 2009, the Janmarg carried close to 47,000 passengers per day and 
earned unprecedented revenue of up to Rs. 250,0000 a day” (IE, 2010).  
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Figure 4.5.  Branding using uniforms and signage.  Photograph by author. 
 
TRANSPARENT TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION .  An important strength of the Ahmedabad BRT 
communications strategy was the open and transparent approach that was adopted by AMC and 
CEPT throughout the planning process. There was a willingness to share and discuss relevant 
details at each step in the process using media and other tools (Baijal, 2011). Public efforts 
included written material – such as promotional brochures, cartoon strips, annual newsletters – 
prototypes, and even souvenirs and gifts. A painting competition for children organized by the 
local media effectively engaged these important stakeholders. Feedback from the public and 
special interest groups was actively sought, thoughtfully responded to, and captured in design 
and process modifications. All these activities contributed to building support and understanding 
for the new system (Shivanand Swamy, January 15, 2013, Interview with author).   
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4.3 BRT Project Description 
 
 
Little more than four years after it’s conception, Janmarg was launched with great fanfare and 
considerable domestic and international media coverage in late 2009 (Dave & Rana, 2010; DNA, 
2009a; Hook, 2008; IBI, 2009b; Rana, 2009a; Trivedi, 2009). It was promoted by ITDP as “Bus 
Rapid Transit’s New Wave”, promising  “to fundamentally change the public’s perception of bus-
based travel” and “offering important innovations in BRT design and implementation” (Hook, 2008, 
p. 12). In this final section of the chapter I review the distinctive system features of the 
Ahmedabad BRT, its institutional and financial arrangements as well as operational performance. 
 
4.3.1 System features 
 
Modeled on the successful Curitiba BRT developed in Brazil, the Janmarg represents the first 
closed system in India (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009).   Distinctive features of the system include 




Figure 4.6.  Janmarg BRT carriageway.  Photograph from www.narendramodi.in 
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CARRIAGEWAYS.   Physically, the system comprises central median bus lanes that are 
physically separated from the main carriageway by railings (except at intersections/roundabouts) 
(refer figure 4.6).  Though precise configurations vary across the corridor length, a typical BRT 
cross-section for a 40m ROW is depicted in figure 4.730. Buses are given priority at intersections.  
This occurs manually and is managed by traffic wardens that stop conflicting traffic as buses pass 
(Dario Hidalgo, January 4, 2014, Email communication with author).  Throughout the network, 
motor vehicle lanes widths have been maintained at existing dimensions to minimize impact of 
the BRT on private vehicle users.  Provision also exists for footpaths and bicycle lanes but these 
are only constructed where the right of way allows. As a result NMT facilities are not continuous 
(Kost & Kodukula, 2012; Mahadevia et al., 2013; G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). 
 
Figure 4.7. Typical Janmarg BRT cross-section. Source: CEPT University 
 
STATIONS.  Bus stations are aesthetically distinctive (refer Figure 4.8).  They are constructed of 
stainless steel cables for high durability and ease of maintenance, and finished with tactile 
wooden sleeves. Stations are closed but remain relatively transparent with ventilated interiors that 
                                                        
30 BRT corridor comprises 2 median lanes of 3.65-3.75 wide, with motorized lanes varying according to the 
ROW availability from 10.75 (in 60m ROW) to 9.25m (in 40m ROW) and 7m (where ROW is less than 30m).  
Non-motorized lanes range from 2 to 2.5m according to ROW allowances (NIUA, 2009). 
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offer safety and protection from monsoonal rain and sun (AMC, 2012). Stations can handle a 
large number of people with necessary access controls and off board ticketing; IT enabled 
passenger information system and security systems (NIUA, 2009). Each station is equipped to 
dock two buses in each direction and is spaced at an average distance of 800 meters on three 
meter wide, 38m long, central island platforms (G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). To maintain flow and 
minimize delays bus stops are located at near side of intersections and include some overtaking 
lanes (ADB, 2010).  Platforms are built up 0.9 from the road surface to facilitate quick, safe and 
level boarding (ADB, 2010; Kadri, 2010). Pedestrians access stations through mid block 
pedestrian crossings and ramps (refer figure 4.9). These crossing were initially equipped with 
signals, but signals were ultimately removed when they failed to work as planned (Dario Hidalgo, 
January 4, 2013, Email communication with author). Street furniture and extensive plantation and 
beautification have been provided along the corridor (refer figure 4.10). Workshops for buses 
were also constructed to support regular maintenance of the fleet (AMC, 2012). 
 
 




Figure 4.9  Midblock pedestrian crossing.  Photograph by author. 
 
 
Figure 4.10.  Landscaped bus corridor. Photograph by author. 
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BUS FLEET.   A dedicated fleet of buses identified by their distinctive silver grey and orange color 
serves the BRT in Ahmedabad.  Modifications were made to the design and technology of the 
buses to reduce costs while maintaining ridership so that system could be financially sustainable 
and attractive to users (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009). In a bid to keep costs low buses were built on truck 
chassis.  This has had some negative issues for drive quality and has resulted in noise and 
trembling issues in the bus fleet (Author observation, September 2013). Nevertheless, significant 
improvements were made to the interior of buses, which were redesigned with a single level low 
floor, wide entries, and improved seating with dual sided access. These modifications support 
larger flows and improve passenger mobility, particularly for the physically impaired and sari-clad 
women (ADB, 2010; Kadri, 2010). Buses are equipped with rods and handles to support standing 
passengers, large glass windows, good views and light, wheelchair space for physically 
challenged and on-board fire-fighting systems (NIUA, 2009). Engines were updated to reduce 
emissions, and automatic transmissions and pneumatic suspension was introduced (ADB, 2010; 
NIUA, 2009; G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010).  Overall however the buses are not high quality and ride 
comfort could be improved (Author observation, September, 2013) (refer to figure 4.11).  
 
 
Figure 4.11.  Janmarg bus docking at station.  Photograph by author. 
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INTELLIGENT TRANSPORT SYSTEM (ITS).   All buses were also equipped with global 
positioning systems (GPS) that send data to a central ITS so that vehicles can be tracked and 
monitored through a central Operational Control Center (OCC). This information is then fed back 
to digital displays at stations to alert passengers of wait time for buses (ADB, 2010). There were 
initial implementation difficulties with this technology, but these were ingeniously resolved using 
local suppliers (Abhijit Lokre, September 10, 2012, Interview with author).  To enhance off board 
fare collection and promote mode integration AJL is developing a smart card system for 
commuters that will be valid across Janmarg, State transport and AMTS services.  In the interim 
however fare collection occurs mostly at station ticket counters prior to boarding or through 
Janmarg issued smartcards (Author observation, September, 2012) (refer to figure 4.12). 
 
 
Figure 4.12.  Passenger information system and off- board ticketing. Photograph by author. 
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MODE INTEGRATION.  The selection of a closed BRTS corridor system made integration with 
other modes of transit a particularly important consideration in planning and design. Closed 
systems depend on a strong feeder service for areas where ridership is lower and trunk services 
are not financially viable (G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). After almost four years of operationalization, 
work on the integration of Janmarg with AMTS, metro and para transits continue.  Specifically, 
AMTS routes are being rationalized as BRTS network expands by withdrawing or diverting 
competing services in a phased manner. AMTS will be allowed to operate along short lengths of 
the BRT corridor as a feeder service, but for the most part will operate independently as a city 
level service on non-BRT corridors. Integration of fares is currently being planned to allow 
seamless transfers of passengers between the two services (Baijal, 2011). Interchange facilities 
have been constructed as part of Phase I and Phase II works, facilitating the following transfers 
between modes: BRT-Rail-AMTS; BRT-AMTS; BRTS-BRTS feeder; and BRTS-GSRTC (AMC, 
2008). Sidewalks for pedestrians (and bicycle lanes in some segments) are also constructed 
along select lengths of the bus corridors (ADB, 2010).  Zebra crossings and pedestrian activated 
traffic signals have been provided at junctions and platforms to enable safe access with grade 
separated facilities constructed at high demand locations (G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). Finally, free 
parking facilities for auto-rickshaws have been integrated with bus stops and junctions to aid 
transfers, and paid on-street parking is available for other motorized vehicles (G. Tiwari & Jain, 
2010). 
 
4.3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
 
From its inception, the Janmarg BRT was a locally driven initiative – originated and designed in 
Ahmedabad and highly responsive to local conditions. It did however receive valuable support 
from international agencies such as the ITDP and EMBARQ who facilitated external input and 
knowledge sharing.  
 
The AMC developed the initial proposal for the BRT. This local government body remains the 
chief executing authority of the system (G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). Concept design and 
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implementation was led by CEPT University in Ahmedabad with assistance and support from 
local consultants such as Lea Associates South Asia, Arya Architects, Multi Media Consultants, 
Coordinates Infrastructure, and CDAC as well as input from New York based ITDP (Iuchi, 2012). 
The use of predominantly local expertise not only ensured responsiveness to local conditions and 
technology transfer, but also was effective in keeping costs low (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009). This strong 
local ownership was matched at state and national levels with support provided through a 
steering committee under the State Urban Development and Urban Housing Ministry; and 
financial and other incentives at the National level through the JnNURM program. Strong political 
commitment across levels was instrumental to success (Thite, 2010; G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). 
 
Institutional responsibilities for the operation of Janmarg BRTS were clearly defined. The 
Ahmedabad Janmarg Limited (AJL) was constituted as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) under the 
purview of AMC31, to serve as a dedicated and independent agency with operating authority (G. 
Tiwari & Jain, 2010). ‘Ring-fencing’ of operations in this manner facilitated monitoring and 
oversight and thereby financial control of operations.  It also allowed rapid and flexible decision-
making (Baijal, 2011). 
 
AJL maintains responsibility for planning services, selection of operators, monitoring of service 
quality, fare revisions, coordination with relevant departments and development of BRTS 
expansion plans.  This also includes oversight, specifying standards, and regulation of private 
sector functions (NIUA, 2009). To address these responsibilities, AJL has set up three distinct 
divisions – Operations, Maintenance and Finance/Administration, each headed by a Deputy 
General Manager who report directly to the General Manager, who in turn reports to the 
Executive Director (AMC, 2008; Baijal, 2011). CEPT continues to provide advisory services to 
both Janmarg and AMC (Abhijit Lokre, September 10, 2012, Interview with author). 
 
                                                        
31 AJL is a SPV established under the Companies Act as a fully owned company of AMC. AJL is chaired by 
the Municipal Commissioner with representatives of political and administrative wings on its board of 
directors, as well as provision for two experts and two directors from the private sector with capital 
contribution (NIUA, 2009). 
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Other functions have been strategically outsourced to the private sector to maximize expertise 
and efficiencies. A total of nine public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements were structured 
with AJL and private sector providers with carefully constructed incentives (Baijal, 2011).  Bus 
operation and fare collection tasks were competitively bid on a gross-cost per km seven-year 
contract arrangement with in-built incentives and penalties for fleet maintenance, vehicle 
breakdown and cleanliness (ADB, 2010; TOI, 2007). Other contracts include bus procurement, 
integrated information systems (including automatic ticketing and vehicle tracking system), supply 
and service contracts for bus station sliding doors and turnstiles, bus station cleaning, 
management of park and pay facilities, leasing of advertisement rights, development of foot over 
bridges, as well as landscaping, and corridor facilities and maintenance contracts.   Figure 4.13 




Figure 4.13.  Institutional responsibilities for Ja nmarg BRT.  
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Several challenges were faced with the conceptualization, structuring and implementation of PPP 
arrangements. In particular problems arose in the drafting of specifications, determination of 
appropriate performance parameters, and identifying human capacity constraints. But these were 
overcome with a process of trial and error with several contracts having to be bid out more than 
once to get an adequate response (Baijal, 2011). As an example, the initial bids for bus provision 
for Janmarg exceeded budget allowances. To maintain financial viability of operations, bus 
specifications were lowered and tenders rebid (DNA, 2008a, 2008b; P. John, 2008).  
 
4.3.3 Financial Arrangements 
 
Financing of the BRT scheme was multi-tiered coming from different sources under varying terms.  
This has given AJL the flexibility to match financial obligations with revenue flows. AMC obtained 
grants for 35% of total project costs under the Government of India’s JnNURM program. The 
State Government of Gujarat provided an additional 15% and the remaining 50% of funds were 
met through internal debts and accruals of AMC (Pai & Hidalgo, 2009).   
 
The total cost of the first 12 km phase of the Janmarg BRTS cited in the press as costing Rs 96 
crore (or USD 20.1 million), which equates to USD 1.7 million per kilometer32 (Chandran, 2010). 
The most reliable estimate available for the total cost of Phase I and II is obtained from the 
sanctioned funding for Phase I and II provided in Table 4.2. The first 58km phase of the project 
was awarded Rs. 4933.2 million (USD 103.6 million), with the second 30km phase awarded Rs. 
4881.3 million (USD102.5). The second phase has a higher estimated per km cost because it 
includes a 4.5km elevated section as well as cost of bus stations (not included in Phase I figures) 
(Baijal, 2011). Based on these projections, the total estimated cost for Phase I and II works is 




                                                        
32 Figures given in 2009 Rs/USD with average conversion rate from Rs to USD of 0.021 
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Table 4.2.  Janmarg BRT budget.  




Phase I    
12km pilot 18.4 876.0 
46km corridor 85.2 4057.2 
Phase II    
30 km corridor 102.5 4881.3 
TOTAL 206.1 9814.5 
Approx 2.3 M USD/km 2.3 M/km 111.5 M/km 
Source: (Baijal 2011, section 6.2.1). 
 
Janmarg revenues exceed operating costs. In the 2010/11 financial year, total revenue reached 
Rs.308 million. This is comprised predominantly of passenger fares – earning approximately    
Rs.0.6 million/day (Rs.219 million/year) at ridership levels of 100,000 persons/day (Kaushik, 
2010).  Supplementary incomes includes Rs.14.1 million from advertising revenues (Baijal, 2011) 
as well as fines for service lapses of out-sourced bus operators, and parking charges (Ahluwalia, 
2010; Rana, 2011). Combined, these sources of income are sufficient to ensure the AJL is able to 
cover current operating costs which were reported as Rs.250 million for the 2010/11 financial 
year (including bus service contracts, staff salaries, software/hardware maintenance and 
administrative expenses). This yielded a 2010/11 surplus of over Rs.55 million (Baijal, 2011). 
While there are no operating losses for Janmarg, subsidies are required for capital expenses33.  
 
Proposals for generating additional revenue from land development and carbon credits are in 
different stages of development (Rana, 2009a; Vijayapalan, 2008).  A relaxation of FSI limits is 
being implemented along the corridor to encourage rebuilding and densification.  According to the 
Phase II DPR it is proposed to increase the FSI by 25% from it’s current level of 1.8 to 2.35 on all 
roads with ROW greater than 30m (subject to plot size, ratio and dimension restrictions).  A 
further 0.45 relaxation to an FSI of 2.8 will be allowed where RoW are greater than 36m in return 
for a fee (AMC, 2008).  
                                                        
33 It is worth noting that the cost per passenger for Janmarg BRTS is less than AMTS services.  BRT 
operational costs are approximately Rs.45/km (not including fare collection and security).  These are fully 
covered by fares.  In contrast AMTS earns Rs.18/km and costs Rs.40/km to operate (i.e. exceeds revenues 
by factor of 2.5)( Shreya Gadepalli, ITDP, September 13, 2012, Interview with author). 
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Fares are higher than AMTS services, but still remain affordable. In September 2012 fares 
ranged from Rs.3 to 35 depending on the number of stations travelled34 – equivalent to an 
average ticket price of approximately Rs.1/km or USD0.02/km)(Umarji, 2010). Ticket prices are 
linked to fuel price index so that they remain aligned with costs paid to bus operators35.   
Automatic fare changes come into effect on April 1st each year according to a predetermined 
structure, and is then sanctioned by the State Government of Gujarat (Harshadrya Solanki, AJL 
General Manager, September 13, 2013, Interview with author). 
 
4.3.4 Operations   
 
Today, Janmarg BRT operates as a ‘trunk service’ system with a fleet of customized BRT 
vehicles operating exclusively along dedicated bus corridors that are accessed through feeder 
services and other modes. This closed system provides corridor manager AJL with more control 
over service quality.  It also allows off board ticketing and segregation from mixed traffic 
generating speed, reliability and operational efficiency advantages.  Bus service currently 
operates daily between the hours of 6.00am and 11.00pm, over 72 km of network with 110 
stations. A total of 121 buses ply ten routes, with an average daily ridership in October 2013 of 
almost 113,000 persons/day. The frequency of buses varies from 2.4 to 4 minute during peak 
hours, and decreases to 6-8 minutes during off-peak times (AMC, 2008; CEPT, 2013a).  
 
Operationally the Janmarg BRT remains one of the highest performing BRT systems in India, 
boasting the highest peak average speed (24-25km/hr) of all 8 existing BRT systems in India 
(Jaiswal et al., 2012).  It currently supplies 30 buses per hour per direction across the network (G. 
Tiwari & Jain, 2010). Buses are owned and operated by private operators under supervision of 
AJL on a gross cost contract that incorporates penalties and incentives for good operation and 
                                                        
34  In September 2012, the minimum fare was Rs.3 for travel up to 3 stations.  This increased to Rs.5 for 4 
stations, and Rs.7 for more than 8 stations, increasing in steps up to Rs.35 for the entire 45km operational 
length  (Data from CEPT offices).  The logic for this approach to fares is that empirically 66% of passengers 
use Janmarg for distances less than 5km (i.e. 5 stations) 
 
35 Bus operator contracts are also linked to fuel price index to keep revenues and cost in line (Harshadrya 
Solanki, September 13, 2012, Interview with author). 
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safe driving (AMC, 2012).   
 
Customers are also pleased with Janmarg performance. The BRT is a popular way to commute 
for work, education and leisure and attracts both male and female passengers36.  Consumer 
satisfaction surveys conducted by the Times of India suggest that passengers find the BRT 
service reliable, comfortable and affordable (H.M Shivanand Swamy, 2010). User surveys are 
conducted on the system on a monthly basis. Commuters are asked to comment on a range of 
BRT features, including ease of payment, pricing, station and bus cleanliness, staff behavior and 
presentation, bus comfort, driving safety, pedestrian accessibility and frequency of service. Over 
48 months of reporting on these dimensions, users have consistently ranked all features between 
8.3 and 9.5 (out of 10), with an average commuter overall satisfaction rating for service at 9.0 
(CEPT, 2013a).   
 
However there are worrying signs about continued performance of the BRT system.  Expansion 
of the network has slowed over the last year, and ridership has begun to stagnate.  Concerns are 
starting to emerge in the media regarding operational quality and performance.  This scrutiny is 
led by the Times of India (who also played a critical role in Delhi’s demise) (P. John, 2013; P. 
John & Sharma, 2013; Kaushik, 2013; Kaushik & John, 2013).  However, broad support for 
Janmarg is persistent, as demonstrated by the equivalent number of positive articles in the local 
media (Dutta, 2013; Pandit, 2013; Pandit et al., 2013; Vora, 2012).   
 
It is clear that planners benefited from strong political support and institutional alignment during 
the planning and implementation of the Janmarg BRT.  Yet they were not immune to design and 
other missteps.  The planning process was remarkable in its ability to respond and adapt to its 
own mistakes and well as those it witnessed in Delhi.  This ethos will serve it well as it addresses 
new emerging concerns.  For now at least, the system is widely perceived as a success and 
continues to receive favorable and high profile attention.  Most recently it has been featured 
                                                        
36 Swamy (2010) documents a Times of India survey that shows gender composition of passengers as 42% 
female and 58% male. 
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heavily in promotional material for the Chief Minister’s ( Shri Narendra Modi) ongoing electoral 





5 DELHI’S BUS RAPID TRANSIT CORRIDOR 
 
 
     “ Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in Delhi: Who Failed Whom?” 
      - Blog Title, Delhi Greens Blog, March 18, 2012 
 
 
Delhi was the second city in India to implement a Bus Rapid Transit system37 (depicted in figure 
5.1). As a leader in BRT innovation in the nation, the system has faced many challenges.  
Despite a long gestation period, the network has been slow to implement. While environmental 
benefits of the scheme are measurable, the BRT system is not economically sustainable and 
remains politically susceptible to powerful car lobby groups. Today, 5 years after opening only the 
first 5.8km of the initial 14.5 km pilot corridor is operational. Political resistance has been intense, 
forcing a court-ordered shut down of the bus lane from March to September 2012. The corridor 
was eventually re-opened but the future of the Delhi BRT remains unclear. In recent 
developments, the ruling Congress party was defeated in Delhi elections in December 2013.  
Both major parties running in the election expressed a desire to dismantle the BRT as part of their 
campaign. A new government has yet to be formed and policies towards the BRT have yet to be 
clarified (IE, 2013; NDTV, 2013). The Delhi BRT experience does however offer valuable lessons. 
Its signature achievement is the integration of well-designed bicycle lanes and pedestrian 
footpaths into BRT facilities. From a planning perspective it also demonstrates the types of 
resistance and conflict that should be anticipated in the planning process of these systems in 
India and beyond. 
                                                        
37 The Delhi BRT is technically closer to a bus corridor than a BRT (Hidalgo & Pai, 2010; Mathur, 2012) but 




Figure 5.1.  Delhi BRT. Photograph from www.economist.com. 
 
In this chapter I present the details of the Delhi BRT (refer figure 5.1). To facilitate comparison, 
the format of the case will follow that adopted for Ahmedabad. The chapter will commence with a 
discussion of context before turning to the topic of focus – the planning process. Details of project 
rationale, concept development, design and implementation as well as the consultation process 
will be outlined in the following section. The chapter concludes by describing the features of the 










Delhi (formally known as the National Capital Territory of Delhi or NCTD38) is the largest 
metropolitan area in India and includes within its boundary New Delhi – the nation’s capital city. 
The city is a key political, cultural and commercial center and is one of the fastest growing urban 
                                                        
38 The NCTD has a special status under the Indian Constitution, and is neither an independent State nor 
centrally administered Territory.  Though there is an elected Government of the NCTD (GNCTD) it holds 
only limited state government powers. 
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centers on earth (Murty et al., 2006). A combination of geographic expansion, rural migration and 
rising birth rates have contributed to extraordinary population growth, with a decadal growth from 
2001-2011 of 32%. The city’s current population is 22 million, which makes it the second most 
populous city in the world (GOI, 2011). 
 
Sprawling over 1483 square kilometers, the city has a highly mixed land use pattern with few 
defined zones (Bose et al., 2001). The dispersed nature of growth, and a century long process of 
annexation has created a vast, poly-nucleated urban area that is heavily reliant on road-based 
forms of transportation (Murty et al., 2006). Currently, the road network consumes a large portion 
of Delhi’s metropolitan area  - comprising 21% of the urban space39 (Advani & Tiwari, 2005). Yet 
despite the considerable land area (and ongoing investment) dedicated to road infrastructure, 
congestion remains a chronic problem, exacerbated over the last decade by rising income levels 
and massive increases in private motor vehicle ownership. The number of vehicles on Delhi’s 
roads has increased well over 200% over the last 20 years to over 6 million in 2008 (DIMTS, 
2010).    
 
Air quality is also a severe problem in Delhi. In August 2008 the average total suspended 
particulate (TSP) level in Delhi was five times the World Health Organizations recommended 
standard (Bhatia & Jain, 2009b). Air particulate matter and carbon monoxide levels also routinely 
exceed ambient standards set by India’s Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB). The 
transportation sector is the major source of emissions, contributing an estimated 72% of the city’s 
air pollution in 2001 (GOI, 2003). In recent years technological fixes have been employed to 
improve air quality conditions in the city including vehicle fuel and engine modifications. In 2002, 
a Supreme Court order required the conversion of all diesel buses to CNG. Though initially 
successful, air quality gains from this initiative have been reversed by increasing motorization 
(DIMTS, 2010).    
 
                                                        
39 This figure is higher than any other Asian megacity and exceeds the 15-18% desired road area specified 
in the UDPFI guidelines (refer also footnote #16). 
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Administratively, the Government of India (GOI), the NCTD and the local government authority 
jointly oversee Delhi.   At the local government level the city encompasses three municipal areas:  
the New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) has jurisdiction over a core 42.74 square 
kilometers of the city40; the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) serves 1,397 square kilometers 
(or 94% of the area of the city); and the Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB) serves about 43 square 
kilometers around the airport and outer suburbs (DUD, 2006). Figure 5.2 depicts the 
administrative boundaries of these different units. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.  Delhi local government boundaries. 
 
                                                        
40 This core area covers the national capital city of ‘New Delhi’ 
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The complex hierarchy and multiple levels of government within Delhi has resulted in a 
fragmented management structure with poor institutional clarity and duplication in most sectors, 
including transport. Bose et al. (2001) articulates the situation well: “No single agency at the 
central, state, or local level has responsibility to plan, finance, build, and manage transportation 
projects and vehicular traffic. As many as a dozen agencies influence the supply, maintenance, 
and management of transportation infrastructure”.  As but one example, many roads in the city 
have different stretches of its length owned by different authorities – including the National 
Governments Public Works Department (PWD), the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), the 
GNCTD, as well as any one of its three municipal bodies – the NDMC, MCD or DCB. This 
constrains decision-making and causes serious coordination difficulties (Baijal, 2011). 
 
5.1.2 Urban Transportation in Delhi 
 
Growing congestion, pollution and alarming increases in traffic accidents41 have plagued the 
nation’s capital in recent decades and led to a search for mass transit alternatives (Advani & 
Tiwari, 2005; Murty et al., 2006; Pucher et al., 2004; S. K. Singh, 2005). 
 
Historically, buses have been the only mass mobility option for the majority of Delhi’s citizens.  
Buses carry over 6 million riders per day – meeting about half of travel demand with less than one 
percent of the city’s entire vehicle fleet (Bose et al., 2001; TRIPP, undated). Bus service in Delhi 
is provided by a combination of public and private operators. The federally managed Delhi 
Transportation Corporation (DTC) is the dominant public provider42. The poorly performing DTC 
fleet is supplemented by small private sector firms or  ‘private stage carriage’ (PSC) operators – 
commonly referred to as ‘blue line buses’ – who run individual routes43. Other private sector 
                                                        
41 Every year road accidents cost India about 3% of its GDP.  In the first six months of 2008, a total of 1128 
persons were killed on Delhi’s roads(DIMTS, 2010).  
 
42 The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) also operates a number of bus feeder services to the metro 
(Bhatia & Jain, 2009b). 
 
43 In 2009, PSCs operated 3106 vehicles (39%), DTC 3849 vehicles (49%) and DMRC 986 (12%) of fleet 
(Sahai & Bishop, 2009). 
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operators provide contract carriage services from point-to-point during peak hours to subscribers 
who pay a monthly fee for a guaranteed seat. The State Transport Authority (STA) (i.e. Transport 
Department, GNCTD) oversees private sector providers and has the mandate to grant, renew 
and suspend PSC licenses (Bhatia & Jain, 2009b).   
 
The quality of bus service on both public and private systems across Delhi is universally poor, 
with a familiar litany of maladies (Madhav G. Badami, 2005; Madhav G. Badami & Haider, 2007; 
Bhatia & Jain, 2009b; D. Jain, 2010; Pucher et al., 2004; Pucher et al., 2005). Fares are set low 
but remain unaffordable to many.  Buses are overcrowded, unreliable, inconvenient, dangerous 
and uncomfortable and public services sustain losses that are a financial drain on municipal 
budgets. Blue line buses can maintain profitability only by restricting service to high volume 
routes where they compete for passengers by speeding, driving recklessly and making 
unscheduled stops. Costs are kept low by deferring bus maintenance, overworking and 
underpaying drivers. The consequence is unsafe and substandard bus service (Bhatia & Jain, 
2009a, 2009b; Sahai & Bishop, 2009).   
 
It is not surprising that public transport ridership has declined over the last decade.  This trend 
was arrested temporarily by the launch of the widely anticipated Delhi Metro in 2002.  The Metro 
is operated by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) and currently extends over 190km with 
143 stations that serve almost 2 million middle to high income passengers per day (DMRC, 2012, 
2013; Kogdenko, 2011). This first phase of this ‘world class’ metro was implemented under 
budget and delivered two years early, representing an impressive feat of project management. It 
currently offers clean, affordable and reliable service to the city’s residents and has been 
favorably received domestically and abroad, winning numerous awards44 (Hossain, 2006; 
Pandley, 2007). Despite its contribution however, “between 2001 and 2008 public transport fell 
from nearly 60% of mode share to little more than 45% of trips – only a little higher than walking 
                                                        
44 A non-exhaustive list of awards for the Delhi Metro include the 2013 Lokmanya Tilak Award for 
Architecture ; the 2012 JICA Presidents Award; the 2010 “Most Improved Metro” (3rd Metro Awards 
Ceremony, London); the CEAI Excellence in Engineering Consulting Services Award; and the 2010 ACECC 
Outstanding Civil Engineering Project Award. 
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trips at 35%” (Sahai & Bishop, 2009, p. 2). 
 
Increasingly passengers have turned to private motor vehicles (mostly two wheelers but also 
cars) as their transportation mode of choice. Auto-rickshaws and 4-wheeled vehicles that carry 8-
12 passengers and operate without a schedule also fill some of the gap. The combined influence 
of growing population and rising motor vehicle ownership and use has led to an increasingly 
chaotic traffic situation on Delhi’s streets. This issue has failed to be abated by massive 
investment and expansion of the road network45.  
 
For the most part, the needs of non-motorized transportation (NMT) and public transport 
commuters have been ignored. Inadequate sidewalk facilities have meant that pedestrians, 
animals, motorized vehicles and rickshaws ply on the same roads, impeding traffic flow (Bose et 
al., 2001). Traffic management has failed to handle this diversity of modes and speeds, leading to 
inefficient road usage and unsafe conditions. There is broad consensus amongst transport 
professionals that improved traffic management and mode segregation would greatly improve the 




5.2 Planning Process 
 
 
5.2.1 Rationale for BRT 
 
Planners in Delhi had a unique rationale for selecting BRT. The project was driven primarily by air 
quality improvement and not more traditional congestion relief goals. Rather than offer a new 
public transportation system, the objective of the BRT was to promote bus ridership and non-
motorized transportation options by improving the quality of these experiences (Geetam Tiwari, 
September 14, 2012, Interview with author). 
                                                        
45 Total length of road network increased from 652 km in 1981 to 1122km in 2001 – and is expected to grow 
to 1340km by 2021 (Murty et al., 2006).  
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There were many factors that made Delhi a suitable candidate for bus based rapid transit. From a 
technical point of view the poly-nucleated city structure, existing comprehensive road network and 
socio-economic diversity of users was uniquely suited to affordable bus transport that utilized 
existing road infrastructure. BRT was a low cost option that offered flexibility and high 
performance capabilities that could be readily integrated with much needed upgrades to 
infrastructure for non-motorized forms of transportation (e.g. pedestrians and bicyclists). This was 
especially important because it provided service to the estimated 33% of Delhi’s citizens who 
travel by foot or cycle (EMBARQ, 2007) while also promoting this non-emitting transportation 
mode (D. Jain, 2010; D. G. Tiwari, 2001). The segregation of modes offered by BRT also 
responded to the city’s traffic management problems – with the potential to increase lane capacity 
and reduce congestion by removing slower moving and frequently stopping vehicles from traffic 
flows. This has the simultaneous advantage of reducing pollution and improving road safety – 
both overriding concerns of system designers (D. G. Tiwari, 2001). 
 
One of the key advantages however presented for BRT was the flexibility it offered in meeting 
changing demand in quantity, quality and location of services. Electric trolley, light rail and metro 
alternatives require considerable fixed infrastructure investment. In contrast, bus routes can be 
modified quickly and at nominal cost (TRIPP, 2005b). Systems can be operationalized faster, and 
offer more accessible and wider coverage.  Finally, services are at grade and can be extended 
further into the community (Kishore, 2009). 
 
Like Ahmedabad, key proponents supported the Delhi BRT. The TRIPP unit within IIT Delhi led 
concept development.  Key planners were Prof. Geetam Tiwari and Prof. Dinesh Mohan, 
supported by Sandeep Ghandi and Anvita Arora. Their initial vision was for a High Capacity Bus 
System (HCBS), but the project was eventually relabeled a BRT. High-level political support for 
the project came from Ms. Sheila Dikshit, the Chief Minister for Delhi (Dario Hidalgo, January 3, 
2014, Email communication with author). Unlike Ahmedabad, the project was positioned in direct 
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competition to the rapidly expanding and operational metro46.  This conflict was not managed, 
placing the untested BRT technology at an immediate disadvantage in Delhi. 
 
5.2.2 From concept to design 
 
The BRT concept for Delhi evolved over almost two decades. A proposal for segregated bus and 
bicycle lanes were first proposed to the Transport Department, GNCTD in 1997. This concept 
emerged from a 1995 study commissioned by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) to 
address the city’s growing traffic safety and air pollution. Thus, the origin and objectives of the 
Delhi BRT were distinctly different from most modern-day BRT systems, arising from outside the 
transport sector in response to safety and pollution concerns (DIMTS, 2010).   
 
Further public action on the proposal did not occur until 2002 when an International workshop on 
High Capacity Bus Systems sponsored by the DTC and the Infrastructure Development and 
Finance Company (IDFC), was convened from 20 -21 January 2002. The aim of the conference 
was to explore the applicability of BRT to Delhi. It was attended by Enrique Penalosa47 and other 
international and domestic experts and professionals (TRIPP, 2002). The conference produced 
an initial concept for the BRT that was politically endorsed by the Government of Delhi (DIMTS, 
2010). A high level expert Committee on Sustainable Transport (CST) was formed to develop this 
(and other) proposal(s) for dealing with rising motor vehicle pollution and accident rates in Delhi. 
Significantly the Chief Secretary of Delhi was appointed to chair the CST, signaling the political 
importance of these initiatives (Baijal, 2011; Kishore, 2009).     
 
                                                        
46 The metro is generally perceived as a successful initiative (refer discussion in section 5.1.2) that was led 
by Elattuvalapil Sreedharan, a vocal railway engineer who became known as the ‘Metro Man’ and led the 
DMRC from 1995 to 2102 (O.P. Agarwal, July 5, 2012, Interview with author). 
 
47 Refer footnote #23 
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Under the guidance of the Chief Secretary the CST submitted a final report in October 2002 with 
a series of recommendations48 that included the implementation of BRT on five major arterial 
corridors within Delhi, including a 19km length from Dr. Ambedkar Nagar to Delhi Gate and 
beyond to ISBT (the route that would become the current Delhi BRT) (Bhatia & Jain, 2009b; 
Kishore, 2009; TRIPP, undated).    
 
The selection of the initial pilot route was based on its strategic location, ownership, ROW 
availability, and existing level of bus service (Bhatia & Jain, 2009b). The highly congested corridor 
is close to Delhi’s city boundaries and served as an important arterial corridor between residential 
areas in South Delhi and large commercial developments in Gurgaon. The corridor incorporated 
six large intersections, including one of the busiest junctions in Delhi through which over 135,000 
vehicles flowed per day (DIMTS, 2010). A high proportion (80%) of existing users traveled by bus 
or two-wheelers and was therefore deemed potential BRTS users49. The corridor also had a 
ROW greater than 30 meters along the majority of it’s length, and was owned by a single public 
agency – the Public Works Department (PWD) of GNCTD – which was an important institutional 












                                                        
48  BRT implementation was only one of the reports recommendations. Other proposals forwarded by CSTs 
final report included implementation of electric trolley bus in 2 corridors, and feasibility study for light rail 
system within narrow streets of walled city. Recognizing the complexity of existing institutional arrangements 
in Delhi, the committee also recommended the establishment of an integrated Metropolitan Transport 
Authority (INTA) for fare setting and oversight of transportation network, including bus, metro, commuter rail 
as well as IPT modes (TRIPP, undated). 
 
49 62% of existing users traveled by bus, with an additional 18% of users commuting by two wheelers – a 
group considered likely to switch over to improved bus service (Baijal, 2011). 
 
50 As discussed in 5.1.1, many roads in Delhi have multiple owners. Single ownership of the corridor was 




In 2003 a Core Group comprised of Government of Delhi officials51 was established to monitor 
the implementation of CST findings. This group met three times and presented work to the Chief 
Minister and the Cabinet. The Annual Plan 2003-2004 subsequently earmarked Rs.100 crores 
(approx. USD 21M) for “Development of Alternative mode of transport” (TRIPP, undated). After 
several more years of concept development and design, the Delhi BRT commenced commercial 
operations in April 2008. Table 5.1 summarizes the development timeline for the project. Design 
and implementation phases are discussed in more detail in the following sections.   
 
Table 5.1.  Delhi BRT development timeline. 
Date Event 
1996 CPCB commissioned study for reducing vehicular pollution in Delhi and 
presented findings to DDT 
1997 CPCB issue findings including recommendation for segregated bus and 
bicycle lanes 
January 2002  International Workshop on High Capacity Bus Systems (HCBS) hosted in 
New Delhi to explore applicability  
2002 CST established to develop conference proposals, including BRT 
October 2002  CST submit final report proposing BRT on 5 key corridors 
2003 Core Group established to monitor implementation of CST findings 
2003 GNCTD approve funding for initial corridor 
2004 GNTCD appointed RITES as project manager and IIT Delhi as Conceptual 
and Technical Advisor to design and implement corridor 
December 2005  Second International Conference held in Delhi to evaluate Design options 
2006 GNTCD established DIMTES as a SPV to oversee establishment of public 
transport systems in Delhi, including oversight of operation and 
maintenance activities for BRTS 
October 2006  Construction on initial 5.6km pilot corridor from Dr. Ambedkar Nagar to 
Moolchand commences 
April 20, 2008  System opened for operation from Dr. Ambedkar Nagar to Moolchand 
 
5.2.3 BRT Design 
 
In 2004 GNCTD appointed Rail India Technical and Economic Services (RITES)52 as project 
manager and IIT Delhi as conceptual and technical advisor to design and implement the BRT 
                                                        
51 The Core Group comprised of Chief Secretary (Chairperson), PR. Secretary (finance), Pr. Secretary to 
Chief Minister, Commissioner MCD, Secretary Planning, Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Delhi Transport 
Corporation, Jt. Commissioner of Police (Traffic), Engineer in Chief (PWD), Pr. Secretary-cum 
Commissioner of Transport, OSD to Chief secretary, Sh. B. I. Singal, Consultant (TRIPP, undated) 
52 RITES is a public sector undertaking of the Ministry of Railways (Baijal, 2011). 
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corridor (DIMTS, 2010). The Transportation Research and Injury Prevention Programme (TRIPP) 
within IIT Delhi finalized the concept for the BRT, including detailed technical specifications and 
geometric design.  ITDP53 supported them during the initial stages of conceptualization.    
 
The design team adhered to several key principles. To minimize disruption it was decided to work 
within the existing confines of the selected corridor. No land acquisition was undertaken for the 
first phase of the Delhi BRT; instead the existing ROW was redesigned to provide for dedicated 
bus lane, and bicycle and pedestrian facilities (GNCTD, 2005). Secondly, the Delhi BRT was 
driven by ambitious equity goals. Planners at IIT Delhi viewed the BRT as an opportunity to 
reallocate existing road space more equitably amongst road users. NMT was an important priority 
in design and received considerable attention in the development of the system (Geetam Tiwari, 
September 14, 2012 and Sandeep Gandhi, September 19, 2012, Interviews with author). In 
places this required the reduction of motor vehicle lane widths. In hindsight, this trade-off can be 
linked to some of the implementation difficulties experienced by the scheme. 
 
After preliminary design and extensive consultations with relevant departments, utilities and 
residents along the corridor54, a second International Workshop was sponsored by the Transport 
Department of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) in December 200555. Entitled Bus 
Rapid Transit Delhi the workshop engaged a broad range of stakeholders (65 domestic and 4 
international participants) to evaluate the proposed system designs. The workshop weighed 
efficiency, equity and environmental criteria.  Proposals were subject to a second round of 
feedback at a conference on Alternative Technologies for Public Transport organized by the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
53 ITDP is an international advocacy and consulting group based in New York that provided support to both 
Delhi and Ahmedabad in their initial phases of development. 
 
54 Refer to section 5.2.5 for details of the consultation process 
 
55 The “Bus Rapid Transit  - Delhi” workshop was convened from 12-13 December in Delhi.    (A list of 
participants is available)  The objectives of the workshop were to ensure that “(i) the designs prepared by 
the RITES/TRIPP (IIT Delhi) team conform to international best practices for the first Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) corridor from Ambedkar Nagar to Delhi Gate; (ii) the design are suitable for special conditions 
obtaining in Delhi; and (iii) the designs have in principle approval of all the stakeholders in Delhi” (TRIPP, 
undated) App2, p5. 
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MoUD’s Institute of Urban Transport (IUTP) in March 2006 that drew more domestic and 
international experts (Baijal, 2011)56. Ultimately the GNCTD approved these revised proposals 
(Bhatia & Jain, 2009b; Kishore, 2009; TRIPP, undated).   
 
The launch of BRT was opportune in that it coincided with independent but aligned initiatives at 
both the state and national levels.  In 2005 the Government of India announced its National 
Urban Transport Policy (Agarwal & Zimmerman, 2008; Madhav G. Badami, 2009; Bhatia & Jain, 
2009b; GOI, 2006). This policy promoted integrated land use and transport planning, more 
equitable allocation of road space with people (not vehicles) as the main focus; promoted multi-
modal systems and supported investment in improvement of public transport and NMT facilities 
(GOI, 2006; TRIPP, undated). In concert with these efforts, the Transport Department of the 
GNCTD also initiated it’s own bus reform and fleet updating program57, heavily supported by the 
recently launched, nationally funded JnNURM program (Dr. Katyal, September 19, 2012, 
Interview with author). The BRT initiative was also aligned with the City Development Plan for 
Delhi that included amongst its objectives the promotion of NMT and more equitable allocation of 
road space to pedestrians (DUD, 2006). Despite the apparent synergies, there appears to have 
been little attempt to formally link the Delhi BRT project to any of these initiatives. Project 
development was also isolated from metro expansion activities. Various off-the-record comments 
from interviewees have indicated to the author that there were considerable rivalries between the 
Delhi Metro and BRT teams. 
 
Nevertheless, within this context of city and national level support, the proposal for construction of 
the first Delhi BRT corridor was approved in 2006 after what had been ten years of evaluation.  
Detailed profile design and specifications for the first proposed 14.5 km corridor was provided by 
                                                        
56 Hidalgo was amongst the invited participants, and presented the Bogota system as a HCBS (Dario 
Hidalgo, January 3, 2014, Email communication with author). 
57 This comprehensive bus reform program aimed to improve the safety, efficiency, effectiveness, coverage 
and responsiveness of bus services in Delhi. The existing 657 bus routes were aggregated into 17 
geographically defined clusters. Prequalified operators who met minimum financial and operating criteria 
were invited to competitively bid for concessions on a gross cost basis  - eliminating the perverse incentives 
of prior system by delinking profits from passenger numbers (Bhatia & Jain, 2009b). 
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TRIPP with overall project management led by RITES (Baijal, 2011; G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). For 
engineering design purposes the corridor was sub-divided into five segments, according to key 
landmarks along the route (Baijal, 2011).  The entire corridor, including the operational 5.8km, is  
shown in figure 5.3. Unlike Ahmedabad, design of these segments occurred largely concurrently 
and upstream of construction, isolated from the implementation process.   
 
 




In 2006 the Delhi Integrated Multimodal Transport Systems (DIMTS), a SPV formed as a joint 
venture between the Government of Delhi and the Infrastructure Development Finance Company 
(IDFC)58, was entrusted with the implementation and operation of the Delhi BRT Corridor. 
Critically, this appointment came after design had been completed. This meant that DIMTS had 
                                                        
58 The IDFC is a public limited company that provides infrastructure financing and project implementation 
services in India. 
Operational
Corridor Detail
Total Length 14.5 Kms
Road Right of Way 28 – 55 Meters
Number of Road Junctions 17
Number of Bus Stations 29
Bus Lanes 2 X 3.3 M
MV Lanes 2 X 6.75 M
NMV Lanes 2 X 2.5 M
Footpath 2 X 1.5 M
21
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little opportunity to either provide input or gain insights from the design process. RITES continued 
in their role as project manager with TRIPP providing design advice. The CPCB monitored 
progress (DIMTS, 2010, 2012; Kishore, 2009).   
 
The construction contract for Delhi’s first BRT corridor was awarded on September 5, 2006, with 
construction commencing shortly thereafter. The Chief Minister of Delhi laid the foundation stone 
for the first corridor along Josip Broz Tito (JBT) Marg from Moolchand to Dr. Ambedkar Nagar in 
South Delhi on October 4, 2006  (GNCTD, 2006). Originally scheduled for completion in 
December 2007, work delays pushed the completion date back several months (Baijal, 2011; 
DIMTS, 2010; GNCTD & DIMTS, 2008). 
 
Operations commenced on the first 5.8 km pilot phase of the Delhi BRT on April 20, 2008 (DIMTS, 
2010; GNCTD & DIMTS, 2008). In the early months there were a number of setbacks, creating 
heavy traffic jams that has had devastating impacts on public opinion of the Delhi BRT. The 
strong public protests meant that the second phase of the pilot corridor from Moolchand to Delhi 
Gate (an additional 8.7km with dedicated bus lanes on the left side of the corridor) has never 
been operated as a dedicated BRT corridor - despite the completion of painted bus lanes (without 
physical barriers) and simple bus shelters (Baijal, 2011). 
 
The initial launch of the Delhi BRT encountered numerous problems. Intersection design flaws 
and software and hardware faults in the traffic signals were compounded by driver unfamiliarity 
with the new traffic patterns – resulting in immediate traffic snarls.  To cater for the multiple traffic 
movements demanded of an open system, planners fitted high flow intersections59with six phase 
traffic signals with long cycles.  This generated long queue times and impeded flow (HIdalgo & 
Pai, 2009).  Signals then failed to operate smoothly, and the Delhi Traffic Police were unable to 
                                                        
59 Even prior to BRT implementation, the intersection at Chirag Delhi (which lies on the corridor) has one of 
the highest traffic volumes in Delhi  (DIMTS, 2010). 
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provide adequate enforcement of lane or intersection movements60. Bus lanes were also 
congested due to a high rate of bus breakdowns, and there was considerable confusion amongst 
passengers about accessing central medians resulting in jaywalking (HIdalgo & Pai, 2009; 
Kishore, 2009). The media, supported by a powerful and antagonistic car lobby and an 
adversarial group of metro supporters61 quickly joined forces with resident welfare associations 
along the corridor, to criticize the ‘corridor of chaos’ and demand that it be removed (Kishore, 
2009; Nupur, 2012)62. Television interviews were shown with drivers stuck in traffic jams, 
pedestrians attempting dangerous road crossings and fatality reports (G. Singh, 2012)63.   
  
The initial response to the project by some media outlets and opinion makers was 
negative and a political firestorm ensured.  Critics of the system attacked the Delhi 
Government, accusing it of botching the city's highly anticipated bus corridor (HIdalgo & 
Pai, 2009, p. 7) 
 
There was a sense amongst motorists that road space had been stolen from private vehicles and 
given to bus users (Kishore, 2009).  DIMTS responded by deploying additional traffic marshals at 
intersections to facilitate vehicle flow and monitor traffic violations.  They also upgraded traffic 
signal technology (HIdalgo & Pai, 2009), however much of the damage was done and criticism 
broadened.  Media coverage accused designers of not adequately engaging government 
expertise, and misunderstanding on-the-ground realities (Ghosh, 2008), as well as launching the 
                                                        
60The Delhi Traffic Police were vocal in their opposition to the BRT system. They have been accused of 
deliberately contributing to congestion in order to undermine its operation. Ponnaluri (2011) reports on an 
‘undocumented study on signal operations’ that ‘showed that the traffic police had, based on visual 
observations, permitted/prevented vehicle movement without adhering to basic traffic management 
principles’ (Ponnaluri, 2011, p. 273). 
 
61 In an interview with the author, Dunu Roy (September 18, 2012), from the Hazards Center (a citizens 
advocacy group in Delhi) indicated that the anti-vehicle and car lobbies had an adversarial relationship that 
extends over 20 years.  Rivalries also existed between BRT and Metro groups and numerous sources 
suggested off-the-record that the metro lobby helped to incite the media firestorm to sabotage BRT efforts.  
These information is supported by email communications and discussions with Dario Hidalgo (January 3, 
2014).  
 
62 Media coverage variously referred to the Delhi BRT as the “expensive traffic mess that goes by the name 
of the Bus Rapid Transit corridor” (“BRT caused a similar mess in Pune” The Hindu, 4/28/2008); the “BRT 
fiasco” (“BRT project:  No govt engineer on board”, The Times of India, 4/26/2008) ; and “Delhi’s exorbitant 
public transport failure” (“On India” blog, Overdorf 2012)(Ghosh, 2008; Overdorf, 2012; TH, 2008b). 
 
63 Both protagonists and observers of the Delhi BRT project have suggested a strong media bias against the 
project.  Roy (2008) drafted a letter to the editor, with 90 signatories, accusing the Delhi media, specifically 
the Times of India group of unethical journalistic behavior (Roy, 2008). 
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trial run prematurely (Overdorf, 2012).  According to Overdorf (2012) the system was ‘built in the 
wrong place’, located in a middle class enclave where car users would be disproportionately 
inconvenienced for the benefit of few poor. He also highlights missed opportunities – bus 
frequency was not increased to capitalize on the dedicated lane, the bus service provided no link 
to metro, and there were no accompanying policies to promote bus ridership and discourage car 
use (e.g. parking levies and car licensing fees) (Overdorf, 2012). 
 
Various evaluations of the Delhi BRT system suggest that much of the initial media onslaught of 
the system was unjust and ‘confused fact with fury’ (Ecologist, 2012; Kishore, 2009)64.  
Proponents point out that although car users may have suffered some initial congestion, the goal 
of the BRT was not to serve car users, or maximize vehicular trips, but rather to maximize 
passenger trips along the corridor, which they had achieved. They felt that the expectations of 
performance improvement were unrealistic on the demonstration corridor given its limited 5.8km 
length. It was pointed out that the Metro had not been subject to same scrutiny because it did not 
challenge road space (Lahiri, 2012). The media also failed to take into account the improvements 
to the traffic flow achieved by removing slower moving and stop/go bus and bicycle traffic from 
the left curbside lane (Geetam Tiwari, September 14, 2012, Interview with author) (Kishore, 2009; 
Lahiri, 2012).  
 
Environmental organizations65 rallied and conducted a  ‘joint random perception survey of BRT 
commuters’.  The results largely vindicated the system and were reported by the national 
newspaper The Hindu in an article entitled “Belated Support for BRT corridor from users”  (May 
22, 2008). The findings suggested that despite the widespread criticism in the media, that “83% of 
                                                        
64“Streetsblog” Aaron (2008) discusses the disparaging post-launch media coverage of the Delhi BRT “A 
google news search for “brt delhi” comes up with over 70 news articles from the last week, almost all of them 
sensationally pessimistic.  Here are a few headlines:   “BRT nightmare for school kids on way home,”  “kids 
bear the brunt of BRT mess”, “Delhi bus corridor:  Fiasco continues,”  “BRT corridor chaos worse than ever”.  
Aaron concedes that the project had teething problems but suggests that media bias skewed coverage 
making the problem worse than in reality. 
 
65 The study was jointly commissioned and funded by an alliance of the Center for Science and Environment 
(CSE), the Delhi Greens, and the Indian Youth Climate Network (IYCN). 
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all commuters are happy with the dedicated lane system of the BRT and want that it be continued” 
(TH, 2008a). The majority of support came from bus users, pedestrians and cyclists. Most 
interestingly (and contrary to media reporting), “only 8 per cent of the motorists and two-wheeler 
commuters reportedly said that BRT should be scrapped and 73 percent agreed that the project 
can be continued.  Asked whether they would shift from their personal vehicles to better, faster 
and high-frequency buses equipped with AC and GPS running on the BRT corridor, 26 per cent 
of motorists and two wheeler answered positively” (TH, 2008a).   
 
But the damage had been done.  In January 2012, 
 
(A) Public Interest Litigation (PIL) Case (was) filed by M/s. Nyay Bhoomi, versus 
Government of NCT of Delhi on the basis that BRT was not practical given number of 
buses to other vehicles on the corridor. In response the High Court has passed an order 
W.P. (C) 380/2012 on 15.03.2012 directing the Transport Department of the GNCTD to 
conduct an evaluation on (i) whether BRT corridor has served its intended purpose; (ii) 
whether it has slowed movement of traffic other than buses, and if so impact on fuel 
consumption; (iii) the proportion of commuters that have benefited vs. suffered from 
intervention; (iv) the viability/desirability of central bus stops; and (v) a pilot test of opening 
dedicated lane to mixed traffic for comparison study (CSIR, 2012, p. 13) 
 
The CSIR-Central Road Research Institute (CRRI)66 was awarded the contract to complete this 
evaluation. The pilot test for opening of the dedicated bus lane to motorized vehicles was 
originally scheduled for May 12 to May 23, but was subsequently extended under High Court 
Directive until September 15, 2012 (CSIR, 2012, 2013), effectively closing the operation of the 
dedicated bus corridor for four months. In this time an interim report from the CRRI was submitted 
to the High Court (as well as GNCTD Transport Department and DIMTS) on 16th May 2012, with 
the final report issued in mid July 2012 (CSIR, 2012)67. Findings questioned the effectiveness of 
                                                        
66 The CRRI is a national laboratory and part of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CRRI). It 
specializes in research and development as well as training on design, construction and maintenance of 
transportation systems and facilities, with an emphasis on road infrastructure and services (CSIR, 2013). 
 
67 An exhaustive list of studies was completed both on the BRT corridor and adjoining non-BRTS road 
sections as part of the CSIR evaluation.  These included intersection traffic volume counts, mid-block counts, 
speed and delay studies, spot speed studies, queue length and saturation flow studies, pedestrian volume 
counts at strategic locations, parking accumulation and duration studies, user’s perception of BRTS 
operation and experimental (non-BRT) trial, fuel consumption studies and bus passenger boarding/alighting 
studies (CSIR, 2012). 
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the BRT and generated considerable debate in the media (Choudhury, 2012; HIdalgo & Pai, 
2009; ZN, 2012). According to the CRRI report the Delhi BRT has a lack of bus route 
rationalization, over-reporting of passengers, and increase (not decrease) in fatalities/accidents. 
Excessive idling by cars has also led to higher fuel consumption. A visual assessment68 of traffic 
problems suggested that traffic signals were overly long requiring 3-4 phases to clear traffic on 
MV lanes, bus queues extended beyond station platforms causing dangerous boarding conditions 
during peak hour; pedestrians jaywalked at intersections; buses were crowded; and there were 
chronic problems with encroachment – with mixed traffic using bus lane; bicyclists using 
motorized lanes; and motorized 2 wheelers using bicycle lanes. Pedestrian facilities were also 
used for parking and dumping in some places (CSIR, 2012). These visual observations are 
consistent with the authors own field observations in September 2012, both before and after re-
opening of corridor.  
 
DIMTS, and TRIPP responded strongly to the report, submitting formal comments to the High 
Court on July 20, 2012. They argued that the CRRI analysis was fundamentally flawed with 
sampling and extrapolation errors, factual mistakes and numerous omissions. Most importantly, 
they argued that the CRRI analysis focused too much attention on the movement of vehicles, and 
not people, thereby disproportionately favoring powerful car users over the majority bus riders, 
bicyclists and pedestrians (Hidalgo & Pai, 2012b). Drawing on CRRI’s own data they showed that 
even non-BRT users on the corridor supported the BRT. The “majority of taxi, auto and 2-
wheelers users and even more than a third of car users rate BRT as good” (DIMTS et al., 2012).   
Further, data showed that the modal share of buses had increased along the corridor since BRT 
inception, thereby achieving the systems primary stated goal of improving public transport usage. 
Advocates suggested that this was a more suitable metric for judging success (DIMTS et al., 
2012).   
 
In September 2012, having heard both arguments, the High Court decided in favor of re-instating 
                                                        
68 The CRRI study team conducted a visual assessment of traffic conditions along the BRT corridor, over a 
two-day period, at different locations and different times of day (CSIR, 2012). 
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the Delhi BRT (Nandrajog & Singh, 2012).  The dedicated lane was restored to service on 
September 17, 2012 (Author observation, September 2012).  Legal success notwithstanding, 
most experts agree that the Delhi BRT has been successful in achieving its key objectives of 
increasing public transport ridership by improving safety and speed and promoting NMT.  
However, the system had not achieved the same service standards as other BRTs both in India 
and abroad. There is a need to raise operational efficiency of the system (Hidalgo & Pai, 2012b) 
and to manage public perception. Expert reviews suggest that “improving the reliability, comfort 
and safety of buses and the quality of bus services, and reducing person delays must be the 
priorities” (CSE, 2009, p. 1). 
 
5.2.5 Consultation Process 
 
Project documents indicate that the planning process for the Delhi BRT included extensive 
consultations “with all stakeholders of Delhi” (TRIPP, 2005a, p. 6). And while it is clear that a 
large number of stakeholders were consulted in the course of preparation of the Delhi BRT, key 
stakeholders were omitted from the process (O.P. Agarwal, April 17, 2013, Phone discussion with 
author).  Importantly, consultation activities occurred in two distinct  ‘installments’ by different 
agents, separated by a three-year gap in communication. It was during this long silent interlude 
that opposition grew and strengthened.  This meant that the second phase of communication had 
to focus on trouble-shooting and mitigating protests rather than true engagement, ultimately 
undermining the successful operation of the system (Baijal, 2011).   
 
The first phase of communication was managed by TRIPP as part of concept development and 
design. During this period, a detailed activity survey was undertaken using satellite imagery to 
understand how the corridor was used. Designs were subsequently modified to incorporate 
existing uses - for example, stations were relocated and spaces allocated for street vendors 
(Sandeep Gandhi, September 19, 2012, Interview with author).  Community concerns were 
identified during over forty meetings with slum dwellers and concerned residents (GNCTD, 2005). 
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Feedback from various government departments and transport sector officials, utility operators 
and resident welfare associations was also captured through regular meetings with a core group 
of representatives from these agencies (GNCTD, 2005; Kishore, 2009). Concerns and issues 
identified by different stakeholders during this process were then compiled in an evaluation report 
that was addressed in the second International workshop on BRT hosted in Delhi in 2005 
(GNCTD, 2005).  
 
The extent of outreach to the general public however was much more limited in this initial phase.  
Citizen advocate Dunu Roy describes a general lack of ownership of the Delhi BRT and a failure 
to undertake proper consultation and engagement (Dunu Roy, September 18, 2012, Interview 
with author). Rakesh Katyal (DIMTS) also concedes that there was inadequate awareness raising 
and general education about the system prior to operationalization (Rakesh Katyal, September 6, 
2012, Public comments at Asia BRTS conference, Ahmedabad). Though concerted efforts were 
made to engage community members and disadvantaged groups along the corridor, these efforts 
did not extend to other BRT corridor users – most notably motor vehicle users and the broader 
Delhi public. 
 
It was not until the project launched that public relations activities were expanded. This second 
phase of communication was managed by DMITS and supported by the Department of Transport, 
GNCTD (Baijal, 2011). In the face of growing resentment against the project, a comprehensive 
plan for public outreach was developed to explain the advantages of BRT, improve its image and 
public acceptance. This communication strategy was designed and implemented in-house without 
external assistance or designated spokesperson. Specific interventions included the printing of 
BRT brochures to suit different audiences, use of bus queue shelter advertising space for BRT 
education, and production of educational films. To familiarize users with the system, over 300,000 
lists of ‘do’s and don’ts’ were printed and distributed over time (GNCTD & DIMTS, 2008). The 
target group for communications ranged from officials to citizens, including transport operators, 
Delhi metro management, commuters (private vehicle owners, cyclists, pedestrians), resident 
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welfare associations, Delhi Traffic Police, media, non-government organizations and community 
based organizations (DIMTS, 2010). Special efforts were dedicated to youth who were deemed 
more receptive to the scheme. A dedicated blog on BRT project issues was established to 
engage public feedback. This was complemented by awareness raising programs in schools, as 
well as a cycle rally and an Equal Road Right campaign to stress the importance of equal access 
to roads.  On September 19, 2010, DIMTS organized a flash mob in collaboration with the Indian 
Youth for Public Transport. The corridor was also audited for accessibility and user –friendliness 
(e.g. signage, access, consistency, tactile strip functionality etc.) with findings incorporated into 
design (Baijal, 2011).  
 
Both innovative and comprehensive, the communication strategy developed by DIMTS was in 
many ways ‘too little, too late’. The three-year gap between communication phases had enabled 
anti-BRT lobbies to take hold of the debate, shifting the initial momentum and overall acceptance 
of BRT that had been achieved after the first phase of communication. By the time DIMTS took 
over operations the public outcry was widespread, led by vocal and powerful opinion makers, 
officials, police and politicians69. The Delhi BRT failed to capture the hearts of the citizens and 
even DIMTS impressive efforts did little to mitigate the damage (Baijal, 2011)(Personal 
observations by author, September 2012). Media animosity in particular was averse and 
entrenched, and the project authorities had little choice but to adopt a defensive stance. This was 
unfortunate, because in many ways the negative publicity did not reflect user opinion (Baijal, 
2011). Indeed an independent survey of BRTS users undertaken by the television channel NDTV 
in May 2008 discovered that contrary to popular perception, users of the BRTS were broadly 
satisfied with the system (NDTV, 2008) 70. These results were corroborated by extensive CSE 
surveys several months later in June 2008 (refer to section 5.3.4) (HIdalgo & Pai, 2009). 
                                                        
69 Interestingly, despite the public outcry, Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit was re-elected in 2009 with a majority 
vote from districts directly impacted by the BRT (Dario Hidalgo, January 7, 2014, Email communication with 
author). 
 
70 “BRT Corridor:  The great Delhi divide’, New Delhi, NDTV Correspondent, May -1, 2008. Amongst the 
findings, this story showed that while 65% of car users objected to road space reallocation, 75% bus drivers 
reported a huge improvement in road conditions. Surprisingly, half or car users, and 72% bus drivers felt the 





5.3 BRT Project Description 
 
 
The first 5.8 km of the initial 14.5 km pilot corridor was opened in April 2008, running from 
Ambedkar Nagar to Moolchand along JBT Marg – a heavily congested thoroughfare in South 
Delhi that serves over 135,000 vehicles per day (refer figure 5.4)(DIMTS, 2010)71. Four years 
later, the remainder of this pilot corridor is yet to be operationalized and the initial 5.8km is under 
threat of being dismantled. To this point I have outlined project context and the planning process. 
I will now complete the project description by outlining key system features, institutional and 
financial arrangements and operational performance of the scheme. 
 
 
Figure 5.4.  Delhi BRT carriageway.  Photograph from www.designpublic.in. 
 
5.3.1 System Features 
 
Unlike Janmarg, the Delhi BRT is an open system design allowing buses to freely enter and leave 
bus corridor along the route (Kishore, 2009). This approaches maximizes catchment area (and 
                                                        
71 Peak hour the corridor serves 12,000 passengers/hr. in both directions.Traffic is predominantly cars (35-
40%),that carry 15-20 of total commuters.  Buses account for 2-2.5% of vehicles, carry 55-60% of total 
commuters. Remaining transportation is by NMT, 2 wheelers and rickshaws(DIMTS, 2010). 
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thus commuters) without the need for transfers and feeder buses. This is particularly desirable in 
Delhi given its mixed land use, and relatively short trip length enabling it to compete against two 
wheelers. It is also flexible, enabling existing bus routes to connect into the system (G. Tiwari & 
Jain, 2012). Significantly, the system incorporates the city’s first designated lanes for NMT with 
bicycles and pedestrians segregated.  The design utilized the existing right of way along the 
corridor72, taking space from existing carriageways to create the dedicated bus-lanes, footpaths 
and bicycle lanes. By removing buses from mixed traffic, the expectation was that overall traffic 
speed would increase (Kogdenko, 2011). 
 
CARRIAGEWAYS.  Physically, the Delhi BRT system consists of two, one-way, physically 
segregated bus lanes in the central median (3.3m wide), widening at intersections to allow for 
parallel bus stations. The remaining right of way provides two lanes for motorized vehicles 
(6.75m) in each direction (flared at intersection to provide an additional turning lane), physically 
separated from bus lanes by a concrete curb. A dedicated lane for non-motorized transport 
(2.5m) runs on both sides of the entire corridor length, also separated from the motorized vehicle 
(MV) lane by a high concrete curb. Alongside the non-motorized vehicle (NMV) lane runs a 
disabled-accessible footpath with tactile and open level crossings. This improves the safety of 
bicyclists and pedestrians and reduces pollution by encouraging these modes of transit. Regularly 
spaced street lighting improves security and safety of road users. A two feet wide area between 
the MV and NMV lanes is kept unpaved, to accommodate underground services and landscaping, 
and also serves as a barrier between MV and NMV providing enhanced psychological and 
physical safety to cyclists along more than 75% of it’s length (DIMTS, 2010; GNCTD & DIMTS, 
2008; G. Tiwari, 2010; TRIPP, 2005a).  Figure 5.5 depicts a typical corridor cross section. 
 
 
                                                        
72 The right of way along the Delhi BRT corridor varies from 28 to 51.5 meters (DIMTS, 2010). 
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Figure 5.5.  Typical Delhi BRT cross-section. Source: DIMTS 
 
STATIONS.  Bus stations are spaced approximately 500m apart on central platforms that are 
staggered approximately 20 m inside the intersection on either side for buses travelling in 
opposite directions. Each station has parallel platforms to maximize boarding capacity and 
minimize signal timing. Stations are built up, allowing level access to that portion of the fleet that 
has been upgraded to low floor configurations. Stations are a modern open design with some 
shelter and are accessed at grade through pedestrian crossings at intersections as shown in 






Figure 5.6.  Delhi BRT station.  Photograph by author. 
 
BUS FLEET .  The Delhi BRT has no dedicated fleet. Buses are operated on the Delhi corridor by 
a variety of public and private operators. Access is also provided to charter buses and emergency 
vehicles. Initially, the majority of the buses that operate on the corridor were older, poorly 
maintained stock with drivers that were untrained on docking procedures or corridor operation. 
This led to problems with bus bunching, unsafe passenger boarding, bus crowding, stalled 
vehicles and platform congestion (Aaron, 2008; Overdorf, 2012; TH, 2008b).  Figure 5.7 shows 
some of the initial variation in bus quality. Over time DTC has invested significantly in fleet 
upgrading accessing JnNURM funds to gradually overcome the most significant bus quality 
issues (Dario Hidalgo, January 7, 2014, Email communication with author). Low floor CNG buses 
were purchased that offer improved emission standards, and also require only a single step entry 
and come equipped with a simple manually operated ramp for wheel chair customers. Within the 
BRTS system, these buses are level with the platform allowing easy access and faster 
boarding/improved efficiency.  This also vastly improves accessibility for disadvantaged groups 
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Figure 5.7.  Varying bus quality. Photograph from www.indianexpress.com. 
 
ITS.  Upgraded low floor buses operating on four routes (route numbers 419. 423, 521 and 522) 
are equipped with GPS that are fed to PIS systems at all 57 stations (refer figure 5.8). This allows 
passengers to receive updates on waiting times for these routes (Rakesh Katyal, September 19, 
2012, Interview with author). However, many buses operate without GPS equipment so PIS 
systems offer only partial information to passengers (GNCTD & DIMTS, 2008). Ticketing is on-
board and there are no imminent plans for fare integration or smartcard facilities. Intersections 
are controlled by an intelligent signaling system, installed in response to initial problems (Rakesh 
Katyal, September 6, 2012, Presentation at Asian BRTS conference). The complex intersection 
design and six phase traffic signals continues to cause long delays and queuing at intersections 
(Joshi & Bramhecha, 2010). To support oversight an Operational Control Center (OCC) has been 
established at Kashmere Gate, which is supplemented by field data recorded at DTC Khan Pur 
Depot (DIMTS, 2010: personal observation). This information is used by DIMTS to monitor bus 
 
operation and corridor safety.  It is not however linked to bus dispatch, which is operated 
independently by DTC. (Rakesh Katyal, September 19, 2012, Interv
 
Figure 5.8 .  Delhi BRT passenger information system
 
MODE INTEGRATION. A comparison of the level of integration of Delhi and Ahmedabad is not 
entirely valid due to the length of 
most part as an express bus lane for existing bus services.
link effectively with the parallel metro service 
achieved a high level of integration within the road cross section
pedestrian and cycle traffic as well as parking, hawking, signaling, signage and landscapin
figure 5.9).   
 
The treatment of the complete cross sections of the road space is what renders BRT as a 
new technology for the Indian city, as it also facilitates a new way of using the streets, with 
a clear emphasis on issues of safety, accessibi
BRTS has a broader impact on the lifestyles and habits of the citizens as their behavior is 





. Photograph from DIMTS. 
operational corridor. The Delhi BRT currently operates for the 
 It has been criticized for 
(Overdorf, 2012). The Delhi BRT has however 
 – incorporating vehicular, 
lity, convenience and speed of transit.  The 
(Baijal, 2011, p. 
. 
 




Figure 5.9.  Delhi NMT facilities. Photograph by author. 
 
At intersections pedestrian footpaths merge into marked, at-grade zebra crossings, with 
pedestrian holding areas and street vendors facilities were required. Three wheeler parking is 
also provided near intersections along the curbside lane and for bicycle and bicycle rickshaws 
along the non-motorized vehicle lanes at intersections. To promote bicycle use a “Pay and Hire 
Bicycle” facility is located at each bus stop along the corridor, offering bicycles for rent (refer to 
Figure 5.10) (Joshi & Bramhecha, 2010). Where right of way allows, some on-street parking is 
provided for 2 wheelers and cars alongside the motorized lanes to facilitate integration with 




Figure 5.10.  Bike hire facilities. Photograph by author. 
 
5.3.2 Institutional Arrangements 
 
Institutional arrangements in Delhi are necessarily ‘muddy’ due to the many layers of government 
with responsibilities within the capital territory. Though there was strong leadership from the Chief 
Minister at different stages of the Delhi BRT project, lines of communication between agencies 
were hierarchical and the planning process was marked by a lack of clear ownership (DIMTS, 
2010; Ponnaluri, 2011).  
 
Administratively, the Dehli BRT is under the aegis of the Transport Department of the GNCTD 
and the project was financed by direct grants from the GNCTD. RITES assumed project 
management responsibilities and TRIPP was charged with providing concept and design services.  
DIMTS is the corridor manager with responsibility for implementation and management of corridor 
operations. DIMTS engaged private sector partners for construction of the BRT corridor 
infrastructure, maintenance of corridor infrastructure, management of advertising, and provision 
of traffic marshals etc. The federally managed Delhi Traffic Police are responsible for corridor 
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enforcement and safety. Within the corridor, buses are operated by both DTC and private 
operators licensed by the Transport Department of the GNCTD (Baijal, 2011). DTC is also 
responsible for operation and maintenance of bus terminals and depots (Baijal, 2011; Bhatia & 
Jain, 2009a, 2009b). Figure 5.11 depicts the institutional responsibilities for implementation and 
operation of the Delhi BRT. 
 
 
Figure 5.11.  Institutional responsibilities for De lhi BRT.  
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5.3.3 Financing Arrangements 
 
The Delhi BRT was funded entirely from the budgetary resources of the Transport Department of 
the GNCTD (Baijal, 2011). Total cost of the 14.5 km Delhi BRT project was Rs.2150 million (USD 
$45 million). Of this only 5.8 km of the corridor is operational. Though the remaining length of the 
pilot has been provided with BRT infrastructure (including dedicated cycle and pedestrian tracks), 
the bus lane is not physically separated and continues to operate on the left hand side of the road 
with mixed traffic. The average cost of construction of this corridor is about Rs.148.3 million/km 
(or USD 3.1 million/km). This does not include the cost of rolling stock as bus operations are 
funded separately (Baijal, 2011; GNCTD & DIMTS, 2008). 
 
Maintenance costs of the corridor (including road marshals and other repair and maintenance) 
are estimated at Rs.212 million per annum.  Buses operated by licensed private contractors and 
DTC serve the corridor and collect fares directly. Thus DIMTS revenues are limited to 
advertisement rights on bus shelters. Deficits are funded by GNCTD (Rakesh Katyal, September 
19, 2012, Interview with author). 
 
In Delhi there is no agreed fare revision policy. Currently fares are set at a standard rate for all 
buses in the city. These vary from Rs.5 to Rs.25 depending on distance travelled and whether 
buses offer air-conditioning (Baijal, 2011). 
 
5.3.4 Current Status 
 
Today, the Delhi BRT continues to operate as a ‘direct service’ or ‘open’ system with buses 
travelling both within and outside the dedicated bus corridor. The extent of the corridor remains 
limited to the initial 5.8km pilot length that comprises 9 stations and serves 57 bus routes 
operated by DTC and private contractors. These buses are a mix of low floor and high floor 
configurations, air-conditioned and non air-conditioned. Tickets are issued manually with on-
board fare collection. The dedicated lanes are also open to charter and school buses as well as 
 115 
emergency vehicles such as ambulances, fire engines and police vehicles (Baijal, 2011; GNCTD 
& DIMTS, 2008; HIdalgo & Pai, 2009; Kishore, 2009).   
 
The throughput of passengers and buses on the short corridor is impressive.  On average 3000 
buses ply the corridor each day with an estimated 240 buses carrying 13500 pphpd during peak 
hour (G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). Operations run seven days a week from 7am to 11pm with a 
frequency ranging from 5 to 10 minutes (Baijal, 2011). The total ridership is 85,000 passengers a 
day along the corridor with an additional 4,000-6,000 cyclists/day travelling on the high quality 
bicycle lanes73. Average speeds on the bus lane are 16-18km/hr., compared with 12-16km/hr. on 
the motorized lanes, though the short operational length limits timesavings. Bicycle sharing 
schemes also operate from 5 cycle stations located along the route (Rakesh Katyal, September 6, 
2012, Presentation at Asian BRTS Conference).   
 
Some of the initial operational problems have been overcome.  Traffic signal hardware issues 
have been resolved however six phase signals continue to create long queues at intersections.  
DIMTS has deployed 180 road marshals, across two shifts, to support enforcement, guide 
passengers, and assist children and elderly to cross road. To familiarize marshals with their 
duties, DIMTS provided training with the Delhi Traffic Police and the Institute of Driving Training 
and Research (IDTR) prior to deployment. Two shifts of 15 security guards have also been 
allocated to bus platforms on a 24-hour basis to improve safety of bus passengers (DIMTS, 2010, 
2012).  A total of 700 drivers (including DTC, PSC and school bus drivers) have also received 
training at IDTR to improve driving safety and reduce accidents along the corridor. To manage 
vehicle breakdowns and maintain traffic flow DIMTs contracted a designated crane to remove 
disabled vehicles from the corridor74. Cleaning and landscaping is also contracted out and 
deployed daily to keep lanes, stations and signage in good condition (DIMTS, 2010; GNCTD & 
                                                        
73 ITDP has rated Delhi’s bicycle lanes as Grade A with bicycle flows that rival China, at up to 1200 
bicycles/hour (GNCTD & DIMTS, 2008). 
 
74 Since the commencement of operations, on average 3 vehicles break down on the corridor per day.  
Response time to all disabled vehicles, including buses is 10 minutes (DIMTS, 2010). 
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DIMTS, 2008).  Despite these measures however, there is evidence of infrastructure deterioration 
along the corridor with damage to bus stations, and ongoing encroachment of cycle and footpaths 
(Author observation, September 2012). 
 
Interestingly, consumer satisfaction surveys of the Delhi BRT belie the negative publicity that it 
has received. The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) conducted a user satisfaction 
survey of 1500 respondents in June 2008. The results suggested that 88% of bus commuters 
were happy with the Delhi BRT service. In addition 85% bicyclists and pedestrians were happy 
with corridor improvements, as well as (somewhat surprisingly) 50% of car and 2 wheeler 
commuters. Given the high volume of bus and NMT commuters, this equates to an overwhelming 
proportion (83%) of corridor commuters who have expressed satisfaction with the Delhi BRT and 
want it to be continued (DIMTS, 2008; HIdalgo & Pai, 2009; Nupur, 2012).   When users were 
asked to specify problems with the system, complaints centered on crossing facilities and 
inadequate enforcement of bicycle and pedestrian lanes (Nupur, 2012).   
 
Today, the future of the Delhi BRT is precarious and is likely to be played out in the political arena. 
It is clear that the Delhi BRT faced numerous design, institutional and political obstacles and 
suffered a ‘first mover’ disadvantage in India.  In many ways the High Court ruling that re-opened 
the corridor in September 2012 was a great victory, unequivocally establishing that the benefits of 
the BRT exceeded its costs.  The corridor has also led the way in the design and integration of 
NMT facilities into the road cross section in India.   Despite the criticism, ridership numbers and 
customer satisfaction ratings for the Delhi BRT are favorable.  And yet pre-election discourse 
from both major parties suggest that the current corridor may be dismantled (Mathur, 2013).  A 
final decision regarding its fate awaits the newly formed government in Delhi.  Perceptions are 




6  COMPARING EXPERIENCES AND CONTRASTING OUTCOMES 
 






In this chapter we will compare and contrast the experiences of the BRT planning process in 
Delhi and Ahmedabad to develop an understanding of the distinctly different situations and 
decisions made in the two schemes and how this translated to outcomes. The chapter is divided 
into two parts. The first describes the quite different project contexts, before outlining the 
differences in our key variables of concern - design, institutions, politics and planning process.  
With this as background, the second half of the chapter will show how this led to different 
outcomes, both real and perceived.     
 
6.1 Comparing experiences 
 
 
6.1.1 Differences in project context  
 
Before commencing this analysis, it is essential to understand that the projects faced quite 
different urban contexts. While Delhi and Ahmedabad are both important administrative and 
financial centers in India, Delhi’s status as the nation’s capital grants it particular distinction.  It 
also complicates institutional arrangements with responsibilities divided between federal, state 
and local agencies within the city. Delhi is also an order of magnitude larger than Ahmedabad 




Table 6.1.  Comparing Delhi and Ahmedabad.  
DATA DELHI AHMEDABAD  
Description India’s Capital City, and also 
National Capital Territory (NCT) 
Financial and administrative hub 
of Gujarat 
Area 1483 sq. km 466 sq. km 
Population 22M  6.3 M  
Average population density 12005 persons/sq. km 11297 persons/sq. km 
Median household income USD221 USD114 
Physical description Poly-nucleated, mixed land use, 
expansive road network 
Compact city, mixed land use, 
ring-radial road network 
Average trip length 10.2 km 5.4 km 
Public Transport  (prior to BRT) Public and private bus  
Delhi METRO 
Municipal bus service (AMTS) 
Cars/1000 population 117 55 
Vehicles/1000 population 355 371 
















Institutional Divided responsibility between 
federal/state/local 
Clear and fully empowered 
state/city institutional 
responsibilities 
*Data sources: (Baijal, 2011; Bose et al., 2001; DDA, 2013; EMBARQ, 2007; GOI, 2011; NIUA, 2009) 
 
The table depicts the distinct geographic and demographic features of Ahmedabad and Delhi that 
have resulted in quite different transport patterns in the two cities. Firstly, the dense but dispersed, 
poly-nucleated layout of Delhi results in longer average trip lengths then in more compact 
Ahmedabad, making NMT trips less practicable and the population more reliant on public 
transport. Secondly, residents of Delhi are significantly wealthier with higher rates of car 
ownership. Interestingly vehicle ownership rates in Ahmedabad are comparable, however 
residents in this city opt for more affordable two-wheelers. Both cities have a demand for public 
transport and experience with public bus service provision. Demand for public transport is highest 
in Delhi but the development of the Delhi Metro has introduced competition for this market.  
 
6.1.2 Differences in project variables 
 
In the introduction I discussed the importance of three key variables to project outcomes:  design, 





DESIGN.  From initial concept through to detailed design there were clear contrasts between the 
objectives and design details of the BRT systems in Delhi and Ahmedabad.   
 
(I) Goals.  From the outset, the goals of BRT provision in the two schemes were distinctly 
different. Driven by air pollution and traffic safety concerns, the BRT proposal in Delhi 
aimed not to replace, but rather to upgrade and improve existing bus service. In contrast, 
the Ahmedabad BRT was designed to serve as a new, modern, high quality and 
affordable rapid transit system for the city.  
 
The systems also had different approaches to equity. Planners of the Delhi BRT had 
ambitious equity goals and saw the BRT as an opportunity to redistribute road space 
evenly, shifting lane space from motorized vehicles towards public transport and NMT 
facilities. The redesign of the road cross section in this manner was expected to reduce 
traffic accidents and encourage more environmentally sustainable travel patterns. 
(Geetam Tiwari, September 14,2012, Interview with author). In Ahmedabad planners 
were more pragmatic.  Though equity goals were important and led to the provision of 
some NMT facilities, the aim of the redesign was to improve the travel conditions of all 
existing users - motorized vehicles, buses, as well as cyclists and pedestrians.  Critically, 
no space was taken from motorized vehicles.  Instead car users benefited from BRT 
investment through the provision of 8 additional flyovers, 2 rail overs and 2 river bridges 
as part of Phase I and Phase II construction (Shivanand Swamy, September 11, 2012, 
Interview with author). 
 
(ii) Layout and Corridor Selection.  The layout of the BRT master plan for the two cities, 
and selection of pilot corridor were also distinct. In Delhi, the BRT master plan was 
conceived as a series of corridors to fill in the gaps in planned metro service provision. A 
single, highly congested corridor was selected for the initial pilot, with the rationale that 
BRT needed to be successfully demonstrated under difficult conditions for it to be 
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considered a realistic alternative for Delhi (Geetam Tiwari, September 14 and Sandeep 
Gandhi September 19, 2012, Interviews with author). In Ahmedabad they pursued an 
alternate strategy.  The premise of the master plan was to ‘design networks, not corridors” 
that would ‘ connect busy places, but avoid busy roads’ (Shivanand Swamy, September 
11, 2012, Interview with author)(AMC, 2012).  The aim was to maximize coverage and 
connectivity throughout the city but to avoid congested corridors. In contrast to Delhi, the 
selection of the initial pilot corridor in Ahmedabad was based on ease of implementation 
(Refer figures 4.3 and 5.3).   
 
(iii)  Open vs Closed.  Perhaps the most fundamental design difference between the 
Delhi and Ahmedabad system is that the former was designed to operate as an open 
system, and the latter as a closed system. This has created striking differences in the 
standard and nature of operations.  
 
In an open system - as adopted in Delhi – the dedicated bus corridor is open to access 
by all public and private buses, including school buses, charter buses as well as 
emergency vehicles. The advantage of this approach is that it facilitates seamless travel 
from origin to destination, expanding both catchment area and accessibility for users by 
eliminating the need for transfers (TRIPP, 2008).  In the short term at least, open 
operation in Delhi was essential. The limited 5.8 km length of the pilot corridor is less 
than the average Delhi commuter trip length.  Introducing transfers for this limited 
distance would have alienated users.  However there are serious drawbacks of open 
systems.  Firstly, the corridor manager has limited control over fleet operations or service 
quality beyond the provision of improved physical facilities (e.g. platforms, crossings, 
pavement, signals). Though some of the municipal bus fleet in Delhi was upgraded to low 
floor CNG buses, at least initially, the majority of the buses operating on the corridor 
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remained unchanged, offering the same poor quality service75. The open corridor 
operation also requires frequent access and egress for buses. This adds physical 
complexity to the corridor, requiring additional turning movements and traffic signals 
phases at already congested intersections. These factors – intersection complexity, traffic 
signal delays and poor service quality – generated a lot of criticism upon 
operationalization of the scheme and fueled opposition to the BRT (ITDP, undated). 
 
In contrast, Ahmedabad’s closed system was served by a dedicated and specialized fleet 
of Janmarg buses purposefully built and operated by the corridor manager – AJL. These 
buses provided trunk service along the dedicated corridor, requiring connection to feeder 
services such as auto-rickshaw or municipal bus service.  Service quality improvements 
and image branding were made possible because of AJL’s control over operations and 
played an integral role in public acceptance of the system. This is despite necessary 
compromises in bus standards (e.g. non CNG, truck chassis – refer to earlier discussion 
in section 4.3) to keep operating costs in line with expected revenues (cost/km). 
(Shivanand Swamy, September 11, 2012, Interview with author). 
 
(iv) Station Design.  In other respects, there were numerous design distinctions between 
the schemes. Though both systems operated on a central bus lane, the design and 
layout of stations were configured differently, with the Delhi system opting for 2 x 2.5 m 
parallel station platforms at the nearside of the junction for each direction (Baijal, 2011; 
TRIPP, 2005a). This arrangement increases passenger capacity because it allows 
boarding/alighting simultaneously on two parallel platforms. Some experts suggest even 
this enhanced capacity was (predictably) inadequate for the high loads experienced on 
the congested corridor  (Christopher Kost, April 17, 2013, Interview with author). 
Designers placed stations close to the intersection to take advantage of existing 
crossings and to minimize travel distances for pedestrians (TRIPP, 2008)(Anumita 
                                                        
75 Over time the DTC fleet throughout Delhi has been upgraded (Dario Hidalgo, January 7, 2014, Email 
communication with author). 
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Chowdury CSE, September 18, 2012, Interview with author). However this decision 
consumed scarce cross section width where it was most needed. It merged buses 
paused at stations with those waiting for green traffic phases, placing additional pressure 
on intersections. Anecdotal reports suggest that the combined effects of these decisions, 
and long traffic signal phases (discussed in section 5.2) led to bunching of buses at 
stations on the Delhi BRT, contributing to congestion and delay problems at intersections 
as well as fostering dangerous off-platform boarding/alighting of passengers (Aaron, 
2008; NDTV, 2008; Overdorf, 2012; TH, 2008b). 
 
In Ahmedabad, the BRT design comprised single 3.5 m x 38m median islands that 
adequately served the much lower flow of passengers. A dedicated fleet of buses 
equipped with doors on both sides allowed these central islands to serve both directions 
– eliminating the need for dual islands and thus freeing cross section width for other 
purposes. Planners learnt from Delhi’s experience and relocated islands mid-block, 
equipping them with dedicated pedestrian crossings. This shifted stopped buses away 
from intersections, alleviating road space pressures at these locations. Fewer turning 
movements were required at intersections because of the closed nature of corridor 
operation. This minimized traffic phases at intersections maintaining throughput along the 
network. Instead of exacerbating congestion, the Ahmedabad BRT was successful in 
improving the flow and speed of all traffic. This was critical in building broad support for 
the system (Baijal, 2011; LBGC, 2001; NIUA, 2009; H.M Shivanand Swamy, 2010). 
 
(v) Cross section design.  Typical cross sections for both Delhi and Ahmedabad are 
provided in Figure 4.7 and 5.5. These vary along the corridor according to the available 
ROW.  In Delhi, critics laud the design of the NMT facilities that included landscaping, 
shading and lighting to enhance user experience (ITDP, undated). However these 
facilities consumed valuable road space and required a reduction in the width of the 
motorized vehicle lanes. The was arguably one of the more damaging design decisions 
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as it alienated powerful motor vehicle users who ultimately led protests against the 
system and were instrumental in its demise. 
 
Motorized traffic lanes were wider in Ahmedabad (for both mixed traffic and buses), but 
cycle lanes were quite narrow at only 2m, with high curbs that further reduced the 
effective width (Geetam Tiwari, September 14, 2012, Interview with author). Bollards 
were placed at entry points to bikeways to prevent encroachment by 2 wheelers, but they 
were placed so close together that they also inhibited access by cyclists.  In many 
locations they have been removed and 2-wheeler encroachment continues unabated 
(Author observations, September 2012).  Planners also eliminated NMT infrastructure 
from cross sections where obstructions and rights of way did not allow (Shivanand 
Swamy, September 11, 2012, Interview with author). This resulted in discontinuous NMT 
facilities along many corridors in Ahmedabad severely undermining the functionality of 
NMT facilities (Kost & Kodukula, 2012; Mahadevia & Joshi, 2012). 
 
(vi) ITS.  Both Delhi and Ahmedabad BRT invested in ITS technologies – including 
passenger information systems (PIS) and GPS equipped buses – managed through a 
central OCC.  However in Delhi these services only monitor upgraded municipal buses. 
They therefore offer incomplete data for passengers and operators (Rakesh Katyal, 
September 19, 2012, Interview and author inspection of OCC). In Delhi, bus ticketing 
occurs on-board.  Intelligent Signaling systems (ITS) have also recently been installed in 
Delhi to help manage intersection flows (Sandeep Gandhi, September 19, 2012, 
Interview with author). In contrast, Ahmedabad’s closed system and stations enable off-
board ticketing including the recent introduction of a smart card, with a future plans for 
fare integration across the transportation network (Baijal, 2011; NIUA, 2009).   
 
(vii) Integration with other public transport services. Critics of both schemes suggest that 
the BRTs are poorly integrated with other public transport services (Hidalgo & Pai, 2012b; 
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G. Tiwari & Jain, 2010). The Delhi BRT has no links to the more extensive Delhi Metro 
network (Overdorf, 2012). This is attributed to a rivalrous relationship between the Metro 
and BRT planners during the development phase.  Instead of placating this tension, the 
Delhi team inflamed relationships with public criticisms of the metro (Mohan, 2008). A 
metro proposal also exists for Ahmedabad, but in the absence of detailed plans 
integration discussions remain conceptual. Planners in Ahmedabad were careful to avoid 
competition with the metro during the planning phase, and displayed a more conciliatory 
and complementary approach to this alternative transportation option. They deliberately 
sought rail advocates to publicly support the BRT (Raghuram, 2009)(Shivanand Swamy, 
September 11 2012, Interview with author).  Interestingly, a champion of the BRT – I.P. 
Gautam is now serving as head of the Ahmedabad Rail Corporation and is spearheading 
new urban rail efforts within Ahmedabad and the adjoining state capital, Gandhinagar 
(TOI, 2013). 
 
In Delhi there was a concerted effort to integrate the BRT with NMT facilities. This 
included the innovative “Green Bike’ initiative that incorporated 5 pay and hire bicycle 
stations along the short pilot corridor. Planners developed aesthetically appealing and 
accessible footpaths for pedestrians, and even incorporated vendor facilities into 
intersection design where space was available (TRIPP, 2005a).  In Ahmedabad planners 
paid less attention to NMT infrastructure, however they did integrate BRT corridor 
extensions with redevelopment projects in the city. For example, the pilot corridor was 
extended to Kankaria Lake76 in December 2009 to coincide with the re-opening and 
week-long celebration (“Kankaria Carnival”) at the newly pedestrianized and upgraded 
recreational area (Shivanand Swamy, September 11, 2012, Interview with author). 
Planners also incorporated parking facilities into the Ahmedabad BRT design to ease 
transfers and generate revenue (Baijal, 2011; NIUA, 2009). 
                                                        
76 Kankaria Lake is one of the largest lakes in the city, located in Southern Ahmedabad. It is a large 
recreational area with many public attractions, including a zoo, toy train, kids city, balloon rides, water rides 
and water park, food stalls and entertainment. The recreational area was recently renovated, and opened in 
December 2009 with a weeklong carnival with many cultural, art and social events.   
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INSTITUTIONS. The institutional complexities that are inherent to Delhi’s federal status under the 
Indian constitution have already been discussed (refer section 5.1.1 and 5.3.2). It is remarkable 
that in spite of the institutional complexity that roles assigned to different actors within the Delhi 
BRT project remained relatively clear. Responsibility for design (TRIPP, IIT), project management 
(RITES), corridor management (DIMTS) and bus operation (DTC/private) were well defined and 
compartmentalized. Issues did arise however with coordination between the multiple agencies. In 
some instances conflict arose.  For example resistance to BRT design by the Delhi Traffic Police 
(a federal agency) led to weak enforcement of discipline along the corridor and encroachment of 
bus and cycle lanes. This friction seriously impeded operations of the corridor during its initial 
launch (Baijal, 2011).   
 
In Ahmedabad, institutional responsibilities were also clearly demarcated, but they had the 
advantage of strong informal networks between a reduced number of agencies (Baijal, 2011). 
This allowed responsive and quick decision-making and facilitated smooth and rapid 
implementation (Shivanand Swamy, September 11, 2012, Interview with author; Author 
observation of team interactions).  Ownership of the BRT was held by AMC, with design function 
performed by CEPT University (with support from other collaborators). AJL was established as a 
dedicated agency responsible for corridor management and bus operation. In both schemes, 
certain key functions (e.g. landscaping, maintenance etc.) were competitively outsourced to the 
private sector.  
 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.  The schemes received notably different levels of political support and 
leadership – although it is unclear whether this was an influence, or consequence of their 
respective achievements. 
 
At least initially, the Delhi BRT received considerable support from the Chief Minister, the Chief 
Secretary and the Transport commissioner of GNCTD, but repeated changes in the Chief 
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Secretary and shifts in institutional support meant that it ultimately fell to the Chief Minister and 
representatives of RITES and TRIPP to deliver the project (Mohan & Tiwari, 2000; Ponnaluri, 
2011). DIMTS were appointed in 2006, providing an important interface between the Transport 
Department of the GNCTD (client) and other actors, but this was fairly late in the process and 
coincided with growing community resentment against the scheme. As ‘newcomers’ to the 
process they were poorly equipped, lacking the “valuable continuity and deep knowledge that is 
required to support flexible decision making and adaptive change during implementation” (Baijal, 
2011). This impeded the leadership that they were able to lend to the project. 
  
In Ahmedabad, the BRT concept also evolved across multiple agencies (GoG, GIDB, AUDA and 
AMC), but was immediately championed by a powerful leader – the Chief Minister of the State, 
Shri Narendra Modi who promoted and implemented his vision of a ‘People’s Way’.  Shri Modi 
was critical to the uptake of the project and continues to associate with its success.  Videos and 
promotional material of Janmarg feature as part of his campaign for the country’s presidency in 
upcoming elections (IBNLive, 2013; Modi, 2012). Another key protagonist was Mr I.P. Gautam 
(Commissioner, AMC, then Principal Secretary of Urban Development and Urban Housing 
Department, Government of Gujarat) whose service as Commissioner of AMC was extended to 
maintain continuity for the project (Dario Hidalgo, January 7, 2013, Email communication). Prof 
Shivanand Swamy of CEPT then gave shape to the vision. These individuals offered continuity 
and leadership that really sets Ahmedabad apart. The Chief Minister, Commissioner AMC 
(project owner); and CEPT (project consultant) remain unchanged and consistent in their support 
over the duration of the project. Strong links were forged between these key actors, as well as 
across academic, political and administrative bodies.  Though clearly successful until now, 
commentators on the system suggest there is a need to transform these personal relationships 




6.1.3 Differences in planning process 
 
So far, I have outlined the key differences in project context and variables between Delhi and 
Ahmedabad. They were clearly numerous and significant, and had an important influence on 
outcomes.  But the role of the planning process itself is often overlooked. In this section I will 
discuss how the planning process varied between the two projects, and how it contributed to 
outcomes. Using the three dimensional framework developed in chapter 3 I will examine each of 
the three dimensions of the planning process individually – process steps, process timing and 
process strategy and tactics. 
 
PROCESS STEPS.  In many ways, the planning process in both projects followed a similar 
sequence of steps. BRT was identified in both cities as one of numerous transportation solutions 
to growing congestion, pollution, and safety concerns. In Ahmedabad, the concept for a BRT 
emerged from the citywide Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS) study. In Delhi, planners 
identified BRT as a transportation option under a Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) study.  
In both cities, BRT was evaluated in detail. Planners for both schemes undertook detailed traffic 
surveys and demand assessments, collected interviews and socioeconomic data and carefully 
analyzed results. International experts supported them both, with ITDP playing a key role initially 
in both projects.  During the design process, planners consulted extensively with stakeholders, 
sought expert input through multiple workshops, and embarked on community outreach.     
 
There were however subtle differences in the phasing and sequencing of work. In Delhi steps 
were followed sequentially in a technocratic manner. Though only a pilot portion (5.8km of 
planned 14.5km) of the corridor was initially constructed, the design of the entire length was 
largely fixed prior to construction with limited opportunity for adjustment. In contrast, the planning 
process in Ahmedabad was deliberately incremental and phases overlapped. Rather than wait to 
launch a completed network, planners chose to expand its coverage in 5-10km segments, 
launching new sections in a phased manner. This strategy of continuous advancement was 
effective in building momentum around the project, strengthening public support as payoffs for the 
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inconvenience of construction became apparent in the short term. The incremental approach 
employed by the planning team also encouraged innovation, allowing new ideas to be tested and 
feedback incorporated before full-scale launch. Construction was phased to maximize this 
opportunity.  For example, Phase II design was held until construction on Phase I commenced.  
This allowed experiences to be incorporated into future design and resulted in significant 
modifications including the provision of overtaking lanes at bus-stops, shifting of bus stop 
locations away from intersections, relocation of lighting from bus median to curb, and widening of 
footpaths and bicycle lanes. Incrementalism was used to advantage also in the free three-month, 
pre-launch trial of the pilot corridor as well as the construction of the prototype bus stop.  It 
offered opportunities to foster public understanding of the system and solicit feedback 
(Harshadrya Solanki, September 13, 2012, Interview with author).  
 
Beyond the sequencing of project steps, other important differences in the nature of the planning 
process in Delhi and Ahmedabad emerged, particularly in relation to timing (i.e. duration and 
moment of action), strategy (i.e. style, actor interaction, and communication strategy) as well 
tactics (e.g. project launch, communication techniques). 
 
PROCESS TIMING.  Timing is often overlooked in the planning process, but is perhaps one of 
the most noticeable differences between the two schemes in terms of both duration and moment 
of action. 
 
(I) Duration.   While the BRT in Ahmedabad took just 4 and a half years to implement 
from initial concept to system opening, the Delhi BRT took considerably longer, with a 12-
year period elapsing between concept and operational launch. The precise cause of 
delays in Delhi is unclear, however there was an extended period of silence on project 
activities from design in 2003-2004 to commencement of construction in late 2006 
creating discontinuity. Baijal (2011) suggests that the large number of actors (i.e. GNCTD, 
CPCB, TRIPP and RITES) engaged in concept development and design, and a lack of 
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political continuity contributed to the extended development phase. In contrast, the 
Ahmedabad BRT planning process was relatively rapid, exhibiting a steady momentum 
with continuous and well-broadcasted progress (Dave & Agarwal, 2009; Devarhubli, 
2013; DNA, 2008a, 2008b, 2009b, 2010a; IBI, 2009a; IE, 2010; P. John, 2008; Kaushik, 
2010; Lohia, 2009; Manish, 2010; Padia, 2009; Raghuram, 2009; Rana, 2009a, 2009b, 
2011; TOI, 2007, 2010; Vijayapalan, 2008).  Leadership continuity and political support 
both contributed to, and benefited from this rapid pace.  
 
(II) Moment of action.  There were also discrete differences in the ‘moment of action’ – or 
point at which key decisions were made or acted upon. This makes a difference to how 
well integrated the project is with other initiatives and thus the breadth of support for the 
project. In Delhi, the planners made no explicit attempt to tie the planning process into 
local events or to align the project with parallel transportation initiatives. The project was 
pursued largely independently of other sector activities with limited consideration given to 
the timing of key project milestones. One such missed opportunity was the rollout of 
NUTP and associated financing under the JnNURM program at end of 2005/beginning of 
2006. These initiatives were launched early in the concept design process for the Delhi 
BRT. Yet planners failed to tap into the valuable political and financial capital available 
under this national policy (NUTP) and program (JnNURM) to build support for the Delhi 
system77.  This is in direct contrast to the Ahmedabad BRT that actively pursued and 
benefited from its connection to these initiatives. JnNURM funded 35% of the project 
costs for the Ahmedabad BRT, and its affiliation with the NUTP lent it political support at 
the national level and access to expert input. To be fair, the Ahmedabad BRT proposal 
was less evolved at the time JnNURM and NUTP was launched and therefore arguably 
more receptive to the opportunities offered by these initiatives. In addition, Delhi had 
already secured funding for the project so did not have financial motivation. But there are 
                                                        
77 The Delhi BRT corridor facilities and infrastructure received no JnNURM funding, however funds were 
accessed separately to finance bus reform (route consolidation) and upgrading of the municipal bus fleet 
(Rakesh Katyal, September 19, 2013, Interview with author). 
 130 
benefits to diversifying support that do not need to rely on fortuity. Planners have the 
ability to time their ‘moment of action’, building their project so that it aligns with broader 
and more powerful initiatives that can lend it support. In Delhi, it may have been prudent 
to slow down concept development, taking time to monitor progress at the national level 
in an attempt to coordinate with policy and financing developments at this level. Better 
integration with NUTP and JnNURM might have arguably broadened political support for 
the Delhi BRT, bringing onside powerful actors who might have ultimately saved the 
project from the media’s fury, or at least helped to mitigate the public damage. 
 
Not all projects will have the good fortune to align with national policy and funding 
programs.  Nevertheless it is possible to build support for a project by looking beyond 
project boundaries to other activities at state and local levels. From a policy perspective, 
the Ahmedabad BRT was well integrated with the “Accessible Ahmedabad” as well as the 
Gujarat “Year of Urban Development” at local and state levels respectively. These multi-
sector, multi-level initiatives expanded support for the project beyond just transport 
advocates and across levels of government. At a project level also, planners of the 
Ahmedabad BRT actively sought opportunities to coordinate milestones with local events.  
An excellent example of this was the coordination of BRT corridor construction with the 
pedestrianization and upgrade of a central public space in Ahmedabad – Kankaria Lake.  
Planners carefully timed and integrated the BRT at-grade connection to the popular 
recreational area. It opened the Kankaria Lake loop segment for operation to coincide 
with the Kankaria Festival in December 2009. The Ahmedabad BRT provided service to 
carnival attendees and offers a best practice example of how to link land use and 
transportation that simultaneously generates public good will and increases ridership 




STRATEGY AND TACTICS.   Timing however was but one element of the planning process that 
distinguishes the two systems. The strategies pursued by the planning teams were different.  This 
can be seen in the overall approach or ‘style’, nature of actor interaction, and communication 
strategy. Specific tactics and/or techniques also yielded considerable success. 
 
(I) Style.  In Delhi, the planners had aspirations for the BRT corridor that extended 
beyond improved bus service. They viewed the project as a much-needed opportunity to 
‘reform’ the road cross section, reallocating road space on principles of equity.  
Considerable effort was dedicated to developing transformative designs for NMT 
infrastructure. Their approach was highly principled and technocratic, grounded in 
rigorous analytical assessment and sound economic argument. The essence of this ‘style’ 
or ‘approach’ to the planning process is reflected in their decision to test the BRT concept 
on one of the city’s’ most highly congested corridors – suggesting that if it could work 
there, it could work anywhere. In hindsight, this principled and somewhat idealistic stance 
led to design and institutional choices that made outcomes more difficult. Another 
example was the decision to reduce the width of the motor vehicle lane at intersections. 
Though technically necessary to achieve the high standards of bus, pedestrian and 
bicycle service desired in the scheme, it was politically (and predictably) fatal for the 
scheme given the volume and influence of private motor vehicle users that relied on the 
corridor. The planning process is Delhi was highly principled, but also relatively fixed 
which ultimately limited its ability to adapt as circumstances changed – at least until too 
late. Though feedback was actively sought in workshops and community outreach 
activities conducted during initial design stages, there is no evidence of modification 
beyond this period as construction and operations commenced.   
 
In stark contrast, the planning process in Ahmedabad can best be described as 
pragmatic, and flexible. Learning from the experience in Delhi, the initial trial corridor in 
Ahmedabad was selected based on a variety of criteria, not least of which was that it was 
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‘easily implementable’. It was eventually sited in a relatively low-density area with low 
traffic volumes. This decision reflected the planning team’s practical, and clearly 
articulated philosophy to ‘connect busy places but avoid busy roads” (Shivanand Swamy, 
September 11,2012, Interview with author). Likewise, equity was an important design 
principle for the planning team, but there was an explicit understanding that this could not 
be achieved at the expense of existing road users. The revised road cross-section design 
benefited all corridor users. It included provision for bikeways and footpaths for bicyclists 
and pedestrians, central dedicated bus lanes, as well as parking facilities while 
maintaining existing motor vehicle lane width. Even car users benefited from the BRT 
plans because investment was made in augmenting the existing road system. This 
included construction of additional bridges over the Sabarmati River, grade separation of 
busy intersections, and widening and beautification of the ROW in almost all corridors. 
 
Compromise was inevitable however, and poorer users did not benefit as much as they 
might in Ahmedabad. Where rights of way were constrained, bicycle lanes and footpaths 
were omitted. As a result the NMT infrastructure along the corridor is discontinuous which 
seriously undermines the functionality of these facilities (Kost & Kodukula, 2012; G. 
Tiwari & Jain, 2010). Another negative impact that has received limited attention is the 
elimination of ROW encroachments prior to construction that adversely impacted 
residents and business owners (Mahadevia et al., 2013). 
 
There are numerous other examples however of how the pragmatic philosophy adopted 
by the planning team resulted in stronger outcomes. This was exhibited in their 
willingness to re-bid the bus tender and to consider less appealing, but more affordable 
diesel high floor buses when initial tender costs of CNG alternatives came in too high to 
enable cost recovery. Indeed, numerous tenders had to be rebid as part of the learning 
process that was characterized by trial and error. Pragmatism was also displayed in 
design and construction decisions. For example, curb cuts designed to improve access to 
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island platforms were subsequently re-installed when they became turning points for two 
wheelers, creating dangerous conditions for pedestrians entering stations (refer figure 









Table 6.2.  Temple and Mosque adaptations in Ahmedabad. Source: Baijal 2011. 
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Finally, the approach to the planning process in Ahmedabad was inherently flexible. An 
excellent example was the adaptive approach of planners to negotiations concerning 
relocation of a Muslim shrine “Peer Kamal Dargah” on the pilot corridor. Religious 
negotiations are highly political in Gujarat because of entrenched tensions between 
Hindu groups and the Muslim minority. Rather than adopt a ‘standard’ solution, they 
negotiated with local and national Muslim leaders to relocate the mosque. Though this 
caused initial project delays, it eventually resulted in an agreement by the local Muslim 
community to dismantle a portion of the mosque that directly impeded the carriageway.  
Hindu resentment then surfaced at what was perceived as preferential treatment given to 
the Muslims. Planners therefore agreed to allow a number of small Hindu temples to 
remain untouched despite their encroachment on the roadway (refer figure 6.2)(Baijal, 
2011).  Though far from technically optimal, the solution developed by the planner’s 
exhibits the flexibility of the team and it’s intuitive understanding and ability to respond to 
political and social imperatives including religious equity. 
 
This flexibility permeated the design and construction process. Planners displayed a 
willingness to adapt even though this led to short-term delays. For example, several 
contracts had to be re-bid where results were undesirable (refer earlier discussion in 
6.5.1.2), or phasing of works had to be adjusted to take into account changing conditions 
(e.g. flooding issues along some lengths resulted in adjustment to phase I and II works).   
The detailed project report for the Ahmedabad BRT discusses how over 100 design 
modifications were made during implementation of the project. These ranged from 
relatively major redesigns as construction started (e.g. the relocation of bus stops to 
central median from central curbside lane) to minor tweaks of station or lighting design to 
take into account site conditions (AMC, 2007).  
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(ii) Actor interaction.  The distinct ‘styles’ or ‘approaches’ to planning in Delhi and 
Ahmedabad were mirrored by differences in the way the project teams interacted. In 
Delhi the relationships between project agents was formal and indirect with hierarchical 
top-down reporting structures. There was also additional complexity created by the mixed 
federal/state/local jurisdiction of the project that necessarily engaged more actors and 
made collaborative engagement and feedback between actors difficult. Incentives were 
not always aligned, and relationships were sometimes adversarial. This is illustrated in 
the initial months of corridor operation by the recalcitrance of the Delhi Traffic Police 
charged with monitoring and enforcing the corridor (Ponnaluri, 2011). There are also 
suggestions that the design team TRIPP were somewhat isolated from other project 
actors inhibiting interaction and feedback between the design and implementation teams 
(Baijal, 2011). The multi-agency, multi-government, multi-sector institutions involved in 
the Delhi BRT project required a more traditional, segmented, top-down reporting 
structure that inherently supported its more idealistic and fixed approach to planning. 
 
In Ahmedabad, relationships were instead informal and direct.  Key figures in the 
planning process in Ahmedabad – from the Chief Secretary of the State down to the 
CEPT design team enjoyed a close and collaborative working relationship founded on 
mutual trust and respect. This enabled quick and responsive decision-making that was 
essential to the flexible and incremental planning process in Ahmedabad.   
 
(iii) Communication strategy.  The final aspect of strategy that distinguishes the planning 
process of the two BRT cases concerns communication. Communication campaigns 
were an integral component of the implementation process in both Delhi and Ahmedabad 
but yielded quite different outcomes. Both teams developed and implemented 
communication strategies using in-house resources. Opinions from a wide variety of 
stakeholders were actively sought in both the Delhi and Ahmedabad design processes. 
What distinguishes the two approaches however is that Ahmedabad communication 
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strategy was more comprehensive (engaging advocates and antagonists alike), 
continuous and interactive, while the process in Delhi was interrupted, one-way and 
omitted two powerful lobby groups – car owners and metro advocates.   
 
The details of the two processes are discussed in section 4.2.5 and 5.2.5 respectively.  
The description shows how there were conscientious efforts by the Delhi design team to 
seek feedback from existing users on the layout and usage of the BRT corridor, with a 
particular focus on NMT facilities. A number of workshops provided valuable input to the 
corridor design, but there appears to have been very little follow up or feedback after 
these events. Communication was one-way, and then stopped completely with an almost 
three year period of silence. It wasn’t until after public opinion had turned against the BRT, 
that a newly assigned DIMTS took the reins and embarked on a public relations 
campaign to mitigate the public opinion damage. Innovative techniques were employed 
including blogs, cycle rallies, a flash mob to support the BRT, promotional brochures, 
familiarization sessions, school campaigns and ‘equal road right’ campaigns.  Revealing 
user surveys were commissioned by CSE that demonstrated the overwhelming support 
for the BRT- contrary to the perception portrayed by the media. But in many ways, it was 
too little, too late. Resistance had already emerged and proved too difficult to overcome. 
 
In contrast, Ahmedabad embarked on a communication campaign that was highly 
effective in winning broad public support. Their communication campaign was continuous 
and employed a variety of different formats (e.g. outreach, knowledge sharing, 
technology promotion, branding and transparent and two way communication). The BRT 
planners were outwardly transparent and welcoming of feedback, building trust and 
support amongst Ahmedabad’s residents. Rather than excluding likely protagonists they 
were strategic in targeting these groups for escorted trips and additional outreach in a bid 
to win them over to the merits of the system. Planners strategically decided to ensure 
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benefits from the BRT investment accrued to all road users meaning that there were few 
‘losers’. This ensured widespread support for the system. 
 
Perhaps the masterstroke of the Ahmedabad communication campaign however was the 
decision by planners to showcase the new BRT technology with a free three-month trial 
of the system prior to the commencement of commercial operations. This strengthened 
public acceptance, built ridership and allowed infrastructure and operations to be tested 
prior to official launch. It also gave BRT planners time to incorporate feedback from 
developments emerging in Delhi.  As a first mover, Delhi took a different approach, 
rushing operational launch without the advantage of a trial period. As a direct result, 
untrained drivers, user confusion, and traffic signal failure as well as intersection design 
flaws combined to create chaotic conditions that solidified public opinion against the 
scheme. 
 
(iv)Techniques.  In addition to overall ‘strategy’ there were explicit tactics and techniques 
employed in the two schemes that contributed to their varied success. I just highlighted 
one of the most successful of these - a free three-month pre-launch trial of the 
Ahmedabad BRT that built ridership and support for the system while simultaneously 
trouble shooting potential operational problems. If Delhi had adopted this approach it may 
have been able to mitigate at least some of the damage created by the rushed launch 
and associated traffic signal technology failure. In addition to this measure there was a 
range of innovative techniques – especially relating to communication – that were 
employed in the schemes that are worth highlighting.  These included: 
 
• Media outreach.  In addition to more typical outreach activities (e.g. stakeholder 
consultations, meetings, workshops), planners in Ahmedabad were proactive in 
engaging the media to generate a constructive discussion about the BRT in the local 
and state newspapers. For example, as citizens became concerned about the 
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implications of construction the press ran articles such as ‘No price too high for 
development, say city” (Daily News and Analysis, 15 November 2007) that 
highlighted long term advantages of the system. Other articles reminded residents of 
the cost advantages of bus over rail, and provided updates on design changes and 
construction progress (e.g.“It’s fuel v fare battle in BRTS, Ahmedabad, Paul John, 
The Times of India, 1 July 2008). Asked about the media’s positive bias towards 
Ahmedabad’s BRT, Mr. Paul John (Correspondent, Times of India) explained: 
 
(It) was a response to the positive attitude shown by the project promoters, who 
presented ‘a very balanced face’ to the media. CEPT opened up to the public, 
discussed their plans and technical details and also shared the fact that in the 
introduction of a new technology, there were always some problems but there 
were also solutions to such problems, which would require trust between the 
public and the consultants. It was demonstrated by project authorities that if 
problems occurred, they would be fixed (Baijal, 2011, p. 10.13.17)   
 
Despite the much stronger media presence in Delhi generally, planners had neither a 
close nor open relationship with media outlets and there was no attempt to ‘manage 
the message’. In it is unclear how effective efforts may have been, but in contrast to 
Ahmedabad, negative publicity in Delhi newspapers was relentless and damaging. 
The Delhi case study does nevertheless offer some innovative techniques, 
particularly with regard to outreach to younger stakeholders. In their efforts to reverse 
negative press attention, DIMTS targeted school children to promote their message 
recognizing that they were more likely to be receptive to new ideas and were 
effective at carrying these messages to parents. Awareness campaigns were 
conducted at schools engaging students, teachers, parents, school transport 
authorities and bus drivers with a single message (Baijal, 2011). Social media was 
also used to organize cycle rallies along the corridor; a blog on BRT was 
implemented to discuss issues related to the project; and relevant content was 
uploaded onto Wikipedia, Slide share and similar information sharing sites. On 
September 19, 2010 a Flash Mob was organized in collaboration with Youth for 
Public Transport group, and an ‘equal road right’ campaign was launched to counter 
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messages from the powerful car lobby (Baijal, 2011). Unfortunately, the force of 
opposition to the BRT limited the success of these initiatives. They were helpful 
nonetheless in reversing some of the negative press and hold promise for future 
application. 
• Technology Promotion.  In addition to the pre-launch free trail of the Ahmedabad 
BRT, planners engaged a variety of techniques to test and build familiarity and 
enthusiasm for new technologies introduced as part of the BRT. This included the 
construction of prototype bus stations and public exhibitions of proposals. 
• Branding.  The Ahmedabad BRT image was carefully and consistently managed – 
from it’s strategic naming to the slickly designed facilities and bus stations. The brand 
projected an ‘everyman’ image, generating broad based stakeholder support, while 
also offering ‘world class’ quality. The name and logo were used widely in advertising, 
stationary, signboards, corridor infrastructure and facilities, and staff were provided 
uniforms allowing easy identification and forging unity. Signage was simple and easy 
to understand, and bus stations were designed with a clean and appealing aesthetic 
with comfort of passengers in mind. These strategies were important in making the 
service appealing to a broad range of users, but also in instilling pride and sense of 
identity amongst staff members and the public ((Baijal, 2011).  
• Transparent two-way communication.  Planners of the Ahmedabad BRT did a 
masterful job of instilling a sense of transparency in the process and responding to 
feedback from community and media, incorporating comments into design and 
implementation. Rather than focus solely on outreach they ensured communication 
was transparent and two-way. 
 
6.2 Evaluating Outcomes 
 
 
Having identified key differences between Delhi and Ahmedabad, we now turn to a discussion of 
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outcomes. There is a widespread perception that the Ahmedabad BRT has been incredibly 
successful and that Delhi ‘failed’. This is both supported and perpetuated by the slew of 
international and national awards Janmarg has received, and the adverse media scrutiny, 
negative publicity and ultimately the closure (albeit temporarily) of the Delhi system. In this 
section we will examine the data to separate the reality from perception.   
 
Project success can be defined many ways, and outcome measures can incorporate a wide 
variety of criteria. For the purposes of this dissertation we will borrow from the project 
management literature, which in its simplest terms defines project success in terms of three key 
parameters:  (i) timeliness; (ii) cost-effectiveness; (iii) did project achieve it’s goals and are users 




One measure of project success is on-schedule completion. To determine project completion 
goals against which to evaluate Ahmedabad and Delhi a thorough review was conducted of 
preparation and design documents including DPRs. These were uniformly vague on the matter of 
project schedule. In the absence of specific dates or benchmarks for the projects, the ‘timeliness’ 
of the project will therefore be evaluated by comparing the length of the planning process in each 
of the projects (defined for our purposes as the time from initial concept through to project launch) 
with average experiences for other BRT systems.  
 
Again, data on the precise length of the planning process is variable and limited – possibly due to 
vagueness associated with concept initiation and completion dates – especially where systems 
are being gradually expanded.  Wright has prepared several practitioners guides for designing 
BRT systems (Wright, 2005; Wright & Hook, 2007). He suggests that “a focused BRT planning 
process can be reasonably completed in a period of 12 to 18 months”(Wright & Hook, 2007, p. 7) 
(Wright 2005, 7). In reality, the process has tended to be longer.  In a review of 13 cities in Latin 
American and Asian cities (including Ahmedabad), Hidalgo and Carrrigan (2010) find that BRT 
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systems generally took two to five years to evolve from concept to operationalization. The initial 
phase of the Ahmedabad BRT was implemented in a bit over four years, lying comfortably within 
this timeframe, however the 12year planning process in Delhi is a clear outlier, as shown in 
Figure 6.3. 
 




How cost-effective were Ahmedabad and Delhi?  For comparisons purposes the total cost/km of 
the initial pilot of both systems is compared. These values are contrasted with typical costs 
reported for BRT systems globally in figure 6.4 
 
Figure 6.3.  Comparing BRT unit costs.  Source: Hidalgo and Carrigan, 2010 and CRRI 2012. 
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The initial pilot corridor of the Delhi BRT is estimated to cost the equivalent of US$3.1 million/km.  
This is slightly more than the US$2.3 million/km spent on the initial Ahmedabad BRT corridor, but 
is still well within typical system costs, which range significantly according to system design, from 
US$1.4 million per km (Jakarta) to US$12.5 million per km (Bogota). 
 
6.2.2 Did the project achieve its goals and are use rs satisfied? 
 
To the casual observer there are numerous reasons why the Ahmedabad BRT would be 
perceived as a success, and why the Delhi BRT is considered a failure.  On the surface, the 
Ahmedabad BRT network is more expansive comprising 72 km of corridors. The system is 
enthusiastically supported by the city’s residents and provides a genuine and operational 
transportation alternative for Ahmedabad, with plans underway for continued expansion. In 
contrast, the Delhi corridor remains stalled at it’s initial pilot of length of 5.8km. In the absence of 
additional corridors it operates largely as a stand alone express lane for existing bus service 
accompanied by effective but isolated bikeways and footpaths. Public and political support 
remains fickle, and future BRT plans for the city of Delhi are unclear. 
 
But in many ways comparative analysis of the two schemes has treated the achievements of the 
Delhi BRT unfairly.  From the outset, goals in Delhi and Ahmedabad were quite different. BRT 
planners in Delhi were initially driven by air quality not specific transportation concerns. Unlike 
Ahmedabad, they were not trying to develop an alternative transportation system, but rather 
aimed to demonstrate new ‘models’ or ‘best practices’ for promoting lower-emitting technologies 
such as buses, and NMT modes such as bicycling and walking. This has been forgotten in many 
of the comparisons that have been conducted on the schemes, with outcomes judged unfairly 
against different standards.   
 
With this is mind; it is interesting to revisit key operating performance indicators collected for the 
two cases.   
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Table 6.2.  Comparing operational performance.  
DATA DELHI AHMEDABAD  
Operational length as of Oct 2013 5.8km 72 km 
Bus operation 7am-11pm 6am-11.00pm 
Bus frequency 5-10min 2-4min (peak hr.) 
6-8 min (off peak) 
Bus Ridership 85,000 passengers/day 
 
112,882 passengers/day 
Cyclists 4000-6000 cyclists/day  
(1200/hr at peak) 
unknown 
Pedestrians Peak hour pedestrian volume 
ranges from 130-2000/hour at 
different junctions 
unknown 
Average speed in corridor 16-19km/hr (peak hr.) 25 km/hr 
Average speed off corridor 12-16km/hr (peak hr) 18.7 km/hr 
Travel time savings 19%  7-27%  
Operational critique Corridor is poorly enforced, with 
encroachment of bus and cycle 
lanes, particularly at intersections 
for turning traffic 
Discontinuous cycle path, that is  
inadequate width 
Sources: (CEPT, 2013a; CSIR, 2012; HIdalgo & Pai, 2009; Jaiswal et al., 2012) 
The data in table 6.2 shows that there is a clear gap between the perceived and actual outcomes 
of the BRT system. Though Ahmedabad has generally performed better than Delhi, Delhi’s 
achievements are nonetheless admirable, particularly given its significantly reduced length of 
corridor. For example, in Ahmedabad, BRT ridership is 50% higher than in Delhi, but these 
volumes have been achieved with ten times the network length. Both systems have yielded 
improvements in operational performance of city bus systems with measurable timesavings 
generated for corridor users on both systems. Environmental and safety performance has been 
more difficult to capture.  Air pollution improvements cannot be accurately attributed to BRT 
implementation in either city.  Ahmedabad has realized significant safety improvements recording 
a 28% decline in fatalities and 20% decline in accidents in the first year of BRT operationalization 
(Jaiswal et al., 2012).  Data in Delhi is much more contentious. TRIPP suggests that there is no 
statistical difference in the number of fatalities on the corridor pre and post BRT implementation, 
though argues there has been a gradual decline in traffic accidents since corridor opening. This 
number is disputed by CRRI whose data shows that both fatalities and accidents have increased 
(i.e. safety declined) since BRT operationalization (CSIR, 2012). 
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The final outcome measure we will examine is user satisfaction. Given the information presented, 
it is perhaps not surprising that users of the Ahmedabad BRT view their system favorably.   
Monthly surveys of commuters reveal that users are happy with their system. Over the last three 
years of operation they have ranked the BRT an average of 9 (out of 10) for a range of 
performance and satisfaction criteria.   
 
Contrary to media perception, users of the Delhi BRT are similar to Ahmedabad BRT users in 
their support for their system.  Surveys conducted by CSE in 2008 show that the overwhelming 
proportion of corridor users (83%) – including bus commuters, pedestrians, cyclists, 2 wheeler 
and car commuters – are satisfied with the Delhi BRT and want it to be continued (DIMTS, 2008; 
Nupur, 2012).   
 
 
6.3 Two key messages 
 
 
A comparison of experiences in Delhi and Ahmedabad and evaluation of their respective 
outcomes reveals two key messages. 
 
Firstly, it shows that institutions, politics, design and planning process varied between the two 
schemes.  There is little dispute that the distinctly different institutional and political contexts in 
Ahmedabad and Delhi and the fundamentally different designs selected for the two schemes had 
a substantial influence on the eventual outcomes of the projects.  But my analysis shows that 
there were also significant differences in the planning process between Ahmedabad and Delhi 
and that these differences had its own influence on outcomes. Where the Delhi process was 
sequential, technocratic, slow, isolated, principled and fixed; Ahmedabad was incremental, fast, 
integrated, collaborative, pragmatic and flexible.  Communication in Delhi was interrupted; one-
way and excluded key stakeholders, whereas in Ahmedabad it was continuous, comprehensive 
and interactive.  The sequencing of steps, strategies and tactics employed, and timing of the two 
schemes had an impact on both real and perceived outcomes. 
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There is a second message to emerge from this analysis – that while not the focus of this 
dissertation – is nonetheless worthy of mention.  And this is the realization that there were distinct 
differences between the real and perceived outcomes in Ahmedabad and Delhi that were in many 
ways self-fulfilling.  While general perceptions of the two schemes portray Ahmedabad as a 
success and Delhi a failure, a closer examination of the two cases indicates that both systems 
have performed reasonably.  Ahmedabad exceeds Delhi on most performance and user 
satisfaction metrics, but the achievements of Delhi are nonetheless admirable – particularly if you 
consider its unique objectives.  In hindsight, some of the criticism of Delhi may have been unfair, 
and the universal praise for Ahmedabad premature.  These perceptions however did make a 
difference to the status of current operations of the schemes – ensuring that Janmarg continued 
to expand while Delhi faces a precarious future.  It speaks to the critical importance of both facts 
and perception in managing the planning process.    
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7 PROCESS MATTERS 
 
 
‘…the outcomes of planning, then, are profoundly shaped by choices about 
planning processes and the planner’s role in discussions……Transportation 
planners should take planning processes as seriously as their models, investing 
time on process design and seeking consensual ground rules for discussion”  




Process does matter. The cases presented in this dissertation illustrate how different decisions 
and actions taken during the planning process contributed to different outcomes in Delhi and 
Ahmedabad. In this final chapter I will present additional evidence that suggests my findings 
concerning the importance of process are transferable to other BRT contexts. I present the 
results of an opinion survey of BRT experts who report similar relationships between process and 
outcomes in other BRT projects in cities across the world. 
 
But how does process impact outcomes? And how does an awareness of the influence of 
process contribute to better project design? There is evidence that the planning process has both 
a direct and indirect impact on outcomes. In the second part of this chapter I will elaborate on 
these mechanisms illustrating with examples drawn from the cases. I then return to the three-
dimensional framework conceptualized in chapter 3 to show how it can be used to design a 
‘better’ planning process – one that gives the planner greater control over the project and yields a 
more positive impact on outcomes. The chapter concludes with a discussion of implications of 
these findings for both theory and practice. 
 
7.1 Transferability of findings 
 
The cases presented in chapter 4 and 5 provide compelling evidence for the importance of 
process to outcomes.  But the data used to develop these conclusions is limited to the 
experiences in Delhi and Ahmedabad. To test the validity of my hypothesis to other BRT projects 
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I presented my research conclusions to a group of BRT experts, and then conducted an opinion 
survey to understand their perceptions of the relative role of planning process and project 
variables (i.e. institutions, politics and design) on project outcomes.  A copy of the opinion survey 
is attached in Annexure 1.  Responses were collected from 8 senior experts, who reported on first 
hand experience of 14 individual BRT systems implemented in South America, North America, 
Africa and Asia.  Figure 7.1 shows the countries represented in the survey.   
 
 
Figure 7.1.  BRT systems represented in expert opin ion survey.   
 
The systems represented by the opinion survey adopted a wide range of planning approaches – 
from the ‘Big Bang’ approach employed in Transantiago to more incremental approaches 
representative of systems such as Cali, Colombia. Irrespective of approach adopted, there was 
unanimous agreement from amongst the experts concerning the importance of planning process 
to outcomes in each of the systems reviewed. This suggests my hypothesis has implications 
beyond Delhi and Ahmedabad. 
 
Analysis of expert opinions on elements of the planning process and the nature of project 
variables in each of these systems yields some further interesting, though still nascent findings.   
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It is notable that BRT experts struggled to accurately describe the strategy or approach adopted 
within the planning processes reviewed and there was little agreement on the types of planning 
processes that lead to good outcomes. Additional informal feedback from participants after the 
opinion survey suggested that there is a lack of understanding of the types of planning processes 
that lead to good outcomes, and a desire to better synthesize current experiences. All agreed that 
it is reasonable to expect that different strategies might work in different contexts. 
 
BRT experts had mixed responses concerning the role of timing in the planning process. The 
concept of controlling the ‘moment of action’ was considered in only half of the systems reviewed.  
It was not an issue that attracted much attention.  Trends concerning average duration did comply 
with my prediction. The average duration for the planning process for the systems examined was 
5.8 years. The duration was slightly less, taking 4-5 years for those projects with outcomes 
ranked as good. Though clearly the sample set is still small, it does offer some early support for 
the role of timing in the planning process. 
 
The final questions asked in the opinion survey were aimed at developing an understanding of 
the relative roles of other project variables in project outcomes.  Respondents were asked to rank 
the relative strength (i.e. strong, fair or poor) of the institutions, politics and design in each of the 
systems reviewed. Results are depicted in Figure 7.2. Interestingly, institutional strength ratings 
varied the greatest, and show that BRT projects were developed in a range of institutional 
contexts. Design aspects were almost always (with one exception) ranked either strong or fair. 
This is not surprising given the extensive effort that has been devoted by the BRT community to 
design issues. Political support appeared to be major factor in the development of BRT projects.  
It was ranked strong in all systems with an outcome ranked as good, and was poor for the one 
case where outcome was ranked as poor. This suggests that political support is important for 
success. As shown in Ahmedabad, the planning process can contribute to solidifying and building 




Figure 7. 2. Ratings of project variables (Design, Institutions, Politics).  
 
Findings of the opinion survey should be considered indicative only as the sample set was small, 
self-identified by experts, and questions necessarily subjective. Nevertheless they do represent 
the views of leading experts and practitioners in the field and reflect significant global experience 
with the BRT planning process. The fact that the BRT experts unanimously agreed that the 
planning process impacts outcomes suggests that my findings in Delhi and Ahmedabad may be 
applicable to other BRT systems. Findings related to issues of strategy and timing are more 
tenuous, but were interesting enough to suggest that these elements of the planning process are 
worthy of further investigation. 
 
7.2 Process Mechanisms 
 
The knowledge that planning process impacts outcomes is helpful only if we have an 
understanding of the mechanisms by which this occurs. It is only then that it can be used to 
influence project success.   
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The cases presented in this dissertation offer evidence that the planning process has both a 
direct and indirect impact on outcomes. That is, the planning process indirectly influences 
outcomes through its interaction with project variables (institutions, design and politics), in 
addition to impacting project outcomes directly. Figure 7.3 and 7.4 depicts the indirect and direct 
pathways of influence of the planning process. To understand these mechanisms I will illustrate 
with examples drawn from the experiences in Ahmedabad and Delhi. In practice, the precise 
pathways by which planning process influences outcome is somewhat blurred. At a practical level 
it is impossible to isolate entirely the many and interactive influences. But from a theoretical 
perspective it is useful to distinguish between the direct and indirect pathways of influence.   
 
 
Figure 7.3.  Indirect pathways of influence. 
 
7.2.1 Indirect influence 
 
There are myriad mechanisms by which planning process indirectly impacts outcomes through its 
interaction with the key project variables: design, institutions and political conditions. Actions 
taken during the planning process impact (and are in turn impacted upon) by changing design 
conditions, politics and institutions, that then influence outcomes. For example, in Delhi, the slow 
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pace and extended duration of the planning process weakened its political support by making it 
susceptible to leadership changes and less attractive to possible political proponents, leaving the 
project vulnerable to attacks from a powerful car lobby. Similarly, the fixed and idealistic approach 
that defined the planning process influenced design choices (e.g. reduced motor vehicle lane size, 
selection of highly congested corridor) that made the project more difficult to implement and 
outcomes less successful. Further, the hierarchical relationship of actors and formal lines of 
reporting that characterized the planning process in Delhi acted to impede institutional 
collaboration, contributing to fragmented project ownership even where responsibilities were 
clearly defined, and ultimately isolated design decisions from implementation, weakening project 
outcomes.   
 
Corroborating evidence is offered by the experiences in Ahmedabad. Here, the relatively rapid 
planning process both resulted in, and contributed to sustained political commitment. This 
propelled the project and created a momentum that enabled planners to overcome minor 
missteps without jeopardizing outcomes. Likewise, the flexible pragmatic approach to the 
planning process led to design choices that were more easily implementable. This ensured that 
project objectives were realistic and outcomes successful. The incremental strategy employed in 
the planning process allowed the project to be pursued in smaller, more achievable steps that 
required less institutional capacity. It also gave institutions the time to gauge, adjust and respond 
to changing circumstances or emerging issues. Finally, the informal, collaborative lines of 
reporting between institutions facilitated quick and more responsive decision-making.  
Incrementalism and informality thus improved outcomes indirectly through it’s influence and 






7.2.2 Direct influence 
 
Figure 7.4.  Direct pathways of influence.  
 
The impact of planning process on outcomes can also be direct. The cases offer some 
illustrations of how this might occur. For example, in Delhi, it can be argued that the fixed 
idealistic nature of the planning process - independent of its affects on design choices - made 
planners less aware of growing disenfranchisement of motor vehicle users and hampered their 
response to protests. This failure to respond was instrumental in the demise of the system in 
Delhi.  Similarly, the discontinuous nature of the communication campaign  (an important 
component of the strategy and tactics dimension of the planning process) exhibited direct and 
detrimental consequences for project outcomes in Delhi. In contrast, the adaptive, incremental 
and pragmatic planning approach employed in Ahmedabad incorporated many opportunities for 
feedback. This gave planners in Ahmedabad an advantage when problems emerged (which they 
did), allowing them to respond in ways that still maintained desired outcomes. 
 
7.3 A Three Dimensional Perspective of the Planning  Process 
 
 
So far, this chapter has demonstrated the influence of planning process on outcomes and 
elaborated on the mechanism by which this is achieved. This evidence suggests that the planning 
process should be treated as an important project variable alongside design, institutions and 
political support and thus should be carefully formulated as an integral part of the project 
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development process. But the power to craft the planning process in a way that optimizes project 
results relies on a broader understanding of this process. There is a need to look beyond the 
traditional representation of the planning process as a one-dimensional series of steps. In chapter 
3 I introduced a new conceptualization of the planning process that reflected not just ‘what’ 
occurs (e.g. identify alternatives, evaluate and select preferred solution etc.), but also considers 
‘how’ and ‘when’ the process occurs.  Figure 7.5 depicts diagrammatically this three dimensional 
perspective. 
 
Figure 7.5.  Three-dimensional model of the plannin g process.  
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The BRT experiences in Delhi and Ahmedabad differed significantly in terms of each of these 
dimensions. Where Delhi was sequential, slow, fixed and idealistic, Ahmedabad was incremental, 
fast, flexible and pragmatic. This resulted in entirely different outcomes for the two schemes.  The 
model presented in Figure 7.5 can be used in this manner to capture the complexity of the 
planning process and support ex-post project analysis. The most useful application of the model 
however is as a tool for informing the design of the planning process with each axis representing 




In a normative rational model the ‘steps’ of a planning process follow a fixed sequence starting 
with problem analysis; identification and evaluation of alternatives; design; implementation; and 
finish with feedback. In practice however the steps involved in a planning process may look quite 
different with the content and sequencing of steps varying between contexts and projects. There 
are few cases I can envisage where the process will be entirely linear as described above. 
Instead the planning process is more likely to be circular or iterative whereby particular steps are 
revisited and repeated and/or occur in parallel. It is conceivable for example that some 
construction activities commence prior to completion of design, as it did in Ahmedabad. Likewise, 
the content of each step may vary. For example the type of analysis used to select between 
alternatives; or the process of alternative identification; may involve different degrees of 
community engagement depending on the specific features and context of the project. In 
Ahmedabad, each step of the planning process – from concept through to operationalization – 
involved community participation, whereas the content of the Delhi process was much more 
technically focused. To some extent the content and sequencing of process will derive from the 
planning process strategy (refer to discussion in 7.3.3). From a process design perspective 
however, the important issue is to be deliberate in the selection of both content and sequencing. 
Though this does not need to be fixed upfront, a stronger planning process is one where planners 
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have contemplated possible scenarios and made clear choices concerning process content and 




There are two elements of timing that need to be considered in the design of the planning 
process. The first concerns the ‘moment of action’ – or the point in time at which key actions or 
project milestones are undertaken and how they interact and complement other activities or 
events. The second relates to the duration of the planning process. 
 
MOMENT OF ACTION.   Where possible project design and operationalization should be linked 
to local events or sector initiatives. The expanded political and financial support and public and 
private momentum this generates contributes to better project outcomes. In Ahmedabad, 
planners took care to time incremental corridor openings with local events. For example, the 
Kankaria Lake Loop was opened to coincide with the Kankaria festival and re-opening of the 
recreational area. Similarly, smaller corridor lengths were opened to coincide with important 
conferences and other state and city showcase events. Planners can (and should) explore and 
identify synergies between their proposal and other initiatives, looking for opportunities to 
leverage support by forming alliances with events, activities and programs within and outside 
sectoral boundaries, across levels of government, as well as inside and outside government.   
 
DURATION.  The second critical element of timing involves the ‘duration’ of action – defined as 
the time from initial project concept through to operationalization. The length of time that the 
process takes has a significant impact on action. Protracted planning processes reduce 
momentum by diluting existing support, and increasing the susceptibility of the process to 
changing leadership. Conversely, rushed processes run the risk of overlooking important 
considerations resulting in flawed design and implementation decisions. As a general rule, the 
faster a project can be completed the better. This is supported by the results of the BRT opinion 
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survey that showed that higher performing projects tended to average shorter durations. The 
planner has a role in striking the right balance of haste versus comprehensiveness in the planning 
process. This balance may be different for different stages in the planning process. For example, 
strong political disagreements may need to be dealt with through an elongated period of concept 
development to forge in-principle agreements, that may then be compensated for by faster design 
and implementation schedules. Alternately, if delays are faced on certain aspects of design, then 
efforts may need to be temporarily diverted in the interest of maintaining momentum. This 
approach was effectively used by Ahmedabad when faced with flooding issues along segments of 
the phase I network. Rather then hold up phase I works, planners substituted proposed phase II 
segments for these lengths. A similar ‘sidestep’ occurred when political issues emerged around 
mosque and temple relocations. Design and construction effort was re-diverted to other corridor 
segments until relocation negotiations had been satisfactorily resolved. An understanding of 
these trade-offs, and a willingness to adapt to maintain project momentum should be incorporated 
into the design of the planning process. 
 
7.3.3 Strategy and Tactics 
 
The final dimension of the planning process to be considered in project development concerns 
strategy and tactics. Though there are many elements of strategy, we use it in this analysis to 
describe the ‘style’ or approach to planning process, nature of actor interaction and 
communication strategy. Tactics are a subcomponent of strategy that refers to specific 
techniques employed78. They represent possible ‘tools’ for applying strategy they may have 
broader application. An important part of designing the planning process is to explicitly identify the 
strategy and tactics that will be used.   
 
STRATEGY. Different projects will require different strategies. For example, where a project 
involves relatively untested technology it may be prudent to develop a strategy that is more 
                                                        
78
 Though techniques may be used at any stage of the planning process, the cases examined in this 
research provide examples associated with project launch and communication campaign in particular.   
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incremental overall, to rely on informal and collaborative work arrangements, and to focus on 
public education.  This strategy was effectively employed in Ahmedabad and was successful in 
building broad spread support and understanding of the system helping it to overcome skepticism 
associated with the technology and Delhi’s prior experience. There is a considerable body of 
practice that offers concrete examples of strategies that might be effective in different contexts, 
however there is currently limited research directed towards understanding how different 
strategies and techniques in different contexts translate to different outcomes (E. R. Alexander; 
Bryson et al., 1990; Bryson & Crosby, 1989). In the context of the Ahmedabad and Delhi cases 
we might conclude that iterative, incremental and pragmatic approaches work better for BRT.  But 
much will depend on precise context and experience with the BRT technology. A more systematic 
approach to collecting and evaluating experience in this area would enable planners to more 
effectively design the planning process to suit changing contexts and improve the likelihood of 
project success.  
 
TACTICS.  Different projects will also demand different tactics or techniques. The experiences in 
Delhi and Ahmedabad reveal a host of interesting techniques that could be usefully applied in 
other contexts. For example, using branding to distinguish the BRT, investing time and finances 
into free trial periods, proactively engaging the media, establishing two-way communication loops 
that allow easy feedback and the construction of prototypes and public exhibitions of proposals. 
The appropriate application of techniques however is currently hampered by a lack of 
dissemination of experiences across the BRT community, study of relative effectiveness or 
understanding of applicable contexts. Just like the discussion concerning process strategy, this 






7.4 Implications of findings and future research 
 
Drawing on empirical evidence offered by case studies of the BRT planning process for two cities 
in India, I have presented an argument for the importance of process to outcomes.  My findings 
offer an alternative framework for understanding and designing the understudied planning 
process. What are the implications of my research for planning theory? How might the process 
frameworks developed in my work be applied in practice?  I conclude my dissertation by 
addressing these important questions. 
 
Before embarking on this discussion however, I must highlight that speculation about the 
consequences of my research is somewhat premature.  Drawn from a dataset of two cases my 
findings are necessarily preliminary and need to be tested for robustness and broader 
applicability.  This could be done by developing additional case studies in other BRT cities to 
confirm consistency of findings in India.  A second stage of research could then examine case 
studies in other BRT countries to test for applicability of findings to other regions.  A final stage of 
research could investigate whether findings apply more broadly to other infrastructure sectors.79.  
With this important caveat in mind, it is interesting to explore implications of my research for 
theory and practice.  My hypothesis is that process matters   – that the way things are done 
impacts outcomes.  This recognition demands a broadening of the scope of current planning 
theory to incorporate fuller consideration of the planning process and a more deliberate 
understanding of its multiple dimensions. 
  
In chapter two I described how planning theory has historically been pre-occupied with defining 
and evaluating alternative models of planning (Banister, 2002; Dimitriou, 1990, 2011; Meyer & 
Miller, 1984).  These ‘planning models’ define ‘approaches’ to formulating plans.  They comprise 
many variants including rational comprehensive planning, advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1965), 
                                                        
79 As discussed in section 7.1, initial indications from BRT experts suggest that findings might be similar for 
other BRT projects, but further research investment is required to confirm the importance of planning 
process to BRT project outcomes in other cities in India and beyond.  It would also be interesting to test 
whether planning process has broader implications by conducting case studies in other infrastructure 
sectors. 
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equity planning (Krumholz, 1982) and communicative action planning (Healey, 1996; Innes, 1995)  
– to name but a few.  Planning models are conceptual in nature and tend to be limited in scope to 
a discussion of approaches for reaching agreement on desired outcomes.  For the most part, 
planning models can be described mechanically and are removed from context.  They do not 
provide direction on how or what actions are required to bring about the agreed results, and 
universally omit consideration of the often-contentious implementation process.  
 
Another dominant strand of planning theory has examined the relative importance of political 
versus technical concerns in planning decisions (Altshuler, 1965; Beckman, 1964; Davidoff, 1965; 
Flyvbjerg, 1998; Krumholz, 1982).  However, like planning models, the debate is highly 
conceptual, removed from context, and tends to be limited to the analysis of power balances and 
fixated on upstream decision making processes.  Despite conceptual agreement on approaches 
to, and influences on the planning process, there remains limited guidance within planning theory 
on how to choose between alternative planning models, or how to apply different models and 
appropriately incorporate political and power imbalances.   Further, downstream portions of the 
planning process, such as design and implementation phases receive limited attention despite 
their significant impact on outcomes. 
 
My research expands the scope of planning theory by introducing ‘process’ as a theoretical 
construct to augment our understanding of planning ‘models’ and political influence.   In the 
context of my dissertation I have defined the planning process as all activities, actions and 
decisions involved in project (program or policy) development from initial concept through to 
operationalization.  It includes the setting of objectives, strategies, establishment of institutions 
and policies as well as design and implementation, from the very start to the end of the project.   
By defining the planning process as a distinct concept I address a gap in the literature in two 
ways.  First, by looking beyond broad concepts or models to the details of the planning process I 
provide more practical and actionable guidance on planning.  Secondly, by expanding the 
discussion beyond the upstream decision-making I ensure consideration of the entire planning 
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process – including critical design and implementation phases.  My research thus offers more 
specific guidance not just on reaching agreement about a plan, but also on how to move forward 
past the plan towards an intended outcome.  It also recognizes that the planning process is 
detailed, interactive and political and will require techniques for working with clients and 
constituents (Talvittie, 2008).   
 
The ‘planning process’ as I have defined it is thus distinct and complementary to normative 
models of planning offered in the literature.  The planning process will look different for different 
models of planning in different contexts under different political conditions.  By defining the 
planning process, and analyzing practical experiences in executing planning processes, 
practitioners can improve their methods for navigating a selected model of planning and consider 
alternate ways of incorporating political influence. Of course, the precise form of the planning 
process will remain contingent on context.  This precludes the development of prescriptive 
recommendations on how to pursue a particular planning process. Instead, my research identifies 
key elements that should be considered as planning proceeds and evolves.  My findings suggest 
that the planning process be considered in three dimensions.  This requires looking beyond 
traditional one-dimensional representations that limit the planning process to decisions regarding 
content and sequencing of steps.  Instead planners should consider as part of the planning 
process the strategy and tactics to be employed as well timing of interventions – both ‘moment of 
action’ and duration.  By understanding and ‘crafting’ these dimensions of the planning process, 
planners can improve project outcomes. 
 
The ability for a planner to ‘craft’ the planning process assumes that the planner has agency, or 
some form of control or decision making power in the planning process.   This assumption of 
agency has remained implicit throughout this discussion and requires some attention. The degree 
of agency given to a planner will clearly vary by circumstance, and in some instances may be 
extremely limited due to structural constraints and/or existing power structures.   While it is naive 
to assume that the planner will be able to act with full autonomy, it is equally incorrect to discount 
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entirely his or her ability to influence outcomes, even in the most constrained of circumstances.  
Without agency, there can be no planning, just predetermined outcomes.  The very act of 
implementing a plan is a sign of agency – or ability to influence outcomes towards agreed ends.  
The profession of planning thus relies on this presumption of agency.  Mandelbaum, Mazza and 
Burchell (1996) summarize well the views of their planning colleagues on issues of agency and 
process.  They support my hypothesis by suggesting that not only is agency a reasonable and 
broadly held assumption in planning, but that the planning process is of central importance 
because it is where planners execute key decisions: 
 
“..virtually all members of the community of theoreticians represent planning as some sort 
of process in which individual or collective agents exercise discretion:  They choose to do 
A (whether it is a simple momentary act or a complex behavioral chain over extended 
time) in a field in which it always is possible to select at least one other alternative.  The 
modes of choice are planning processes and are the central concern of the theorizing 
community.” (Mandelbaum, Mazza and Burchell 1996, p xvi.) 
 
To this point I have shown how my findings contribute to current theories of planning and 
reconciled the subject of my research – the planning process – with normative models of planning 
and political discourse.  But what are the implications of my research for theory and practice? 
 
At a theoretical level my research on planning process argues for a broadening and deepening of 
current theoretical debate.  While planning literature acknowledges the importance of process, 
few if any, have investigated the consequences of this reality.  My research addresses this gap by 
introducing the planning process as a new distinct construct that is more detailed, actionable and 
extensive in coverage than traditional discourse centered on planning models and political 
influence.  A focus on the planning process extends planners attention beyond plan preparation 
to acknowledge and incorporate important and influential downstream actions and activities that 
occur during design and implementation phases.  A focus on the planning process also offers a 
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more actionable type of theory that bridges the widely recognized gap between planning theory 
and practice (Albrechts,2003; Flyvbjerg,1996; Hall, 2002).  
 
At a more practical level my research demonstrates the importance of planning process and 
articulates a three dimensional framework for understanding this process better.  This framework 
empowers planners by identifying tools for influencing project outcomes.  This can be done by 
employing specific strategy or tactics, capitalizing on timing, or rethinking content and sequencing 
of steps.  The framework can also be used to help evaluate planning processes, by isolating 
variables and linking different planning process decisions to different outcomes in different 
contexts.  For example, the two case studied in this dissertation suggest some approaches that 
have worked in their specific context. It would be interesting to expand this analysis to other 
projects to isolate approaches that are more or less successful in different circumstances.  This 
would inform the design of future planning process for BRT projects – with possible implications 
for other infrastructure projects and beyond.     
 
In the introduction I compared the planning process to playing a round of poker.  I would now like 
to return to this metaphor.  Assume that our project variables - institutions, design and political 
will/leadership - are the cards that we are dealt, and the planning process reflects how the hand is 
played.  All good poker players understand that most hands have the potential to be winners.  
They invest considerable effort into developing their ‘craft’ of playing poker.  I believe it is time 
that planners invest equally in their craft – learning to play their cards - and grant the overlooked 









Name of respondent (optional): 
BRT System Name, City, Country: 
 
 
BRT ELEMENTS:  
How would you rank the following elements of the BRT system? 
 (circle appropriate response) 
 
• Institutions    STRONG FAIR  WEAK 
 
• Design   STRONG FAIR  POOR 
 
• Political Support  STRONG FAIR  POOR 
 





• Duration (How many years from concept to operationalization?): 
 
• Moment of Action (Did one or more project milestones align with initiatives in transport and 
other sectors? )  Circle   YES   or    NO 
 




Incremental  Big Bang  Pragmatic  Comprehensive 
 
Sequential  Planned  Iterative Opportunistic 
 





• Were there distinctive features of the planning process that contributed to project 
outcomes (good or bad)?   Circle   YES  or  NO. 
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